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 3 
1 Overview 
1.1 Executive Summary 
 
Concluding an in-service evaluation of two new turbulence detection technologies 
developed in the Turbulence Prediction and Warning Systems (TPAWS) element 
of the NASA Aviation Safety and Security Program’s Weather Accident Prevention 
Project (WxAP), this report documents Delta’s experience working with the 
technologies, feedback gained from pilots and dispatchers concerning current 
turbulence techniques and procedures, and Delta’s recommendations regarding 
directions for further efforts by the research community. 
 
Technologies evaluated included an automatic airborne turbulence encounter 
reporting technology called the Turbulence Auto PIREP System (TAPS), and a 
significant enhancement to the ability of modern airborne weather radars to predict 
and display turbulence of operational significance, called E-Turb radar. 
 
The in-service evaluation validated the two technologies as enablers for aviation 
safety improvements, and revealed to Delta the negative impact of turbulence on 
airspace capacity, airline economics, and environmental concerns.  Representing 
a subset of weather constraints affecting airspace utilization and responsible for 
excessive fuel burn and emissions, lack of high quality, comprehensive information 
on turbulence stands as a significant challenge facing the Next Generation Air 
Traffic System (NGATS).  The use of better data as result of improved detection 
technologies is therefore seen as a key enabler to increasing the safety of flight, 
easing airspace restrictions, and reducing the environmental impacts of air travel, 
forming the basis for the recommendations that follow in Section 5. 
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1.2 Statement of Work Deliverables 
1.2.1 In-Service Evaluation of TAPS – Task 1 
1.2.1.1 Analysis of Questionnaire responses 
1.2.1.1.1 Procedures used by dispatchers to identify turbulence 
1.2.1.1.2 Procedures used by dispatchers to identify aircraft for avoiding turbulence 
and approach used to establish the change 
1.2.1.1.3 Nature of collaboration between dispatchers and pilots to arrive at a plan of 
action 
1.2.1.1.4 Dispatcher estimates of benefits realized from the TAPS system 
1.2.1.2 Provide raw data for questionnaires 
1.2.1.3 Provide log of events for TAPS 
1.2.2 In-Service Evaluation of E-Turb Radar – Task 2 
1.2.2.1 Analysis of Questionnaire responses 
1.2.2.1.1 Procedures used by pilots to identify turbulence 
1.2.2.1.2 Procedures used by pilots to issue a request for avoiding turbulence and 
approach to establish the change 
1.2.2.1.3 Nature of collaboration between dispatchers and pilots to arrive at a plan of 
action 
1.2.2.1.4 Pilot and Dispatcher estimates of benefits realized from the E-Turb system 
1.2.2.2 Provide raw data for questionnaires 
1.2.2.3 Provide correlation data 
1.2.3 Recommendations for Further Efforts – Task 4 
1.2.3.1 Report documenting the turbulence requirements of the airlines and how they 
meet the needs for the NGATS based on three years of experience with two 
turbulence technologies. 
1.2.3.1.1 Overview describing the current state of how turbulence effects the daily 
operation of the airlines as well as the technical and economic drivers in 
dealing with turbulence as a subset of weather 
1.2.3.1.2 Specific recommendations for areas of research based on end users, 
targeted toward pilots and dispatchers with consideration of the 
requirements including controllers as defined by NGATS Integrated Plan 
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1.3 Background 
 
The problem of turbulence has long plagued the aviation business.  Relying on 
what has historically amounted to a very sparse dataset of winds, temperatures 
and pilot reports (PIREPs) to populate forecasts and warnings, it now stands as 
the last major weather-related safety challenge facing large commercial aircraft.1  
Turbulence is the leading cause of passenger and crew injuries today, resulting in 
$26 million in related annual expenses to US airlines.2  However, the economic 
consequences of turbulence that are not related to safety are perhaps even more 
startling.  A study conducted by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 
initially calculated that the annual cost to US airlines of airframe inspections, 
delays, cancellations and diversions due to turbulence exceeded $750 million,3 
although a subsequent analysis put these costs at about $100 million.  In addition, 
because users lack good tools to define these hazards, other costs due to the 
conscientious but probably overly conservative avoidance of turbulence could be 
even higher, and receive major attention later in this document. 
 
Following a series of flight experiments demonstrating the fundamental technical 
success of TAPS and E-Turb radar on the NASA B-757 research aircraft, NASA 
approached Delta Air Lines in late 2003, proposing an in-service evaluation of 
these technologies.  While further demonstrating the technical performance of the 
two technologies, the need for aviation operational experience with these concepts 
was needed.  Focusing on TAPS and E-Turb radar as technologies to reduce 
injuries related to turbulence as a goal of the WxAP program, the in-service 
evaluation was underway with Delta participation in early 2004.  Additionally, the 
TPAWS development partners were granted open access to the airline’s 
operational personnel. 
 
Although this report does discuss some of the high level technical results obtained 
from the in-service evaluation, the official source for technical results and 
descriptions can be found in the proceedings of the 5th annual NASA WxAP 
Review held at Williamsburg, Virginia in September of 2005. 
 
Through January of 2006, the technical merits of both systems were further 
validated, and as documented in Appendices C and D of this report, Delta 
dispatchers and pilots provided valuable operational feedback regarding both 
technologies. 
 
                                                
1 August 2003 National Aviation Weather Program Mid-Course Assessment.  This analysis 
delineated weather-related risks facing various segments of the aviation marketplace (general 
aviation, business aviation, air taxi, air carriers etc.). 
2 B. Campbell and S. Borener, US DOT/Volpe Center, Cambridge, MA, AIAA-2004-6395. AIAA 4th 
Aviation Technology, Integration and Operations (ATIO) Forum, Chicago, Illinois, September 2004  
3 Ibid. 
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1.4 Technology Description 
 
Using the existing sensors on most modern commercial airliners, the Turbulence 
Auto PIREP System (TAPS) is an event driven turbulence encounter reporting 
mechanism that uses airborne “g” load measurements to indicate the aircraft 
severity response.  Upon encountering a turbulence incident that exceeds a pre-
determined acceleration threshold, a report of the aircraft response, in rms “g,” is 
automatically downlinked to a groundstation for dissemination among various user 
groups.  Compared to current voice reports of turbulence by pilots, TAPS has the 
advantage of providing more turbulence reporting data in a more accurate and 
timely manner.  Also, since TAPS reports include real time information on the peak 
“g” loads that were encountered, maintenance personnel can use TAPS to assist 
in determining the necessity and complexity of airframe inspections following 
turbulence encounters. 
 
Minimizing the datalink expenses associated with TAPS reports was viewed as an 
important element of the in-service evaluation.  Therefore, the minimum threshold 
for reports to be generated was approximately .1 rms “g.”  The technical 
performance of the TAPS algorithm was also perceived by developers to be 
degraded any time that flaps were deployed, which typically occurs below 10,000 
feet MSL.  Given these considerations and the fact that passengers are usually 
seated with their seatbelts fastened below 10,000 feet, reports were inhibited from 
being generated below 9500 feet above Mean Sea Level (MSL). 
 
Although current generation airborne weather radar units have a function whereby 
particulate-based turbulence can be presented in the color magenta over radar 
echoes, for a number of reasons, the system rarely presents accurate, reliable 
information.  The E-Turb radar is a major enhancement which predicts an aircraft’s 
hazard response to atmospheric attributes detected by weather radar and displays 
the severity level and location. This technology a was prototype implemented in a 
Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 Multiscan radar unit, which includes capabilities such 
as automatic tilt, ground clutter suppression, and automatic gain compensation.  
This automation proved critical to the functionality of the E-Turb during the in-
service evaluation. 
 
In order to present information on turbulence resulting in degraded ride quality as 
well as turbulence constituting a potential hazard, the E-Turb technology is 
capable of displaying two levels of turbulence intensity in the standard color 
magenta.  E-Turb software inputs specific aircraft flight parameters, including 
weight, to determine the aircraft’s predicted response, and has an operational 
range of about 25 nautical miles ahead of the aircraft.  The lower threshold of 
turbulence, representing turbulence predicted to result in an aircraft response of at 
least .09 rms “g” but less than .15 rms “g” (representing a change in vertical “g” of 
approximately .2 to .4), was presented on the display as a pattern of speckled 
magenta, while all turbulence predicted to result in an aircraft response greater 
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than or equal to .15 rms “g” (a change in vertical “g” of about .4 or greater) was 
presented as solid magenta. 
 
While .15 rms “g” was decided as the threshold for solid magenta, this does not 
represent a level of turbulence that is necessarily hazardous.  Rather, setting the 
threshold at this level captured more data to observe operational responses as 
part of the in-service evaluation.  In guidance to crews, solid magenta was 
described as advisory information representing turbulence of moderate or greater 
intensity. 
 
It is important to note that both technologies use the rms “g” quantity to determine 
and report turbulence hazard severity, making the technologies consistent for 
aircraft responses to turbulence. 
 
1.5 TAPS Evaluation: History and Overview 
 
Beginning in early 2004, project personnel worked extensively with Delta 
dispatchers and meteorologists to refine display and functionality requirements for 
a web-based display of real time TAPS reports that could be presented at these 
groups’ workstations.  During the summer of 2004, all 71 of Delta’s Boeing 737-
800 aircraft were outfitted with the TAPS software, and began transmitting TAPS 
reports to groundstations based on rms “g” threshold exceedances.  A web based 
flight following product was first utilized as the platform for selected dispatchers to 
begin viewing graphical TAPS data.  This “beta version” of the display provided a 
real-time feed of TAPS information, and those dispatchers viewing the data gave 
feedback on their likes and dislikes to help fine tune the display. 
 
In 2005, all 21 of Delta’s 767-400ER aircraft, as well as 31 of its Boeing 767-
300ERs, were outfitted with TAPS.  Additionally, the ability to automatically uplink 
TAPS data to other equipped aircraft was demonstrated in these later iterations of 
the TAPS software.  These uplinks were transparent to ground-based users and 
flight crews, and technical success was demonstrated. 
 
Given the scarcity of conventional PIREPs and just some minor criticisms 
concerning the WebASD display, reactions to the information provided by TAPS 
were so positive that those dispatchers looking at WebASD began requesting that 
it be deployed among the entire dispatch group.  The project team therefore 
decided to make a newly refined display of TAPS on WebASD available to all 135 
dispatchers.  In addition, a 30-minute segment introducing the group to TAPS was 
incorporated as part of recurrent training for all dispatchers throughout the summer 
of 2005.  Also, by August 31, 2005, more than 35,000 TAPS reports had been 
made by more than 15,000 Delta flights.4 
 
                                                
4 Robinson, Paul A. “Turbulence Auto PIREP System In-Service Evaluation,” NASA’s 5th WxAP 
Review, September, 2005. 
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Dispatchers continued to use and give qualitative feedback regarding the 
technology through the conclusion of the program in January of 2006.  It is 
important to note that the information in Appendix C documents only those uses of 
TAPS data between 1 June 2005 and 31 January 2006 of which Delta project 
personnel were aware, and is therefore not necessarily comprehensive.  
Nevertheless, given frequent visits to the Operations Control Center by project 
personnel and dialogue with various members of the dispatch group, it represents 
a highly accurate overall picture of the extent to which TAPS was used. 
1.6 E-Turb Radar Evaluation: History and Overview 
 
In March of 2004, a Rockwell Collins Multiscan WXR-2100 radar unit was installed 
on one Delta Boeing 737-800 as the platform for the E-Turb radar enhancement.  
A Delta Flight Crew Bulletin was issued to all 737-800 pilots in advance of the 
installation, and crews became familiar with the automated functionality of the unit 
over an approximately 5-month period.  The E-Turb radar was certified and 
installed as a software enhancement in August of 2004.  Another Flight Crew 
Bulletin explaining the E-Turb functionality had also been drafted and issued prior 
to its installation, and an onboard supplement was written for further reference by 
flight crews on the aircraft. 
 
As evaluations got underway, system performance – both quantitative and 
qualitative – was gauged by a variety of methods.  The Multiscan radar transceiver 
incorporated a data logger that automatically recorded the radar picture presented 
to flight crews any time the radar detected and displayed levels of E-Turb 
magenta.  In addition, whenever the weather + turbulence mode on the radar was 
selected by the flight crew (regardless of the presence of E-Turb magenta levels), 
the data logger recorded the g loads that the airplane encountered for comparison 
against a recorded radar picture, which aided tremendously in evaluating 
quantitative system performance.  Pilots could also opt to record encounters with 
weather that they deemed worthy of analysis by the project team.  All recordings 
were periodically downloaded for analysis.  Results proved impressive, and are 
summarized in a histogram that appears in Section 3. 
 
Qualitative feedback on the performance of both the Multiscan radar and E-Turb 
magenta was solicited via paper questionnaires on the flight deck, ACARS 
messages, jumpseat observations by personnel assigned to the project, and direct 
contact via phone and email correspondence with Delta’s representatives at 
company headquarters. These results, which are overwhelmingly positive, are 
documented in detail as Appendix D. 
 
1.7 Evaluation Elements and Questionnaire Methodology 
 
Throughout the various phases of deploying TAPS on WebASD among 
dispatchers, Delta project personnel obtained general feedback concerning the 
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system, as well as documentation of times when TAPS data were used within the 
operation through frequent visits to the Delta Operations Control Center (OCC).  
Data in Appendix C log all discussion that project personnel had with dispatchers 
and meteorologists concerning the system, all known inquiries from pilots 
regarding TAPS data, as well as all known uses of TAPS between June of 2005 
and January of 2006.  Because TAPS was not integrated into the applications 
most referenced by dispatchers, uses of the system usually led to the involvement 
of project personnel.  An explicit request was also made that users make project 
personnel aware of any times when TAPS was used operationally.  So although it 
was impossible to capture all uses of TAPS among 135 dispatchers, what is 
documented would seem to approach a comprehensive account.  Of particular 
interest in Appendix C are a few applications of TAPS data in some higher profile 
turbulence encounters that resulted in airframe inspections and injuries. 
 
Qualitative feedback concerning uses of E-Turb radar that occurred during the in-
service evaluation is captured in Appendix D.  Contents in this section catalogue 
all input concerning the performance of the Multiscan radar, and subsequently the 
combined performance of the Multiscan and E-Turb magenta for all entries after 
8/21/04.  Each entry represents input captured via (1) hard copy questionnaires 
that were available on the flight deck and mailed to project personnel, (2) phone 
conversations with pilots who used the radar during encounters with convective 
weather, (3) detailed observations by project personnel occupying the jumpseat, 
and (4) information regarding system performance that was sent via ACARS for 
review by project personnel. 
1.7.1 Questionnaire Development 
 
Formal questionnaires soliciting related input were also developed.  Two separate 
questionnaires document recent feedback gained from 50 Delta dispatchers and 
20 Delta pilots regarding their prior experiences working with TAPS and E-Turb, 
respectively, as well as input from both groups on current turbulence tools, 
procedures, and related areas needing improvement.  Personnel assigned to this 
work within Delta led the development of the questionnaires.   Peer input on 
content was sought from all other in-service evaluation participants, and Dr. Amy 
Pritchett of the Georgia Institute of Technology was consulted for an academic 
review.  Both questionnaires contained a majority of open-ended questions, and 
while this proved more difficult in analysis, it also yielded a richness and range of 
input that would not otherwise have been captured. 
 
As reported in NASA’s 5th WxAP Review on September 21, 2005,5 current 
turbulence encounters are grossly under reported, and those PIREPS that actually 
are given are late, subjective, and not distributed to all users.  In that same review, 
pilots’ qualitative feedback validated the quantitative data obtained from the E-
Turb radar, showing good correlation between turbulence warning and in-situ 
                                                
5 Robinson, Paul A. “Enhanced Turbulence Radar In-Service Evaluation,” and “Turbulence Auto 
PIREP System In-Service Evaluation,” September, 2005. 
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measurements of aircraft response.  While also adding depth around these 
findings, the purpose of the questionnaires was to capture operational experience 
and feedback on uses of TAPS and E-Turb radar.  In addition, through questions 
on current state activities, additional foundation for hypotheses regarding 
potentials in the realms of capacity enhancements and operational efficiencies 
were provided. 
 
The general sections are described below, and follow a similar format for both 
groups so that comparisons could be made.  Questions on respondents’ 
backgrounds were also included to compare individual feedback against 
experience levels and types of experiences.  Ultimately, however, these 
differences appeared insignificant given consistent answers on most questions. 
1.7.1.1 General Turbulence Resources and Procedures (Section 1) 
The main goal of this section was to determine the tools currently used by pilots 
and dispatchers, how often they are used, and the value of each one for the user. 
To further clarify current uses of turbulence information, we asked the two groups 
to define the most relevant data set for different phases of flight in a convective 
and clear air environment.  A second goal in this section was to determine how 
often flights deviated from their original flight plan and the drivers for this decision. 
1.7.1.2 Scenario-based Questions (Section 2) 
 
This section was designed to present actual scenarios that occurred during the in 
service evaluation.  Subjects were asked to respond based on their experience 
with the technologies during the evaluation period, which lasted from August of 
2005 through January of 2006.  The intent was to gauge whether the technologies 
were thought to be capable enough to change their normal behavior relative to 
turbulence. 
 
1.7.1.3 Historical Uses of the Technologies (Section 3) 
 
This section was designed to capture the subjects’ reaction to the technologies 
based on previous uses in operations.  They were asked to evaluate the 
technology based on how often they used it and how valuable it was in various 
situations. 
1.7.2 Selection of Respondents 
1.7.2.1 Dispatchers 
 
Participation in the dispatcher questionnaire was solicited via a group email sent to 
all 135 Delta dispatchers, and the first 50 respondents expressing interest were 
included as subjects.  This represented a statistically significant sample. 
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1.7.2.2 Pilots 
  
Participation in the pilot questionnaire among Boeing 737-800 pilots was targeted 
towards those who had had experience using the E-Turb radar in convective 
weather, and participants were similarly included on a first-come, first-served 
basis.  Although the pilot subject sample (20) was much smaller relative to the 
general 737-800 pilot population (800+), participation in the questionnaire was, 
again, limited to those pilots who had flight experience with the E-Turb radar. 
1.7.3 Administration of Questionnaires 
 
To encourage candor, all responses were anonymous.  Questionnaires were 
administered via fifteen, two-hour sessions led by Delta project personnel, allowing 
participants to ask questions and request clarification as needed.  No group was 
larger than five subjects.  All questions in the questionnaire were read aloud by 
Delta project personnel, and respondents were asked to write in their answers only 
one question at a time before the group moved onto the next question. 
1.7.4 Limitations of the Questionnaires 
 
Though unavoidable, some limitations in the questionnaire data need to be 
considered. Feedback on uses of TAPS information by dispatchers is constrained 
by the fact that the questionnaires were administered several months after active 
work on the program concluded on January 31, 2006.  Dispatchers continued to 
have access to the display of TAPS reports through approximately June of 2006.  
Based on answers given in the questionnaire, however, the time between the last 
day that the average dispatcher accessed TAPS and the day that the 
questionnaire was administered during November of 2006 was 9 months. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the questionnaire was designed to compensate 
for this.  Section 1 was meant to determine uses of current turbulence information 
(not including TAPS) and how often flights deviated from their original flight plan.  
Section 2 was meant to determine if the technologies were thought to be capable 
enough to change respondents’ normal behavior relative to turbulence.  The 
sample size was large enough to achieve exposure sufficient to inform answers in 
this section.  Also, results consistently showed that based on an introduction to the 
technology during recurrent training sessions, as well as at least 5 months of 
exposure to the technology, subjects would indeed change their normal approach 
to turbulence if given TAPS information.  Section 3 was used to evaluate TAPS 
from the standpoint of specific historical uses.  Even though the average 
dispatcher recalled having the display of TAPS reports available only 12% of the 
time, responses indicated that this was mostly due to problems accessing and 
interacting with the display platform used for presentation of TAPS data, rather 
than the fact that the questionnaires were administered several months after the 
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conclusion of the program.  General comments showed overall support for the 
technology, but complained about interfaces for the data. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the pilot sample was relatively small, but the subject pool 
was based on exposure to E-Turb radar, which continued to occur through the 
writing of this report.  Although equipage on only one aircraft yielded limited 
exposure to the technology, there was overwhelming support for the system, and 
the qualitative data supported the quantitative correlation provided by Rockwell 
Collins. 
1.7.5 Analysis of the Questionnaires 
Responses were collated in a spreadsheet and analyzed by sections as described 
in the section on “Questionnaire Development.”  Comparisons were made 
between the pilots and dispatchers.  From this, conclusions were made based on 
the percentage of responses for each question relative to the individual section. 
Overall conclusions were made and used in the recommendation section as well 
as Sections 2 and 3 of this report.  The data were very consistent with the 
anecdotal evidence observed by members of the in-service evaluation and as 
documented in the 5th WxAP Review.  There was also consistency in responses 
between the two respondent pools. 
 
Analyses and summaries of these questionnaires are found in Sections 2 and 3 of 
this report.  Also, the questionnaires themselves, including summaries of 
responses in tabular form as well as notes summarizing all input on a question by 
question basis, can be found in Appendices A and B.  Raw data from the 
questionnaires were also provided separately to NASA in both electronic and hard 
copy formats. 
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2 In-Service Evaluation of TAPS - Dispatcher Questionnaire: 
Data Analysis and Results 
2.1 Procedures Used by Dispatchers to Identify Turbulence 
 
Section 1 of the questionnaire administered to dispatchers dealt with the tools and 
procedures currently utilized by dispatchers to identify areas of turbulence.  From 
responses to Question 1, dispatchers appear to use a variety of tools in identifying 
areas of turbulence, including the turbulence forecast generated by the Delta 
Meteorology group, PIREPs and forecast products on the FAA’s Aviation Digital 
Data Service (ADDS) website, PIREPs from company aircraft, and information 
from many other outlets.  However, the data also showed that dispatchers 
generally feel forecasts of turbulence are reliable only 58% of the time on average.  
SIGMETs were viewed to be accurate only 15% of the time.  Meanwhile, although 
most dispatchers acknowledged tremendous subjectivity in the information 
provided by PIREPs, they nevertheless represent the data source most prized by 
the group.  Based on these responses, one recognizes that dispatchers are 
desperate for better tools both to locate and plan for turbulence. 
2.2 Procedures used by Dispatchers to Identify Aircraft for Avoiding 
Turbulence and Approach to Establish the Change 
 
Using many of the resources iterated in Question 1, dispatchers will generally plan 
around (vertically or horizontally) areas of moderate chop or turbulence when 
possible, placing much higher priority on PIREPs vs. information contained in 
forecasts. 
 
Responses also revealed that once the flight plan is settled, instances in which 
dispatchers personally initiated a deviation (either horizontally or vertically) due to 
turbulence were relatively seldom.  In fact, the average dispatcher estimate of how 
often areas of turbulence that were not forecast (but confirmed by PIREPs or other 
means) resulted in changes to preflight route planning was just 7%. 
 
2.3 Nature of Collaboration between Dispatchers and Pilots to Arrive at a 
Plan of Action 
 
During the preflight phase, particularly with respect to domestic flights, very little 
interaction between the dispatcher and flight crew occurs.  Typically, flight plans 
are being sent by dispatchers to the FAA at about the same time as the crews who 
will execute those plans are arriving from previous flights.  Flights are planned to 
avoid areas of turbulence, and the crew receives information on areas of possible 
turbulence via the weather briefing in the flight plan paperwork.  Due to relatively 
high workloads on the flight deck as well as ATC constraints in terminal areas, 
climbout and descent are also phases when dispatcher input is minimal.  Enroute, 
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however, depending on the dispatcher’s workload, this interaction is much more 
significant, featuring mutual dialogue via ACARS. 
 
It is important to note that in all phases of flight, turbulence caused by convection 
is viewed very differently from clear air phenomena.  While convective SIGMETs 
and radar summary information are included as part of the weather briefing in the 
flight plan paperwork, crews tend to be primarily responsible for avoiding 
thunderstorm activity by use of the onboard weather radar from takeoff to 
touchdown.  Since crews have no reliable detection systems for clear turbulence, 
dialogue between the dispatcher and pilots concerning these phenomena are 
much more prevalent. 
2.4 Dispatcher Estimates of Benefits Realized from TAPS 
 
Dispatchers were asked for their responses on their experiences with TAPS via 
the four metrics below, responding as follows. 
 
a. Turbulence encounters avoided 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 25 
Possibly Once 3 
Possibly Twice 4 
Possibly Several 18 
 
b. Airframe inspections avoided 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 41 
Possibly Once 5 
Possibly Twice 3 
Possibly Several 1 
 
c. Reductions in traffic flow disruptions 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 42 
Possibly Once 2 
Possibly Twice 1 
Possibly Several 5 
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d. Other benefits (e.g. confidence in flight situation, workload etc.) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 21 
Possibly Several 9 
Useful check for PIREPS & Forecasts 21 
 
Nearly all dispatchers had a great deal of confidence in the overall idea of TAPS 
information and how it could be used if integrated into the tools and interfaces with 
which they had greater familiarity. 
2.5 Scenario Based Questions 
 
By means of scenarios in which TAPS reports were available to inform 
dispatchers’ operational decisions, Section 2 of the dispatcher questionnaire 
captured feedback on potential uses of TAPS information in 3 different settings, 
including convective and non-convective environments.  All scenarios were based 
on actual occurrences where similar TAPS information was available on WebASD 
during the in-service evaluation. 
 
Even though integration issues associated with the WebASD display and 
occasionally high workloads presented challenges in viewing TAPS data, nearly all 
dispatchers expressed confidence in the real-time, objective information provided 
by TAPS, and would have used that data to be more proactive in most cases.  For 
example, with TAPS providing good information on turbulence of relatively low 
intensity and short duration through southern Colorado, 60% of dispatchers would 
have advised flights transiting this area to secure the cabin and remain at the most 
economical, flight planned altitude. 
 
However, in the real world case on which this scenario was based, no dispatchers 
looked at the TAPS information, and without any knowledge about how long the 
turbulence might last, pilots made altitude deviations based on controllers’ 
feedback.  As a result, one flight burned so much more fuel than had been 
planned through this corridor that priority handling was considered for the arrival 
into the destination airport.  In addition, dispatchers began planning flights 
transiting this area at lower, less economical altitudes.  
2.6 Historical uses of TAPS 
 
Section 4 of the dispatcher questionnaire was designed to provide estimates of 
benefits realized from TAPS based on uses of the system from August of 2005 
until the feed of TAPS reports to the web based display platform was shut down in 
June of 2006.  While detailed results per the NASA deliverables can be found in 
Appendix A, most dispatchers saw a great deal of intrinsic, philosophical value in 
TAPS data, and implied that limited integration constituted the primary barrier to 
actual uses of TAPS during the in-service evaluation. 
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Even though dispatchers were exposed to TAPS in formal training sessions, no 
airline procedures were ever developed or in place for handling the data.  Although 
TAPS was used in a few instances to provide additional guidance to Delta 
captains in deciding whether or not to order airframe inspections following 
encounters with significant turbulence, TAPS data did not govern in these 
considerations. Three of the 50 dispatchers that were surveyed regarding TAPS 
stated that they had used the product in deliberations regarding severe loads.  Half 
of the dispatchers could not recall specific times when TAPS could have been 
helpful in avoiding a turbulence encounter, and 82% could not recall a time when 
TAPS could have helped in avoiding an airframe inspection.  84% of respondents 
could not recall a situation in which TAPS could have proved helpful in reducing 
traffic flow disruptions, and 88% stated that they had never been asked about 
TAPS by a Delta pilot. 
 
As documented in Appendix C and in the feedback contained in the 
questionnaires, dispatchers and meteorologists were also dissatisfied with the 
scarce number of TAPS reports that were usually visible on the WebASD display.  
Because TAPS relies on the ACARS VHF datalink to downlink TAPS messages to 
groundstations, the project team was conservative in setting the rms “g” threshold 
for TAPS reports to be generated.  This was intended to minimize datalink 
expenses as well as prevent excessive clutter on WebASD.  WebASD also allows 
users to select the severity of encounters to be displayed on the screen.  For 
example, dispatchers can choose to display only moderate encounters and above.  
Although project personnel emphasized this feature during recurrent training and 
individual interviews at dispatcher workstations during the summer and fall of 
2005, it is possible that many dispatchers either did not understand this function or 
forgot how to use it.  Still, the default display threshold for a new user opening 
TAPS on WebASD was .10 rms “g,” which is very close to the minimum threshold 
for a TAPS report to be generated.  Additionally, equipage on just 123 aircraft was 
perceived by some as not nearly sufficient to deliver the degree of geographical 
coverage required to deliver significant operational value. 
 
It is important to note that most dispatchers lacked the integrated toolset 
necessary to make the data truly relevant to the operation on even a fairly basic 
level.  In explaining one reason why TAPS proved of limited use at Delta, many 
dispatchers cited the display platform used for presenting TAPS information as a 
significant barrier to their assimilation of the data.  54% felt that the WebASD 
platform was inadequate, and most of the remaining respondents also commented 
that they would have preferred to have the data presented on a more integrated 
and familiar display.  With screen space for displaying a wide variety of more 
primary flight planning applications already limited, WebASD was yet another 
website for dispatchers to pull up, configure and monitor.  Had TAPS data been 
integrated into Delta’s in-house flight following display, operational uses surely 
would have been more numerous.  Data from questionnaires confirm this as a 
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major factor limiting the system’s usefulness; however, tool integration was 
beyond the scope of the TAPS developmental activities. 
 
Most significantly, all dispatchers perceived a high level of inherent value in the 
data and were open to using it provided such issues could be overcome.  76% of 
dispatchers felt TAPS was timelier than conventional PIREPs, and 90% felt that it 
also provided information on turbulence that was both more objective and 
geographically accurate.  Although 62% had never referenced TAPS in making 
flight-planning decisions, 88% felt that the product could be very useful in doing 
so.  More than anything, feedback such as this points to the need for continued 
work to yield an integrated solution that could also be utilized by pilots, ATC, and 
other stakeholders. 
2.7 Dispatcher Questionnaire Summary and Conclusions 
 
Overall, feedback in the questionnaires administered to dispatchers confirmed that 
current tools, available prior to TAPS, and techniques for locating, avoiding, and 
preparing for turbulence are inadequate.  While a variety of resources are utilized, 
dispatchers’ faith in the information provided by those resources is minimal.  As a 
result, the group estimated that flight crews are frequently operating on a tactical 
basis, relying in many cases independently on turbulence that they either 
encounter or hear about over ATC frequencies to drive their decisions.  In 
quantifying the extent of this approach, dispatchers estimated that crews deviate 
from the most economical, flight planned altitude due to turbulence approximately 
32% of the time, remaining at those altitudes for an average of 41 minutes.  Such 
estimates implicate the lack of objective, high quality turbulence data in significant 
safety, economic, and environmental impacts. 
 
Even though uses of TAPS as part of the in-service evaluation were limited, data 
from dispatchers affirmed the group’s belief in the objective information provided 
by TAPS and its potential in satisfying important informational needs.  Responses 
also suggested that maximum equipage, including automatic turbulence reporting 
by other airlines, would be required in order to provide the level of data necessary 
to deliver significant safety and operational benefits.  However, dispatchers were 
perhaps most emphatic about the need for turbulence encounter data to be 
integrated into their operational platforms, also indicating the importance of pilots 
and air traffic controllers sharing the same information.  With the help of wider 
equipage, more formalized procedures, and integration of TAPS into a flight 
following display more familiar to dispatchers, these issues could be overcome. 
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3 In-Service Evaluation of E-Turb Radar - Pilot Questionnaire: 
Data Analysis and Results 
3.1 Procedures Used by Pilots to Identify Turbulence 
 
Several questions in Section 1 of the Pilot Questionnaire looked at tools and 
procedures used by pilots to identify areas of turbulence.  In general, data show 
pilots generally look at fewer sources for turbulence than dispatchers, potentially 
because their training and overall access for many sources is relatively limited.  
Responses also show that the most used and trusted source for pilots are 
comments regarding ride quality transmitted over the ATC frequency.  Flight Plan 
Weather, a compilation of Forecasts and PIREPS, along with Dispatcher Input are 
the next most used sources, with reasonable confidence levels.   
 
The most used and generally trusted source of information for dispatchers, the 
Delta Turbulence Forecast, is seldom used or trusted by pilots.  Although Delta 
Meteorologists are contacted infrequently to inform turbulence related decisions, 
the pilots seem to have a reasonable level of confidence in their input.  Also, as 
part of questionnaire responses, many pilots included comments regarding the 
subjectivity and erratic nature of PIREPS (e.g. different turbulence levels reported 
in same area by different crews).  In summary, pilots, like dispatchers, have to rely 
on forecasts that they feel are only correct a little over 50% of the time, and 
PIREPs that they paradoxically appreciate a great deal but also find unreliable. 
 
Again, a major distinction is made between approaches to clear air turbulence vs. 
convective turbulence.  For thunderstorm activity, pilots generally reference a 
Nexrad radar picture when available during preflight, while also taking note of any 
frontal activity or Convective SIGMETs in the flight plan paperwork.  Once 
airborne, the onboard weather radar is the tool most utilized, and most crews 
reference the path taken by aircraft ahead for additional guidance.  Also, while 
50% of the group stated that they use the current generation Weather + 
Turbulence function on a routine basis in convective environments, 60% found the 
information it provided to be either “Occasionally valuable, but usually unreliable or 
misleading” or only “Somewhat Valuable most of the time.”  Instead, comments 
indicated that pilots tended to use information on radar reflectivity to guide their 
decisions, correlating areas of high reflectivity with turbulence hazards. 
 
For clear air phenomena, although interaction between the pilots and dispatchers 
via ACARS is more prevalent, the responses also show unambiguously that pilots 
use reports of turbulence made over ATC frequencies as their primary source of 
information in all phases of flight. 
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3.2 Procedures Used by Pilots to Request Avoiding an Area of Turbulence 
and Approach to Establish the Change 
 
For convective phenomena, pilots generally will rely almost exclusively on the 
onboard weather radar in guiding decisions, making a request to deviate laterally 
with the controller working the ATC sector.  These requests are nearly always 
accommodated enroute, but higher traffic density leads to greater uncertainty 
when operating in the terminal area.  Most pilots are also careful to note the wind 
information available on the navigation display when requesting deviations, 
avoiding the portion of storms that are downwind whenever possible. 
 
To avoid clear air turbulence enroute, pilots generally will seek the altitude that is 
rumored to be smoothest over the ATC frequency by making a request with the 
controller.  As noted in responses to Question 9, pilots either receive or request re-
routes due to turbulence in only 6% of cases. 
 
Of additional interest were the turbulence thresholds that pilots use in deciding to 
deviate from the flight plan.  For passenger comfort, 75% of the responses 
indicated that pilots look to initiate a change when experiencing either “light chop” 
or “light turbulence.”  Feedback from the questionnaires administered to 
dispatchers, meanwhile, indicated that most dispatchers plan around areas of 
moderate chop or turbulence. 
3.3 Nature of Collaboration Between Dispatchers and Pilots to Arrive at a 
Plan of Action 
 
During the preflight phase, pilots generally have very little if any involvement in 
flight planning, relying instead on the knowledge and good judgment of the 
dispatcher, as well as the additional tools at his disposal.  Also, once enroute, 75% 
of the pilots surveyed feel that the role of the dispatcher tends to be more reactive 
than proactive with respect to turbulence. 
 
For convective phenomena in all phases of flight, responses to Question 5 show 
that the role of the dispatcher is perceived by the pilots to be minimal, with very 
little mutual dialogue regarding the nature of the plan. 
 
With respect to clear air turbulence, although dialogue via ACARS between pilots 
and dispatchers is more prevalent, responses to Questions 6 and 8 show that ride 
reports over the ATC frequency are seen as the primary drivers in executing what 
appears to be a very reactive plan in response to turbulence.  Answers to question 
8 show that a request is made with the controller based on reports made over the 
ATC frequency in 95% of cases, while dispatchers are consulted – time permitting 
– concerning options 45% of the time.  Collaboration and dialogue between pilots 
and dispatchers occur least during climbout and descent. 
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3.4 Pilot Estimates of Benefits Realized from the E-Turb System 
 
Although many pilots wished that E-Turb could be presented at ranges greater 
than 25 nautical miles, nearly all respondents voiced much higher confidence in 
the turbulence information presented by the E-Turb radar capability versus legacy 
systems.  Respondents also mentioned times when the E-Turb gave invaluable 
information on potentially hazardous turbulence in areas of low radar reflectivity.  
Even though the technique of inferring that areas of high radar reflectivity implied 
areas of hazardous turbulence was well-established, of pilots who were asked to 
choose between a routing into (1) an area with little reflectivity where E-Turb 
predicted turbulence was present and (2) an area of relatively high reflectivity but 
no E-Turb predicted turbulence, all opted to transit the latter.  Armed with better 
information on the actual turbulence hazard versus raw reflectivity, this level of 
confidence in the information provided by E-Turb represents a paradigm shift in 
the way returns on airborne weather radar are viewed in the future. 
 
Similarly, as an alternative to raw reflectivity, dispatchers also responded favorably 
to the idea of downlinked E-Turb information being presented at their workstations.  
Beyond this, however, the dispatchers had no context for providing answers on 
how the system provided benefit during the in-service evaluation. 
 
Pilots were asked for feedback on their operational experiences with E-Turb via 
the four metrics below, responding as follows. 
 
a. Turbulence encounters avoided 
 
Pilot  Responses 
None 4 
Possibly Once 2 
Possibly Twice 0 
Possibly Several 14 
 
b. Airframe inspections avoided 
 
Pilot  Responses 
None 14 
Possibly Once 3 
Possibly Twice 2 
Possibly Several 1 
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c. Reductions in traffic flow disruptions 
 
Pilot  Responses 
None 8 
Possibly Once 2 
Possibly Twice 3 
Possibly Several 7 
 
d. Other benefits (e.g. confidence in flight situation, workload etc.) 
 
Pilot  Responses 
Confidence in Forecast 3 
Confidence in PIREPS 4 
Confidence in new E-Turb Magenta 10 
Situational Awareness 10 
Reductions in ATC congestion 1 
 
Negative experiences with the E-Turb radar seemed to be primarily the result of 
limited exposure to the technology.  With the remaining 70 Boeing 737-800s in the 
fleet equipped with legacy weather radar units, there were some instances of pilots 
misunderstanding the Multiscan/E-Turb unit’s capabilities.  Also, a few pilots stated 
disappointment with the information provided in automatic mode, when in fact they 
had based these comments on inadvertent operation in manual mode.  In all such 
instances, poor performance as a result of problems related to the unit’s automatic 
mode or E-Turb could not be substantiated. 
 
Beyond issuance of Flight Crew Bulletins, articles in Pilot Information Packets, the 
information provided by Delta jumpseat occupants from time to time, and the 
onboard supplement, it was also not feasible for Delta to invest the training 
necessary to overcome some of these issues given limited E-Turb equipage.  
When asked about how the system might have proven helpful in more expedited 
routings, for example, many pilots lacked a complete picture of how the E-Turb 
technology could be used in such considerations.  Most pilots saw the intrinsic 
value in the E-Turb radar, but their responses to many questions underscores how 
equipage on just one airframe and no sharing of E-Turb information with airspace 
decision makers limited the potential usefulness of the technology.  The need for 
work to continue in order to ascertain how E-Turb might be used to supplement a 
comprehensive, integrated solution to convective turbulence and accompanying 
airspace challenges is therefore paramount. 
3.5 Scenario-Based Questions 
 
By means of scenarios in which information on TAPS reports and E-Turb was 
presented to inform pilots’ operational decisions, Section 2 of the pilot 
questionnaire captured feedback on potential uses of this information in 3 different 
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settings, including convective and non-convective environments.  All scenarios 
were based on actual occurrences during the in-service evaluation. 
 
When given information by the dispatcher concerning an area where in-situ data 
such as TAPS confirmed turbulence of known intensity and relatively short 
duration, pilots showed uncommon comfort with the option of accepting degraded 
ride quality while remaining at the most economical, flight planned altitude.  This 
approach stands in direct contrast to the one usually taken in the absence of such 
information, as crews climb and descend in search of smooth altitudes.  Results 
such as this underscore how better information can allow crews to prepare for 
turbulence, leading in turn to better operational outcomes. 
 
Another scenario asked pilots which path they would take if the E-Turb radar 
showed an area of yellow (moderate) reflectivity but no magenta, and another area 
of green reflectivity but solid magenta.  Trusting the hazard information provided 
by the E-Turb, 100% of pilots stated that they would transit the area of yellow 
reflectivity, abandoning the long-standing practice of basing such decisions solely 
on reflectivity. 
3.6 In Service Correlation Data (Courtesy of Rockwell Collins) 
 
The qualitative experience of the pilots who worked with the E-Turb radar was very 
positive as discussed previously.  To correlate those experiences against 
quantitative data regarding E-Turb performance, the following brief description and 
histogram document quantitative methodology and results. 
 
As mentioned in the E-Turb Technology Description, the WXR-2100 with E-Turb 
radar flown aboard one Delta aircraft during the in-service evaluation was 
equipped with a built-in data recording system.  The recording system stored radar 
scan data and included turbulence and reflectivity along with in situ vertical 
accelerometer information, airspeed, altitude, aircraft position, and other relevant 
aircraft parameters.  The recording system was automatically activated when in 
situ acceleration exceeded a specific threshold or when radar predicted turbulence 
levels exceeded a specific threshold.  Once activated, the recorder stored 
turbulence and reflectivity sweep data until the event passed behind the aircraft.  
Approximately once per month, the radar recording system was accessed and 
data were downloaded and post-processed. 
 
From August 25, 2004 to November 15, 2005, a total of 798 turbulence encounters 
were recorded.  Of these encounters, 378 events indicated that the crew actually 
penetrated some level of predicted turbulence such that correlation between the 
predicted turbulence of the E-Turb radar and in situ turbulence could be made.  
The resulting histogram shown below summarizes the correlation.  Based on the 
mean of the correlation error, the radar slightly over predicts turbulence events.   
Some of this 0.016 g over prediction can be explained by the offset between the 
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aircraft CG and accelerometer.  The distribution of correlation error has a 
Gaussian appearance with a standard deviation of 0.043 g. 
 
 
3.7 Pilot Questionnaire Summary and Conclusions 
 
Pilots rely heavily on PIREP data in which they often have ironically little 
confidence.  Also, once enroute, their overall approach to turbulence appears to 
be very reactive.  With very little real-time knowledge on the state of the 
atmosphere, pilots appear to find the smoothest flight level through trial and error, 
based primarily on the weather radar and reports of turbulence over the ATC 
frequency.  They voiced strong support for the type of data that could be provided 
by an automatic turbulence encounter reporting system such as TAPS. 
 
For convective phenomena, pilots currently rely primarily on the airborne weather 
radar, correlating high levels of radar reflectivity with turbulence hazards.  Their 
experience working with the E-Turb radar, however, was very positive.  Even 
though crews have little confidence in current generation magenta systems, 
responses to Question 14 showed perhaps most dramatically how crews trust the 
information provided by the E-Turb radar, deviating even around areas where 
magenta overlaid areas of very little or no reflectivity. 
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4 In-Service Evaluation Conclusions 
 
When Delta’s involvement in TPAWS began, it did so under the charter of new 
tools and technologies aimed at enhancing aviation safety for the traveling public.  
As enablers of better and timelier information for various users to leverage in 
avoiding turbulence hazards, TPAWS and related technologies remain firmly 
rooted in the safety arena.  But considering the broader weather related 
challenges facing an airline, air traffic managers, and the traveling public, other 
transferable benefits in the areas of airspace utilization and economic efficiencies 
were quickly realized.  To understand exactly how and where these synergies 
apply, one must first understand responses to turbulence within the current 
National Airspace System.  It should be noted that although in narrative format, the 
description of the system that follows is validated by the feedback in the pilot and 
dispatcher questionnaires that were gathered as part of this in-service evaluation. 
 
For the average Delta pilot flying primarily domestic routes, limited opportunity 
exists to view weather information beyond what appears on the weather 
briefing/flight plan paperwork.  With pilots often facing very little time between 
flights, dispatchers may advise of the potential for areas of turbulence and 
convection in the remarks section of the flight plan, and company PIREPs along 
the route of flight are always included as part of the briefing.  Unfortunately, 
company PIREPs are incorporated as secondary information within position 
reports, and refer only to the turbulence encountered since the previous reporting 
point, seldom resulting in a comprehensive or accurate picture.  Even though 
progress in this area has recently been made as a result of new capabilities on the 
FAA’s Aviation Digital Data Service (ADDS) website, those reports that do make it 
into the FAA’s database of official PIREPs remain generally scarce, and 
depending on the workload and conscientiousness of the dispatcher, these may or 
may not be included in the flight plan paperwork. 
 
Moreover, since PIREPs of turbulence are always dated and based on the 
subjective interpretation of any given pilot flying any different size of aircraft, their 
dissemination often proves counter-productive, particularly for a phenomenon as 
dynamic as turbulence.  As an example, the pilot of a regional jet reports moderate 
turbulence at Flight Level 310 while climbing out of a busy terminal area towards 
cruise altitude.  Armed with very little information concerning the real intensity of 
the turbulence and its expected duration, controllers working flights and 
dispatchers planning flights then take a cautious approach, making that airspace 
inaccessible to all aircraft, including larger airframes which that turbulence may not 
threaten. 
 
Through access to ACARS flight histories, jumpseat observations and 
conversations with pilots and dispatchers, Delta project personnel compiled a 
dataset comparing TAPS data against conventional PIREPs, as depicted below in 
Figure 1.  Consisting of data gathered by project personnel viewing TAPS on 
WebASD between June of 2004 and October of 2005, 74 PIREPs, summing up 
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turbulence that coincided with 316 TAPS reports on equipped aircraft, were plotted 
against average rms g values contained in corresponding TAPS reports.  Only 
PIREPs made within 5 minutes of one or more TAPS reports, or PIREPS that in 
some other way specifically referenced the turbulence that coincided with one or 
more TAPS reports, were considered for comparison in the chart below. 
 
As an example of how one datapoint could be generated, 3 TAPS reports of .100 
rms g, .110 rms g and .120 rms g are made on Delta flight 123.  Within 5 minutes 
of those TAPS reports being generated, a PIREP of “Moderate Chop” is made via 
ACARS by a crewmember of flight 123.  The resulting datapoint plots an average 
rms g value of .110 on the x-axis against “Moderate Chop” on the y-axis.  Also 
significant are 19 PIREPs, ranging from Light to Severe Turbulence, which did not 
coincide with any TAPS reports.  In these cases, it is assumed that the upset 
caused by the turbulence did not meet the threshold for a TAPS report to be 
generated. 
 
The results confirm the broad spectrum of subjectivity in conventional PIREPs, 
further underscoring the need for better information to drive better operational 
decisions. 
 
Figure 1 
PIREPs vs. TAPS
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Compounding the issue even further is an apparent disparity between what most 
pilots perceive as turbulence significant enough to merit an altitude change, versus 
the level of turbulence that dispatchers plan flights to avoid.  In the questionnaires 
distributed to pilots and dispatchers at Delta, participants were asked about their 
tolerances in planning for and reacting to various levels of turbulence.  The results 
revealed that pilots often tend to seek smoother air at the first signs of “light chop” 
or “light turbulence,” while dispatchers tend to plan around areas of moderate chop 
or turbulence.  This leads to further discrepancies in perceptions relating to the 
accuracy of forecasts, and pilots’ perceptions as to the conscientiousness of 
dispatchers. 
 
As a result, in non-convective environments, pilots resort to discussion about ride 
quality over Air Traffic Control (ATC) frequencies as their primary tool in driving 
tactical decisions regarding deviations and altitude changes.  But because the 
information circulated by controllers concerning turbulence is (1) always 
subjective, (2) often dated, and (3) confined only to the airspace over which they 
have responsibility, pilots often have a very inaccurate picture of the intensity or 
duration of reported turbulence.  Yet, for non-convective turbulence affecting 
primarily the cruise phase of flight, this in fact is what currently drives utilization of 
the National Airspace System (NAS) on a day-to-day basis.  In fact, 100% of pilots 
who participated in the questionnaire considered reports of turbulence on ATC 
frequencies as a primary tool in turbulence detection and avoidance.  The result is 
a highly inefficient use of airspace, as pilots scramble to find the smoothest air 
possible by trial and error from one ATC frequency to the next.  It should be noted 
that this is in no way intended as an indictment against the best practices of any 
user mentioned here.  Rather, it is simply the best possible outcome of a system 
that lacks truly objective, real time information concerning the state of the 
atmosphere and its impact. 
 
The consequences of this methodology are multifaceted and expensive, affecting 
pilots, dispatchers, controllers, airlines, and the traveling public.  Consider, for 
example, the following scenario.  An aircraft experiences one to two minutes of 
light chop, prompting the pilot to seek an alternate altitude.  After being notified 
about the chop, the controller then relays this information to others inquiring about 
rides.  As other pilots checking onto the frequency and dispatchers planning flights 
at Airline Operations Centers hear about the report, an entire flight level is 
essentially eliminated from the system on a de facto basis.  In the end, results 
include congestion at other flight levels, ATC delay programs due to pressure on 
enroute spacing, and higher fuel burns due to largely unnecessary avoidance of 
the most economical altitudes. 
 
Consider now that the turbulence that triggered all this was isolated, lasting just 
five minutes with no change in intensity.  Perhaps the pilot who made the report 
had a low tolerance for turbulence on that particular day.  Had aircraft in this sector 
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been equipped with an automatic in-situ turbulence reporting mechanism, the 
duration and true intensity of the turbulence may have been more evident, giving 
crews and dispatchers confidence in transiting the area and enhancing airspace 
utilization.  In fact, in the questionnaires conducted at Delta, pilots were 
unambiguous in their willingness to ride out such patches of turbulence if 
presented with better information in the form of automatic reports such as TAPS.  
Preliminary analysis conducted by the Delta Air Lines Flight Operations 
Engineering Group puts the cost to domestic flag carriers of added fuel due to 
deviations from the most economical altitudes at anywhere from $26 million to 
more than $210 million annually.  The cost of airspace lost to such inefficiencies 
remains unknown, but could be significant. 
 
Meanwhile, the abundance of small-scale data that would have been gained from 
atmospheric in-situ reports in the above scenario could also have fed forecast 
models for better planning by dispatchers and better strategic traffic management 
at the ATC Command Center.  Given all that is at stake for the well being of the 
NAS and the potential to advance the NGATS vision, narratives such as these 
highlight an important opportunity to conduct basic human factors research on how 
this information should be presented to relevant stakeholders. 
 
In convective environments, similar potentials exist for uses of E-Turb information.  
Currently, pilots, using airborne weather radar units, as well as controllers and 
dispatchers, using ground based Nexrad radar, correlate high levels of radar 
reflectivity with areas of hazard, including hail and severe turbulence.  While this 
correlation may be on target in many cases, reflectivity on any weather radar 
display is, in its essence, merely a measurement of precipitation density.  
Depending on the nature of the system, areas of turbulence that are actually 
hazardous to transport aircraft may be relatively localized within much larger areas 
of high reflectivity.  Meanwhile, significant turbulence hazards may exist nearby 
but in areas of low reflectivity, as has been documented in numerous incidents and 
accidents in the past.  But because the only tool available for avoiding such 
hazards is a depiction of reflectivity, pilots, controllers, and dispatchers tend to be 
very conservative when operating in the vicinity of convection, sacrificing what are 
suspected to be very large areas of usable airspace. 
 
With E-Turb airborne weather radar units pinpointing the locations of actual 
turbulence hazards, together with real-time actual turbulence encounter reports to 
validate the locations and intensity of turbulence in these areas, pilots, 
dispatchers, and controllers could make much better decisions regarding 
operations near convection, confidently exploiting much of the airspace in these 
areas that goes wasted today.  Such information would reduce ground delay 
programs due to thunderstorms, and also result in potentially significant fuel 
savings due to more expedited routings.  In questionnaires conducted at Delta, 
pilots who had flown the Boeing 737-800 equipped with E-Turb radar were asked 
which direction they would fly if the E-Turb predicted a large area of turbulence 
(solid magenta) in an area of low reflectivity (green) and another area with no 
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predicted turbulence in an area of moderate reflectivity (yellow).  Trusting the E-
Turb information, 100% of pilots voiced comfort transiting the area of higher 
reflectivity (yellow).  On the ground, a majority of dispatchers also responded that 
downlinked E-Turb radar information would be helpful in relaying strategic 
guidance to crews that would be operating in the vicinity of convection. 
 
Considering the safety challenges posed by pending airspace constraints, together 
with the JPDO’s activity in driving towards the NGATS, the integration of automatic 
turbulence encounter reports and E-Turb radar information could make significant 
contributions to safety, better airspace utilization, and more efficient operations.  
Key ingredients in satisfying such a vision include (1) wide equipage by multiple 
carriers, (2) the right datalinks, interfaces, displays and decision support tools for 
handling the data, (3) pilots, dispatchers, meteorologists and controllers all using 
that data to aid in tactical and strategic decisions, and (4) perhaps most 
importantly, educated users and decision makers. 
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5 Turbulence Needs and Delta’s Recommendations for 
Future Research 
5.1 Overview 
 
As detailed above, Delta’s participation in the in-service evaluations of TAPS and 
E-Turb technologies as part of the NASA Weather Accident Prevention (WxAP) 
Project yielded very positive results.  As a subset of weather issues affecting the 
National Airspace System (NAS), turbulence represents a major constraint to 
airspace utilization, resulting in excessive fuel burn with current avoidance 
strategies creating significant penalties in economics and emissions.  Based on 
the transferable benefits that were realized in this laboratory environment and 
Delta’s perspective as an end user, what follows in this section are Delta’s 
recommendations for follow-on research efforts as related to the requirements of 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS). 
5.2 Current State & Drivers for Turbulence Research 
5.2.1 Current State 
 
Overall, feedback in the questionnaires administered to dispatchers confirmed that 
current tools and techniques for locating, avoiding, and preparing for turbulence 
are inadequate.  While a variety of resources are used, dispatchers’ faith in the 
information provided by those resources is minimal.  As a result, the subject group 
estimated that flight crews are frequently operating on a tactical basis, relying in 
many cases independently on turbulence that they either encounter or hear about 
over ATC frequencies to drive their decisions.  When asked to quantify the extent 
of this approach in questionnaires, dispatchers estimated that crews deviate from 
the most economical, flight planned altitude due to turbulence approximately 32% 
of the time, remaining at those altitudes for an average of 41 minutes.  Pilots, 
meanwhile, felt that these occurrences were more than twice as numerous in their 
responses.  Such estimates implicate the lack of objective, high quality turbulence 
data in significant safety, economic, and environmental impacts. 
 
Similar to feedback obtained from dispatchers, pilots rely heavily on PIREP data in 
which they tend to have very little confidence.  Once enroute, their overall 
approach to turbulence generally appears to be very reactive.  With very little real-
time knowledge on the state of the atmosphere for clear air phenomena, pilots 
appear to find the smoothest flight level through trial and error based primarily on 
reports of turbulence over the ATC frequency.  For convective phenomena, pilots 
currently rely primarily on the airborne weather radar, correlating high levels of 
radar reflectivity with turbulence hazards. 
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5.2.2 Technical & Economic Issues 
5.2.2.1 Technical Drivers 
 
Incorporation of technologies that address the forecasting, now-casting, and 
reporting of turbulence will be vital in devising a comprehensive solution to the 
turbulence problem.  For tactical knowledge regarding turbulence, a combination 
of data such as E-Turb radar returns and actual turbulence encounter reports will 
be needed to satisfy “now casts” of turbulence that users might expect within three 
to thirty minutes.  Strategically, while reliable forecasts of turbulence represent the 
best solution, reporting will still be needed, since improvements in this area will 
depend largely on a critical mass of relatively small scale, automated observations 
and in-situ turbulence reports. 
 
Another important element in this solution involves the evolution of another 
turbulence reporting technology. Refinement and deployment of a turbulence 
reporting metric called Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) was proceeding at another 
major US carrier.  Developed by the National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR), this non-proprietary metric was viewed as a complement or potential 
alternative to TAPS within industry circles.  While TAPS categorizes an encounter 
with turbulence based on the resulting aircraft “g” response, EDR describes the 
normalized atmospheric disturbance responsible for the upset.  Since EDR 
measures the atmosphere, many meteorologists from a conceptual standpoint 
value it more highly than the type of data provided by TAPS.  EDR is also seen as 
an essential component in promoting better turbulence forecasts, and is planned 
to have input into the next iteration of the Graphical Turbulence Guidance (GTG) 
forecast product available via the FAA’s Aviation Digital Data Service.  By the fall 
of 2005, two major US carriers had also committed to reporting EDR, though it had 
yet to be deployed at one carrier. 
 
Debate concerning the merits of both technologies, however, is lengthy and 
complex, and confusion within the industry on how best to move forward lingers. 
EDR  was named as the standard for turbulence reporting by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO); however, in early 2006 the FAA recommended that 
carriers adopt TAPS in Advisory Circular 120-88A. 
 
Delta is in the process of finalizing a contract to install EDR on its aircraft, 
representing an important opportunity to explore the roles, capabilities, and overall 
value of each metric.  To the extent that resources can be aligned towards an 
experimental program incorporating a side-by-side comparison, one is strongly 
encouraged. 
 
Whichever technology or combination of technologies is implemented, integration 
of the data will be a key driver in the relevance and, therefore, the technical 
success of what is implemented.  In responses to the questionnaire and other 
feedback gained from dispatchers during the in-service evaluation, dispatchers 
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were perhaps most emphatic about the need for in-situ data to be integrated into 
their operational platforms as a means of improving utilization.  Given the nature of 
the interaction between pilots and dispatchers that was also detailed in the 
questionnaires, ensuring that both parties have access to the same turbulence 
data will be important.  Controllers, as airspace decision makers, will also need to 
share in turbulence reports and E-Turb data in order to derive many of the 
operational benefits iterated in this document.  Additionally, even though users will 
need to share in the same data, how that data is presented will likely need to be 
different given the different missions of individual users.  It is clear that without 
appropriate attention to such issues, even data that users respect will go ignored 
by the majority of the user population. 
 
5.2.2.2 Economic Drivers 
 
Aside from the albeit important technical discussion surrounding these 
technologies, three issues are primary for the industry.  Firstly, as with any 
technology, the solution must be cost effective for the airlines.  Secondly, as 
shown in the feedback collected from pilots and dispatchers in Sections 2 and 3, 
the toolset currently being used is so deficient in meeting airline and NGATS 
needs that adoption and integration of either technology would represent a major 
leap forward.  Thirdly, with adequate coverage representing perhaps the primary 
ingredient in the success of either metric, achieving critical mass in aircraft 
equipage will most likely decide the path that airlines pursue, easily overtaking any 
lingering technical differences.  Put another way, because the industry is 
marginally profitable and starving for better tools, the better technology may not be 
the one that ultimately gets adopted.  Although Delta and most others in the 
industry remain open to the possibility that EDR and TAPS represent 
complementary technologies, as iterated above, a side-by-side comparison to 
determine the extent to which they satisfy various users’ requirements, areas 
where they overlap, as well as areas where differences satisfy the unique needs of 
users appears needed. 
 
The need for solutions that are cost effective presents additional research 
challenges in two main areas.  Expenses related to the datalinking of turbulence 
data must be minimized, and the training necessary for end users to leverage the 
data effectively must be streamlined as much as possible. 
 
Underscoring the importance of datalink costs, it is Delta’s understanding that 
although EDR is deployed at one major US carrier, not all of the carrier’s equipped 
aircraft are currently making reports due to excessive datalink expenses.  
Meanwhile, entire airplanes have been designed around issues related to training 
expenses at airlines.  Often, these design programs sacrificed significant 
advances in technical capability in order to satisfy the training budgets of the end 
user.  Perhaps the most striking example of a manufacturer’s sensitivity to these 
issues occurred on various iterations of the Boeing 737.  Even when Boeing 
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decided to revolutionize the cockpit on 737 New Generation models by instituting 
flat panel displays on the main instrument panel, it left a relatively antiquated 
design for the overhead panel alone.  Using the flat panel displays, it also gave 
operators the option of displaying the same gauges in the same format as crews of 
previous editions of the aircraft had been accustomed.  The point of all this is that 
items seemingly so insignificant as expenses related to datalinks and training drive 
crucial design points for the airlines, and the same needs to be true of systems 
and interfaces aimed at solving the turbulence problem and related airspace 
constraints. 
 
5.2.2.3  Economic Costs of Poor Turbulence Information 
 
The importance of one particular discovery became increasingly evident over the 
course of the in-service evaluation.  Based on jumpseat observations by project 
personnel and prior experience as a Delta pilot, the importance of giving 
passengers as smooth a flight as possible stood out as a clear element in the 
culture of Delta flight deck crewmembers.  As a result of this observation, and in 
dialogue with the lack of quality information on turbulence under the current 
system, members of the project team hypothesized that the economic cost of 
deviations from the most economical altitudes due to turbulence was potentially 
very large.  To validate this scientifically, pilots and dispatchers were asked in the 
questionnaires for estimates on (1) what percentage of time flights deviated from 
the optimum altitude and (2) how long those flights remained off altitude once the 
change had been made.  The dispatchers estimated that these deviations 
occurred on approximately one third of flights, and the pilots estimated that they 
occurred on two thirds of flights.  Estimates of how long the flights were off of the 
optimum altitude varied by the type of flight.  Narrow body flights with shorter 
enroute time were estimated to be 39 minutes, and the wide body segments with 
longer times to be 53 minutes.  Admittedly, these are small samples, but anecdotal 
evidence based on experience as a Delta pilot and observations on the jumpseat 
seem to confirm the data. 
 
Using data from the questionnaires as referenced above, the analysis in Table 1 
took a typical airline, and computed the additional fuel penalty of deviating from 
the most economical altitude by four thousand and two thousand foot intervals.  
These intervals were chosen since, for the pilot’s direction of flight, the crew must 
climb or descend by at least these intervals while seeking smooth air.  The fuel 
burn for that airline was calculated based on six different aircraft types.  At that 
point, segment data for the 11 major airlines was incorporated.  The base airline 
with 6 aircraft types was used as the model for the other airlines, and a ratio was 
used to get the total gallons of additional fuel for the 11 major airlines if 100% of 
segments were off altitude for the times described earlier.  At that point, estimates 
of 66% and 33% of flights were used to provide sensitivity analysis. 
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The analysis showed that a significant amount of fuel may potentially be wasted 
due to anachronistic turbulence avoidance practices, affecting both airline 
economics and the environment.  The key to avoiding this cost is rooted in better 
turbulence data and procedures to deal with it objectively.  As documented in 
answers to Scenario-based questions in the questionnaires, both pilots and 
dispatchers maintain that they would be more apt to remain at the most 
economical altitudes if armed with better information. 
 
Table 1 
11 Major Airlines 
 Total Gal Fuel Cost $ if All Flights 
Off Alt 
Est. of Flights 
In Percent 
Total  
System $ 
Fuel/Year if Off 
4000 feet 
159,460,057 
 
$2.00 $318,920,115 66 $210,487,276 
 
Fuel/Year if Off 
2000 feet 
40,508,729 
 
$2.00 $81,017,457 66 $53,471,522 
 
33 $105,243,638  
33 $26,735,761 
 
5.3 Specific Delta Recommendations 
5.3.1 Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) Requirements 
5.3.2 General Areas 
 
Given lack of good turbulence information and the way in which weather is viewed 
under the current system, there is an immense need for work aimed at the 
fundamental human factors and training implications of the paradigm shift required 
in order for enhanced turbulence information to actually be leveraged by users.  
The role of end users in defining these design points will be crucial.  While these 
represent vast research challenges, the findings of this evaluation represent a 
foundation for responding to NGATS needs. 
 
As additional background, one especially important aspect of the work being 
conducted by the JPDO deals with how sensors – both on the aircraft and 
elsewhere – can be used as nodes in enabling the NGATS.6  To enhance airspace 
capacity and maintain or enhance current safety levels within the National 
Airspace System (NAS), autonomous sensors will be relied upon extensively in 
supplying a constantly updated, vast array of data, including weather information, 
to drive decisions on routing and airspace usage.  This constant feed of data is 
envisioned to provide the precision necessary to make these decisions more 
intelligently than under the current system, exploiting airspace opportunities that 
go wasted today.  With sensors providing more precise, higher fidelity information 
                                                
6 Joint Planning and Development Office. “Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated 
Plan,” 2004.  Pp 12-14. 
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on real-time aircraft position, guidelines for enroute spacing by ATC might be 
reduced, enhancing system throughput. Likewise, with better information on the 
real time state of the atmosphere across the NAS, users can potentially make 
better decisions and derive significant operational efficiencies alongside additional 
airspace capacity. 
 
So far, the work completed with participation by Delta has demonstrated the 
proper function of two such enabling technologies, TAPS and E-Turb radar, 
revealing an array of other discoveries and potential applications in the process.  
But if the systems are to have any relevance and satisfy the need for which they 
were developed, more work remains. 
 
One major area for further investigation by stakeholder agencies is in the realm of 
human factors, where a number of fundamental questions present themselves.  As 
background for one such investigation, pilots, dispatchers, controllers, and 
meteorologists have always looked to radar reflectivity for guidance in avoiding 
convective hazards.  But as technologies such as the E-Turb radar evolve into 
displaying only the information that is important to the user (i.e. hazards), how 
should this enhanced data be presented? Basically, what are the implications of 
previous display methodologies and data hierarchies in designing new display 
requirements?  How, for example, is the depiction of heavy rain in the color red on 
current radar displays a hindrance to more advanced presentations of weather 
hazards such as turbulence or hail?  What colors and symbols should be 
associated with turbulence hazards on future generation displays?  Also, while it is 
vital that all users have the same turbulence data to drive decisions, not all users 
will necessarily view that data in the same way because of the variation in their 
backgrounds, workloads, and overall missions.  A tailored approach in determining 
how turbulence data get communicated will therefore be essential in achieving an 
effective, integrated solution.  So as technology enables needed and exciting 
changes, work aimed at answering these questions will be crucial in smoothly 
shifting the paradigm on how weather information is viewed and, in turn, exploited 
as an enabler to enhanced safety and additional throughput within the NAS. 
 
Meanwhile, as the state of the art for other sensors advances, other kinds of 
enhanced threat information will surely proliferate and be presented to many of the 
same users who are of interest in this discussion.  In this context, determining 
where turbulence stands in the hierarchy of hazards represents yet another human 
factors challenge.  Fundamentally, how does the advent of reliable, high fidelity 
information on the locations of turbulence hazards, for example, change the way in 
which turbulence is presented alongside other threats such as traffic, terrain, and 
icing?  How, even, does it change the role of users in the system?  Armed with 
better information, who should be accountable for turbulence encounter decisions 
given competing demands in workloads and missions?  Given all of the enhanced 
information that will be presented to users, it seems essential that an appropriate 
place for turbulence be well defined not only in the displays, but also in the 
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responsibilities of each user, highlighting yet another opportunity for fundamental 
research. 
 
In fact, issues such as these were viewed as especially important in the work 
completed at Delta.  Many dispatchers commented that in making them 
accountable to more sources of information, new tools have historically had the 
unintended consequence of making their jobs more difficult and overwhelming.  
After designing display and functionality requirements for TAPS information on 
WebASD, an interesting dichotomy between what dispatchers stated they wanted 
from even a trial system and what they actually used became apparent.  Even 
basic information about TAPS – which dispatchers had previously been 
enthusiastic about receiving – went largely unused.  Many dispatchers were even 
shown how to view TAPS on WebASD in one-on-one discussions during the 
course of normal shifts, and gave positive comments concerning the system.  But 
outside these forums, faced with competing demands, workloads and 
responsibilities, most failed to reference the display at all.  So while this highlights 
the need for an integrated solution for presenting turbulence data at dispatcher 
workstations, it also begs more research on the broader issue of discerning where 
turbulence resides in the hierarchy of other data that will be provided by other 
sensors and technologies. 
 
In referencing real-time data, users will also require some authoritative guidance 
on appropriate turbulence thresholds in order to form their operational responses.  
Based on a higher quality dataset, these thresholds will most likely be radically 
different than the ones currently used.  In today’s system, just four varieties of 
turbulence (Light, Moderate, Severe, and Extreme) exist within the vernacular of 
conventional PIREPs, with very little definition around how users should respond 
operationally to reports of various intensities.  TAPS reports represent objective 
measurements of rms g, presented as icons referring roughly to the four traditional 
definitions of turbulence, in accordance with standard terminology for turbulence 
contained in the Airman’s Information Manual (AIM).  For example, all TAPS 
reports with rms g readings between .2 and .29 rms g are categorized as 
moderate turbulence, and presented as such by a single icon on WebASD.  This 
raises a number of basic questions.  Firstly, are the four current levels of 
turbulence appropriate references for the objectivity and precision of a turbulence 
reporting mechanism?  Perhaps the intensity of automated turbulence reports 
should be presented as numbers, and if so, how many?  Perhaps meteorologists 
would prefer to see a relatively high number of these levels in order to discern data 
on a smaller scale, informing better forecasts.  Perhaps pilots, controllers, and 
dispatchers require less definition around turbulence reports, with the various 
levels serving as drivers for different but complementary operational decisions.  As 
an example scenario, pilots and controllers may use a 7-point scale, making a 
coordinated decision to ride out areas where “level 3” turbulence is reported, 
based on considerations such as fuel savings and additional airspace capacity.  
To enable the forecasting solution, meteorologists, meanwhile, may see the very 
same turbulence as “level 4” events on a larger scale of 10 or 12.  As a 
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replacement for traditional definitions of light, moderate, and severe turbulence, 
additional work aimed at ascertaining user specific turbulence thresholds and 
decision drivers based on turbulence data is therefore needed. 
 
While the above considerations certainly have the industry’s attention, the time 
remaining to maintain the momentum behind these efforts is short.  While capable 
of lending significant resources in the form of an operational platform as well as 
invaluable guidance based on a real-world, airline perspective, industry partners 
will nevertheless require direction, support, and resources from stakeholder 
agencies.  Armed with a wealth of experience on these issues and an active and 
engaged laboratory for such experiments to continue, Delta is perhaps uniquely 
suited to play a leading role in additional efforts, and welcomes the opportunity to 
continue its partnership on related research initiatives. 
5.3.3 Specific Areas 
 
The following categories are intended only as guidelines. Obviously, there are 
ways to group such as research levels, disciplines, and strategic objectives. 
5.3.3.1 Simulation Models 
5.3.3.1.1 A model needs to be developed to simulate new procedures 
and processes for the Airline Operational Center (AOC) that put 
more structure around turbulence avoidance with In-situ 
sensors. 
 
Since in situ turbulence information will radically change the way in which 
turbulence is viewed and utilized within AOCs, models that optimize the integration 
of this enhanced data in these environments should be developed. 
 
5.3.3.1.2 A model needs to be developed that will validate the 
collaboration processes between the three end users (pilots, 
dispatchers, and controllers) using turbulence as a subset of 
weather restrictions. 
 
As the JPDO looks toward building comprehensive air traffic management 
solutions as part of the NGATS, models that incorporate the collaborative 
response to turbulence restrictions and their impact on, for example, four-
dimensional arrival systems will need to be considered. 
5.3.3.1.3 An economic model needs to be developed to assess the cost 
of turbulence avoidance as a subset of weather and other 
restrictions. 
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Models to validate the system wide extent of turbulence as a restriction and the 
resulting impact on economics, capacity and the environment should be 
developed. 
5.3.3.2 End user tools 
5.3.3.2.1  
 
One of the major reasons for long lead times in the adoption of new technologies 
in this industry is the certification process for aircraft hardware and controller 
systems.  Often, by the time the device is in a state to be tested by the end user, it 
has already met design criteria for certification to avoid unnecessary duplication in 
the device’s development.  A common example is an avionics red label part, which 
often arrives for end user validation relatively late in the certification cycle, 
rendering user input moot.  A similar process occurs in the development of 
controller systems, where end user inputs are often too late to have any impact. 
 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the airline dispatcher sits mostly at the other end of 
this spectrum, with less stringent certification requirements for the technologies 
used in the operations centers.  But this is expected to change under the new 
collaboration model of NGATS, and even now, though much less connected to 
certification issues, the systems that they use are often very complex and require 
years to develop.  A new flight planning system installed in an AOC, for example, 
can literally take decades. 
 
5.3.3.2.2 Displays for the end user provide a rich area for research.  Examples 
of areas meriting further work are listed below. 
5.3.3.2.2.1 One of the more significant challenges in presenting turbulence and 
other weather data for the end users centers on the requirement to 
present data with various latencies. The weather Integrated Product 
Team (IPT) of the JPDO is working on a 5D weather forecast using 3D 
space, time, and a probability function, which will likely be displayed to 
end users along with real time radar/lidar echoes and real-time  time-
stamped turbulence reports from other aircraft.  In addition, Nexrad data 
might also be presented, which is typically five minutes old.  Further 
work with users aimed at determining appropriate hierarchies for 
turbulence data of various latencies will therefore be important early in 
development. 
5.3.3.2.2.2 The demands of new systems will provide a real research challenge in 
presentation schemes. As mentioned earlier, what are the implications 
of previous display methodologies and data hierarchies in designing 
new display requirements?  How, for example, is the depiction of heavy 
rain in the color red on current radar displays a hindrance to more 
advanced presentations of weather hazards such as turbulence or hail?  
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What colors, symbols and alerts should be associated with turbulence 
hazards on future generation displays?  Also, while it is vital that all 
users be using the same turbulence data to drive decisions, not all 
users will necessarily view that data in the same way because of the 
variation in their backgrounds, workloads and overall missions.  Work to 
answer these questions will be needed. 
5.3.3.2.2.3 Human sensory requirements for the different data sets must be 
integrated in the total end user solution.  Most presentation schemes 
currently involve visual feedback and a discussion of color, layout, and 
latency schemes as appropriate.  Audio schemes for different levels of 
hazard in the cockpit, such as terrain avoidance, are also prevalent.  
Certain tactile schemes are used such as control vibration (e.g. Stick 
Shaker) to warn of an aircraft stall. Since there will be fairly tight 
collaboration between the three end users, other human sensory 
requirements might be used for controllers and dispatchers, some of 
which may be similar to those in the cockpit.  Determinations as to 
which sensory schemes apply to turbulence as a subset of other 
weather hazards and constraints are therefore needed. 
5.3.3.2.2.4 Prioritization of the data is an area requiring substantial research.  It is 
important that prioritized data in the cockpit and other end user systems 
to meet the demands of the NGATS including safety/security, 
economics, and environment be used.  Fundamentally, how does the 
advent of reliable, high fidelity information on the locations of turbulence 
hazards, for example, change the way in which turbulence is presented 
alongside other threats such as traffic, terrain, and icing? 
 
5.3.3.3 Sensor Development and Preliminary Testing 
 
To enhance airspace capacity and maintain or enhance current safety levels within 
the National Airspace System (NAS), autonomous sensors will be relied upon 
extensively in supplying a constantly updated, vast array of data, including 
weather information, to drive decisions on routing and airspace usage.  With better 
information on the real time state of the atmosphere across the NAS, users can 
potentially make better decisions and derive significant operational efficiencies 
alongside additional airspace capacity. 
5.3.3.3.1 Sensors 
5.3.3.3.1.1 Additional research could be aimed at the development of sensors to 
differentiate between precipitation and areas of hazard on a large 
geographic scale.  Hazards for detection should include severe 
turbulence and hail, with the information being used to avoid 
unnecessary closures of airspace.  As mentioned earlier, all three end 
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users typically avoid areas of red and sometimes yellow, which are 
merely measure precipitation density rather than hazards. 
5.3.3.3.1.2 Using real-time measurements from aircraft as a data source, 
additional research should be aimed at improving turbulence forecast 
models 
5.3.3.3.1.3 Research needs to be continued in the development of sensors 
required for detection of clear air turbulence, and possible incorporation 
with other weather sensors. Integration of the various weather sensors 
is key to the economic health of the airlines 
5.3.3.3.2 Data Link  
5.3.3.3.2.1 An important corollary to the forecast sensors’ research lies in data 
collection and data compression schemes to minimize data link costs. 
As mentioned earlier, aircraft sensors are currently inactive on many 
flights because of data costs.  These expenses are a key driver in 
airline acceptance, and attention to such issues will be important to the 
success of NGATS as data proliferate.  Another area of concern is the 
use of common aircraft data links whenever possible.  It is not desirable 
to have one data link for weather information and another link for 
communications.  The airlines cannot justify such expenses, and pursuit 
of a strategy that ignores this consideration will present a roadblock to 
the success of the NGATS. 
5.3.3.4 Collaboration techniques and lower level system integration 
 
One of the key components of NGATS is the collaboration required to increase 
capacity.7  An example is using 4D arrival schemes which are designed to 
maximized use of runway capacity, which requires an onboard system to meet an 
arrival gate at a certain time. As constraints develop in the system like turbulence 
and other weather hazards, the Airline Operations Center will have to renegotiate 
a new arrival time with the ATC command center while consulting with the flight 
crew. 
5.3.3.5 Environmental Requirements 
As better operational techniques and procedures around turbulence avoidance are 
developed, emissions can be reduced through enhanced flight crew responses to 
turbulence of minimal duration and intensity.  This can be accomplished by 
researching what levels of turbulence are generally acceptable in the daily 
utilization of airspace and developing procedures and processes that are 
collaborated with all three end users. 
                                                
7 Joint Planning and Development Office. “Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated 
Plan,” 2004.  Pp 12-14.   
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Appendix A: TAPS In-Service Evaluation: Dispatcher Questionnaire 
Summary 
 
The following shows all questions and, where applicable, multiple choice responses as presented 
to the 50 dispatchers who participated in the questionnaire.  Tables and graphs show their 
responses.  Notes summarize responses to each question, including mention of any additional 
comments that dispatchers may have made in their answers. 
 
Dispatcher Questionnaire – Turbulence Procedures, Tools and Techniques 
 
Keeping in mind that all responses will remain anonymous, please be as candid yet 
comprehensive as possible in answering the following. 
 
SECTION 1: General Turbulence Resources and Procedures 
 
1. Besides information provided by the Turbulence Auto PIREP System (TAPS) on the 
WebASD display, what tools do you utilize to define areas of turbulence while 
working a shift, how frequently are they referenced, and how do you value the 
information provided by those tools? 
 
(For each tool below, respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
Primary Tool: Referenced at least once during any shift 
Secondary Tool: Referenced occasionally or as needed 
 
Referenced: Primary Secondary Rarely  Never 
Overall Value: 1 – Occasionally valuable, but usually unreliable or 
misleading 
2 – Somewhat Valuable most of the time 
3 – Valuable most of the time 
4 – Very Valuable/Essential during any given shift 
 
Delta Turbulence Forecast 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
45 4 1 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 - Least 2 - Somewhat 3 - Most 4 – Essential 
6 15 22 7 
 
Alerts from Delta Meteorology 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
29 18 2 1 
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Overall Value 
1 - Least 2 - Somewhat 3 - Most 4 – Essential 
3 12 16 19 
 
ADDS PIREPs 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
23 22 5 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
2 15 25 8 
 
Company PIREPs 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
32 16 2 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
2 9 16 23 
 
ADDS Graphical Turbulence Guidance (GTG) 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
17 25 6 2 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
7 13 24 6 
 
Upper air charts/information (raw data on winds, temps) 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
12 21 17 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
9 23 12 6 
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Notes: Data show dispatchers look at many sources for turbulence information, 
potentially because individual ones or subsets are not accurate enough to make good 
decisions.  Although many acknowledged tremendous subjectivity in PIREPs, 
responses also show that PIREPs represent the dataset in which the group has perhaps 
the most confidence – providing at least the locations of turbulence reasonably well.  
In planning flights, dispatchers rely on forecasts which they feel are only correct a 
little more than 50% of the time. 
 
2. What minimum level of turbulence prompts you to plan flights above/below/around a 
given piece of airspace? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
LGT CHOP  LGT TURB  MOD CHOP  MOD TURB 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Light Chop 1 
Light Turbulence 3 
Moderate Chop 28 
Moderate Turbulence 18 
 
Notes:  Dispatchers mainly tend to make decisions based on Moderate Turb/Chop.  
Light Turb/Chop is not considered a factor for planning.  Interestingly, this contrasts 
with results from pilots, who tend to use Light Turb/Chop as a trigger to act. 
 
3. Do you find a general disparity between the level of turbulence contained in a forecast 
for a given area and the levels of turbulence actually reported by pilots within that area 
(e.g. Do turbulence forecasts tend to be conservative in nature, forecasting levels of 
turbulence that are higher than may actually be present, or is it the other way around)? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Too conservative  39 
Too conservative – but forecaster Dependent 13 
Too conservative – but understandable due to potential for severe turbulence 1 
Too conservative – timeframe for forecast too long 5 
Varies with forecaster and area 3 
Forecasts underestimate turbulence 1 
Forecasts are on target 0 
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a. If so, how does this affect your practice of turbulence avoidance in flight 
planning (Do you account for the disparity in turbulence forecasts and actual 
conditions)? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Account 38 
Account – Need other data 33 
Account – Size of Forecast Area 2 
Account – Lack of PIREPS 4 
Ignore 6 
 
b. More generally, how often (as a percentage) would you estimate that forecasts 
of turbulence are accurate? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses Percent Std Dev 
All Forecasts 58 18 
Delta Turb Forecast 57 27 
Delta Metro Alerts 64 14 
ADDS PIREPS 76 10 
Graphical Turb Guidance 67 15 
SIGMETS 15 7 
 
 
Notes: The group generally feels that forecasts are conservative, meaning forecasters 
predict turbulence of greater intensity than what is actually reported.  Reasons offered 
for this approach included a desire by meteorologists to protect themselves from any 
liability.  A good example of doomsday forecasts occurs in Japan, where the culture is 
very sensitive due to several high profile accidents.  However, dispatchers are 
conscientious in accounting for this disparity by cross checking other sources, 
especially ones in which they have a higher confidence. 
 
The overall average for forecast accuracy was 58% with a standard deviation of 18.  
The group also listed a subset of sources it uses the most, which were similar to the 
overall average except for ADDS PIREPS at 76% and SIGMETS at 15%.  Both of 
these were a much smaller sample size, since only a few dispatchers listed them as 
sources outside the options listed in the questionnaire list.  In any case, it’s clear that 
there are no very precise tools for dispatchers to use in making good decisions. 
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4. What kind of role do you play in avoiding encounters with convective turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
 Preflight 
 
Type of Action 
Flt Plan Remarks - Summary 22 
Plan Around Mod when Possible 30 
Less Active 4 
More Active 15 
Most Active 4 
 
Notes: The dispatchers appear to be very active in the Preflight phase, making 
notes in the Remarks section of the Flight Plan, and routing based on forecasts of 
Moderate turbulence as baseline activities.  Still, these decisions are based on an 
array of data without a huge confidence level (e.g. in the range of 60%). 
 
Climbout 
 
Type of Action 
ACARS PIREPS to crew 11 
Contact only with big changes 8 
Less Active 30 
More Active 8 
Most Active 0 
  
Notes: The dispatchers seem to take a less active role in the climb phase, generally 
taking action only in cases of major changes based on PIREPS or Forecasts.  They 
are also less likely to send ACARS messages to the crew due to crew workload. 
 
 Enroute 
 
Type of Action 
Give Input on best Flight Level 8 
ACARS PIREPS, AIRMETS, SIGMETS 23 
Strategic Advice on Deviations 24 
Less Active 3 
More Active 21 
Most Active 8 
 
Notes: By monitoring more tactical information such as PIREPs and updated 
Convective SIGMETs, the dispatchers appear more active in this phase, and are 
much more likely to send ACARS messages given crew workloads. 
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Descent 
 
Type of Action 
Same as Climbout 13 
ACARS Low Level Wind Shear 9 
ACARS ITWS Info 4 
Contact only with big Changes 7 
Less Active 23 
More Active 10 
Most Active 1 
 
Notes:  The dispatchers treat this phase similar to the Climb with a less active role. 
They will still alert the crew to significant changes, which can be fairly subjective. 
 
a. For flights operating near thunderstorms in terminal areas, how much of a role 
do/can you play in guiding turbulence avoidance? 
 
Type of Action 
ACARS Wind Shear & Other Hazards 17 
Monitor ITWS & ACARS as Needed 5 
Major Role 8 
Constrained by ATC, Therefore Minimal 24 
Null 2 
 
Notes: Given significant constraints due to ATC and high crew workloads, the 
dispatchers take a less active role in the terminal area, sending an ACARS message 
only if they feel a definite hazard exists (e.g. wind shear or reports of severe). 
 
b. In these same areas, are reports of turbulence valuable to you as a dispatcher? 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 49 
No 1 
 
i. If so, how long do you view these reports to be valid? 
 
Average Minutes Std Dev 
40 26 
 
Notes: The duration for the validity was somewhat subjective based on a 
lack of  knowledge. 
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c. Would you find information concerning the actual turbulence hazard posed by 
an area of reflectivity (usually in the vicinity of convection) to aircraft you are 
handling helpful? 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 45 
No 5 
 
Notes: These responses were based on the group’s fairly rudimentary 
understanding of the E-Turb radar, and most also noted that they would want more 
training on how the system worked. 
 
A common mistake in all phases of flight was to tightly correlate levels of radar 
reflectivity with the levels of turbulence that might be expected, an approach which 
the E-Turb calls into question.  Several comments were made on the importance of 
human factors in the presentation of the new products, and most dispatchers felt 
they would need more training on the integration of the various new products being 
considered. 
 
5. What kind of role do you play in avoiding encounters with clear air turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
 Preflight 
 
Type of Action 
Flt Plan Remarks - Summary 28 
Plan Around Mod (or greater) when Possible 33 
Less Active 3 
More Active 16 
Most Active 6 
 
Notes: The dispatchers appear to be very active in the Preflight phase, making 
notes in the Remarks section of the Flight Plan, and routing based on forecasts of 
Moderate turbulence as baseline activities.  These decisions are again based on an 
array of data without a huge confidence level (e.g. in the range of 60%, similar to 
Convective).  The group also felt Clear Air phenomena were significantly more 
difficult to predict and locate. 
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Climbout 
 
Type of Action 
Advise Flight Levels 12 
ACARS PIREPS 13 
Contact only with big Changes 8 
Severity Dependent 3 
Less Active 24 
More Active 6 
Most Active 0 
 
Notes: The dispatchers seem to take a less active role in the climb phase, generally 
taking action only if they see major changes based on PIREPS or Forecasts.  
Again, they are also less likely to send ACARS messages to the crew because of 
crew workload. 
 
Enroute 
 
Type of Action 
Advise Changes 29 
ACARS PIREPS AIRMETS SIGMETS 33 
Less Active 1 
More Active 28 
Most Active 3 
 
Notes: The dispatchers appear more active in the Enroute phase by monitoring 
more tactical information such as PIREPS and updated AIRMETS/SIGMETS.  They 
are also much more likely to send ACARS messages in the cruise phase considering 
reduced crew workload. 
 
Descent 
 
Type of Action 
Give best Estimate 17 
ACARS Low Level Wind Shear 7 
Contact only with big Changes 8 
Less Active 23 
More Active 11 
Most Active 0 
 
Notes: The dispatchers treat this phase similar to the Climb with a less active role, 
while still alerting the crew to significant changes which can be fairly subjective.  
They also tend to give more information than with convective phenomena, since 
they feel that crews have much less ability to detect clear air turbulence. 
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a. For flights operating near clear air phenomena in terminal areas, how much of a 
role do/can you play in guiding turbulence avoidance? 
 
Type of Action 
Reports from Previous Flights 24 
Based on Pilot Request 0 
ACARS SIGMETS PIREPS –Mod & greater 15 
ACARS ITWS CIWS 1 
Less Active 22 
More Active 11 
Most Active 0 
 
Notes: The dispatchers take a less active role in the terminal area, but it is more 
active than with convective activity since the crews have a harder time detecting 
clear air.  Still, they feel that ATC restricts them to a great degree, but will send an 
ACARS message if they feel a definite hazard exists (e.g. wind shear or reports of 
severe). 
 
b. In these same areas, are reports of turbulence valuable to you as a dispatcher? 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 50 
No 0 
 
i. If so, how long do you view these reports to be valid? 
 
Average Minutes Std 
Dev 
62 38 
 
Notes: Interestingly, many felt the reports would still be valid 50% longer than 
convective phenomena, but most commented that this was based on mountain 
waves and jet stream CAT, which tend to endure in location and intensity.  This 
might not be true much of the time, especially in the terminal area. 
 
6. Do you feel that there is an altitude threshold below which flight crews either already 
are or should be operating tactically with little real-time input on turbulence from the 
dispatcher, and if so, what is that altitude? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
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Dispatcher Responses 
Yes                                         42 
Below 10K feet: 34 
Below 5K feet: 8 
No 8 
 
Notes: Most dispatchers feel pilots are reacting mainly to ATC in the Terminal area 
(defined primarily as below 10,000 feet in the descent phase), with little input from 
dispatch.  By listening to reports over the ATC frequency, many commented that pilots 
have the same or better information than the dispatcher.  Workloads are also much 
higher in these areas, so there is little opportunity for the dispatcher to provide timely 
information more relevant than that available to the crews.  Exceptions include times 
when the dispatcher receives a report of severe turbulence or low level wind shear, 
which usually triggers an ACARS message.  Still, it is suspected that sending messages 
such as these represents a regulatory induced response, since these reports are usually 
also being broadcast over ATC frequencies. 
 
7. When planning flights around a given piece of airspace due to turbulence, what steps 
do you take in coordinating a re-route or recommending an alternate altitude? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Steps Taken 
Contact Delta Metro 23 
Review PIREPS 30 
Provide Summary Flt Plan Remarks 32 
Assess Turbulence Severity 14 
Assess Forecasts  11 
Assess Fuel Tradeoffs 11 
File Next Optimal Route and/or Altitude 13 
Provide Next Best in Flt Plan Remarks 16 
 
Notes: Most dispatchers confirmed that PIREPS, Forecasts, and Delta Meteorology 
are the primary sources for making their decisions.  There is usually very little direct 
dialogue with the pilots in the preflight phase.  The dispatcher either plans around the 
area on the original flight plan without dialogue with the crews, or provides 
recommendations in the Flight Plan Remarks leaving enroute tactical decisions to the 
crew as conditions evolve.  One wonders whether the people involved have such a lack 
of good data that they only attempt to offer broad guidelines in the hope that more 
tactical information gained during the flight will provide the best information.  This 
begs the question of whether the overall plan is being optimized based on company 
goals. 
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8. Versus alternate altitude recommendations, how often (in terms of number of instances 
per year and a percentage) is it necessary for you to personally initiate re-routes (due to 
turbulence) for aircraft that are already enroute? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Average Percentage Std 
Dev 
6 5 
 
Notes: This excludes tactical deviations for convective activity.  Even though many in 
the research community perceive that dispatchers initiate a lot of reroutes to avoid 
turbulence, the data show that this happens very seldom.  It again underscores the 
importance of an integrated solution whereby those closest to the phenomena (pilots 
and ATC) are in the loop, looking at similar information for better tactical decisions. 
 
9. How often do areas of turbulence that were not forecast (but confirmed by PIREPs or 
other means) result in changes to preflight route planning? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Average Percentage Std 
Dev 
7 6 
 
Notes: This question was misunderstood by several dispatchers, but in many cases, 
their notes clarified their interpretation and provided some valuable insights.  
Generally, the dispatchers felt the different forecasts tended to overstate the existence 
of turbulence in both intensity and area, so it was unusual to have PIREPS outside 
these forecast areas.  If they did find PIREPS outside the forecast area, they would 
generally plan around it. Most indicated a valid PIREP would trigger them to change 
routing 80% to 100% of the time.  It is noteworthy that PIREPS drive a lot of decisions, 
but the data mined at Delta show that PIREPS are highly subjective, often failing to 
correlate to the TAPS based g load thresholds for various levels of turbulence. 
 
10. Based on pilots’ tactical decisions and guidance from ATC in avoiding turbulence on a 
day to day basis, would you say that your role today tends to be more reactive or 
proactive when collaborating with flight crews to avoid areas of turbulence during the 
enroute portion of a flight? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
following categories to account for responses) 
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Dispatcher Responses 
Proactive 29 
Reactive 21 
 
Notes: Most qualified their answers with the caveat that their approach depends 
heavily on the information available to them, with many noting that they would be 
more proactive if they had better information to pass to the crews.  Some also 
commented that by making the dispatcher accountable to new and better information, 
the advent of new tools has had the unintended consequence of making their jobs 
significantly more difficult and sometimes overwhelming, underscoring the importance 
of human factors in presenting new data. 
 
SECTION 2: Scenario-based Questions 
 
(Answers to these questions were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
categories below to account for responses.  To make sense of the answers, many 
dispatchers wrote that they would advise the crew to explore a variety of actions, so all 
possible options have been included.) 
 
Scenario A 
 
11. A Delta B757 flight crew makes a conventional PIREP via ACARS of “moderate 
chop” during cruise at FL330 over southwestern Utah, and descends to FL270 for a 
better ride.  Due to traffic, the flight is unable to climb again for 30 minutes, 
devastating fuel consumption vs. what had been planned at FL390.  Recent TAPS 
reports made in the vicinity (see Illustration for Scenario A in the Appendix) confirm 
the presence of what flight crews would term mostly light, occasional moderate 
turbulence, but also show the dimensions of the turbulence to be only 80 nautical miles 
long.  If you were handling a flight about to enter this area (e.g. DAL1276, as depicted 
in the Illustration), and were planning flights that would transit this area later on, how 
would you handle with this information? 
 
Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Higher Altitude 10 
Lower Altitude 9 
Reroute No Altitude Change 3 
Reroute With Altitude Change 0 
Stay the course 30 
Advise Crew of conditions 47 
 
Notes: All the dispatchers felt the TAPS information provided was valuable enough to 
be proactive in advising the crew of Delta 1276 of the scenario in Question 10.  30 of 
them would recommend that crews stay the course with the seat belt sign ON.  9 would 
recommend a lower altitude due to possible moderate turbulence, with an advisory that 
the crew check the impact on fuel before descending.  10 would recommend a higher 
altitude if weight and ATC permitted, so as to avoid the moderate turbulence and 
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possibly avoid a fuel problem.  3 would reroute if fuel considerations allowed them to 
do so.  Overall, the dispatchers became very involved with reasonable alternatives 
because of the better information available to them. 
 
Scenario B 
 
12. While settling in for a shift, you observe a TAPS report of moderate turbulence at 
FL330 over southern Colorado (see Illustration for Scenario B in the Appendix).  Just 3 
minutes behind the aircraft that made the report, having been on the exact same route 
and at exactly same altitude, is another aircraft (of the same type and approximately the 
same weight) also capable of making TAPS reports.  You observe, however, that this 
aircraft made no electronic report of turbulence while transiting the airspace where the 
first aircraft made a report.  If you were handling a flight about to enter this area, and 
were planning flights that would transit this area later on, how would you handle this 
information? 
 
Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Nothing 3 
Advise & Request Ride Report 46 
Assume System Failure 1 
Gather Other Information 33 
 
Notes: 46 dispatchers wrote that they would take action by advising other crews and 
requesting ride reports to validate the reports. 3 wrote that they would ignore it 
primarily because it was in an area of convective activity (the light Nexrad echoes 
some miles distant from the reports were not intended to connote an area of 
convection, however) where turbulence can change quickly based on storm movement.  
Only one assumed a system failure, but even this dispatcher would opt to get more 
information to validate the decision.  Overwhelmingly, the dispatchers paid attention to 
the TAPS reports and advised the crew of the potential turbulence.  They also focused 
on the area as one of concern and attempted to gather more data to make good 
decisions. 
 
Scenario C 
 
13. While looking at a WebASD screen showing TAPS reports, you notice an aircraft on 
the Falcon arrival (northeast of DIRTY) make a TAPS report of severe turbulence in 
the vicinity of convection at 16,000 feet (see Illustration for Scenario C in the 
Appendix). 
 
c. If the last flight you were handling during the shift were an aircraft along the same 
flight path, but 3 minutes behind the aircraft that sent the report, how would you 
handle this information? 
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Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Nothing 3 
Advise Crew 47 
 
Notes: 47 out of 50 would advise the crew immediately.  Even though the report is 
located near only very light reflectivity on the north side of the cell, 3 of the 
dispatchers would not advise the crew only because they felt time was limited and 
the crew would be avoiding the area anyway based on radar echoes presented on 
their airborne weather radar (which NASA flight tests and other data at Delta show 
might not correlate to the severe turbulence).  Most agreed the message would be 
limited and to the point due to high workloads and limited time for crews to react. 
 
b. If you were handling an aircraft 7 minutes behind the aircraft that sent the report, 
how would you handle this information? 
 
Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Nothing 1 
Advise Crew 49 
 
 
Notes: 49 out of 50 would advise the crew immediately.  One of the dispatchers 
would not advise the crew only because he felt the crew would be avoiding the area 
based on the radar reflectivity.  Most agreed the message would be more detailed 
with more time available to react. 
 
c. If you were handling an aircraft 15 minutes behind the aircraft that sent the report, 
how would you handle this information? 
 
Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Nothing 1 
Advise Crew 49 
 
Notes: 49 out of 50 would advise the crew immediately.  One of the dispatchers 
would not advise the crew only because he felt the crew would be avoiding the area 
based on the radar reflectivity.  Most agreed the message would comment on the 
movement of the convective weather compared to the time of the original report.  
More specifically, the dispatchers wrote that they would be least forceful with their 
recommendation since the cell near the report might have moved out of the 
approach corridor. 
 
d. If your workload was high due to holds, diversions and other constraints related to 
convection in the terminal area, how would this affect your ability to look at 
WebASD, and, if able, process a TAPS report of severe turbulence as outlined 
above? 
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Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Consult WebASD & Act 10 
Consult WebASD but Not enough time to Act 12 
Not enough time to pull up WebASD 28 
 
Notes: With a high workload based on the present WebASD display and the 
attendant problems of smoothly integrating the information on their desktops, only 
10 dispatchers would take action on the reports.  Another 12 would consult the 
display but would probably take no action due to a high workload.  Finally, 28 
would not consult the display at all. 
 
e. If there were lots of other TAPS reports of turbulence in the vicinity, how would 
this affect your ability to look at WebASD, and, if able, process a report of severe 
turbulence as outlined above? 
 
Dispatcher Action/Recommendation 
Take Action because of more reports to confirm 37 
Take No Action because of WebASD issues 13 
Remove Screen because of WebASD issues 3 
 
Notes: 37 out of 50 would advise the crew immediately, while 13 would take no 
action and 3 would remove the screen primarily because of information overload. 
 
Workload issues seem to be the common problem in Questions 13d & 13e, with the 
most important drivers related to the presentation of the data.  Respondents seem 
particularly concerned with issues such as integration of the data, priority schemes 
and display formats, all related to human factors. 
 
It is important also to keep in mind that Question 13 was designed for responses in 
the terminal area, which poses the most demands on this type of system, since there 
is far less room for maneuvering by the crew and requires a lot of focus on the part 
of the dispatcher.  Typically, the enroute environment allows more time for the 
dispatcher to react and the crews usually have more options because of fewer 
constraints.  In the few cases where the dispatcher did not advise the crew, it was 
because they felt the crews were aware of the convective activity and would avoid 
the strong cells if possible. 
 
One interesting point in this question is that dispatchers seem to confirm the belief 
that reflectivity on radar screens (e.g. red) correlates closely with Moderate to 
Severe turbulence.  As noted elsewhere, however, this correlation has been brought 
into question based on the work done with the E-Turb radar, which has often 
revealed the presence of strong turbulence in areas of little or no reflectivity, and 
relatively smooth air in areas of high reflectivity. 
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14. In general, do you feel that real-time, objective information on turbulence around areas 
of convection would enhance your ability to perform your duties? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 43 
No 7 
 
Notes: Respondents also consistently commented that radar reflectivity was the prime 
source of information for avoiding turbulence near thunderstorms, and 7 of the 50 felt 
that the radar was the only source used by the crews in a convective environment. 
 
15. Do you feel that there is a greater need for real-time, objective information on clear air 
turbulence vs. convective turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 49 
No 1 
 
Notes: Most respondents felt TAPS data would be more valuable when used in an area 
of Clear Air Turbulence, since there were no other valid sensors on the aircraft.  One 
felt TAPS information would be of no value, but offered no explanation. 
 
SECTION 3: Personal Background 
 
(The following set of questions was asked to understand individual responses to various 
questions, and to see if there was some correlation between prior experiences and 
individual approaches to turbulence.  Since these experiences seemed not to be a factor, no 
summary of responses has been included.) 
 
1. How long have you been a dispatcher? 
2. How long have you been a dispatcher with Delta? 
3. As a Delta dispatcher, do you work an International desk or a Domestic desk? 
4. Please list any pilot certificates and ratings held. 
5. Is there anything else about your background that might be helpful in understanding 
your responses to this survey (e.g. background as a professional meteorologist , 
previous occupations etc.)? 
6. Have you used the TAPS information/reports on WebASD?  
7. How often did you use the TAPS information (have the WebASD screen available)? 
8. When was the last time you used TAPS? 
9. When were you introduced to TAPS? 
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10. When was the most recent time you were trained on TAPS? 
11. Have you read the TAPS user guide? 
12. Have you handled a flight where an airframe inspection was required due to the 
captain’s assessment of turbulence? 
13. Have you handled a flight where there was an injury due to turbulence? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4: Historical uses of the Turbulence Auto PIREP System (TAPS) on 
WebASD 
 
The following questions relate primarily to any prior uses of TAPS information on 
WebASD that you may recall.  If you cannot recall any instance in which you used the 
Turbulence Auto PIREP System, answer each question as applicable.  
 
Important Note: Although the feed of TAPS reports on WebASD had been available to 
dispatchers until about June of 2006, active project work and support for the technologies 
ended in January of 2006.  As a result, on average, dispatchers stated that they had last 
used TAPS more than 9 months prior to sitting for this questionnaire. 
 
16. During the period in which it was available, how would you categorize your use of the 
information provided by TAPS reports on WebASD? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
Referenced: Primary Secondary Rarely  Never 
Overall Value: 1 – Occasionally valuable, but usually unreliable 
2 – Somewhat Valuable most of the time 
3 – Valuable most of the time 
4 – Very Valuable/Essential during any given shift 
 
 Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
4 – Essential 3 1 2 0 
3 – Mostly valuable 2 9 7 0 
2 – Somewhat valuable 0 7 12 0 
1 – Least valuable  0 0 5 2 
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Notes: Although other questions clearly show that dispatchers want more objective 
information on turbulence, their historical use of TAPS was not as high as some of 
the sources with which they were more comfortable.  Still, over time as they gained 
confidence in the system, many commented that they learned to appreciate the 
objective, real time value of TAPS data.  PIREPS and TAPS data were primarily 
used to validate the forecast in the planning process, and also in the more tactical 
decisions once the flight was dispatched. 
 
Please explain why you reference TAPS as indicated here (include system 
advantages, shortcomings etc.). 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Con - Not Integrated in Graphical Flt Following 12 
Con – Threshold seems high & Insufficient Reports 3 
Pro – Objective information 11 
Pro – Timely information 7 
Con – Glitches using WebASD 16 
Pro – Good reference for airframe inspections 2 
Pro – Good Reference for Turbulence in General 9 
Con – Insufficient Coverage & Reports 12 
 
Notes: One of the major reasons for not using the TAPS data was the difficulty that 
the group had in using the data.  16 dispatchers commented on problems accessing 
the data, and 12 commented that they would use it more frequently if it were 
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integrated into their Graphical Flight Following (GFF) System.  11 specifically 
commented that they really liked the objective nature of the data versus the 
subjective nature of PIREPS.  Although not specific in nature, others indicated a 
similar attitude in discussing TAPS data as a valid verification tool for forecasts 
and PIREPS. 
 
17. Via the following metrics, please give as many examples as possible of times within 
the last year when real time, objective TAPS information either was helpful or could 
have been helpful in performing your duties? 
 
e. Turbulence encounters avoided 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 25 
Possibly Once 3 
Possibly Twice 4 
Possibly Several 18 
 
Notes: 25 could not remember or project a situation where the data would have 
helped.  25 had at least one occasion where the data would have helped, and 18 
had several or more occasions.  Many, however, found the term “turbulence 
encounter” too vague to craft a meaningful response, but put down an answer 
anyway. 
 
f. Airframe inspections avoided 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 41 
Possibly Once 5 
Possibly Twice 3 
Possibly Several 1 
 
Notes: Although 41 could not remember or project a situation where the data 
would have helped, it is important to note that airframe inspections are not a 
common occurrence.  When one does happen, however, it often creates a set of 
equipment issues that ripple through the system. 
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c. Reductions in traffic flow disruptions 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 42 
Possibly Once 2 
Possibly Twice 1 
Possibly Several 5 
 
Notes: Comments indicated that dispatchers are unclear on how ATC and pilots 
will actually use the data in the system, but were open to the possibilities. 
 
d. Other benefits (e.g. confidence in flight situation, workload etc.) 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
None 21 
Possibly Several 9 
Useful check for PIREPS & Forecasts 21 
 
 
Notes: There was some difficulty for the dispatchers in trying to speculate about a 
hypothetical (i.e. recalling instances when TAPS data might have been of benefit 
versus actual situations encountered). This was especially true for those 
dispatchers who had not used the data frequently.  Still, use of the data as a 
crosscheck against PIREPS was a recurring theme. 
 
 
 
18. Is WebASD a useful/viable platform for you to reference TAPS information? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 27 
No 23 
 
Notes: While 27 felt the display was adequate, most also wrote that they would 
prefer an integrated display. 
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a. If not, how would you suggest that TAPS data be presented at your workstation? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Put TAPS into in-house display 28 
Eliminate WebASD access glitches 3 
More input from Delta on Displays 2 
Put Mod/Severe Reports in Dispatcher Queue 1 
Provide different screen 2 
Quicker sign-in 1 
N/A 10 
Null 5 
 
Notes: Integration of TAPS data into the Delta flight following display was 
mentioned as perhaps the best option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. As presented on WebASD, TAPS reports can be scaled to assess the impact of the 
same turbulence on different airframes. 
 
a. Have you used this feature? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 48 
No 2 
 
Notes: Most commented that the feature was not very user-friendly. 
 
b. Do you feel that scaling either is or could be helpful? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 42 
No 3 
Null 5 
 
Notes: While most felt the feature could be helpful, the key is to make it easy to use. 
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c. Is the process to conduct the scaling straightforward, and if not, how do you feel 
this feature could be made easier? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 7 
No 6 
Null 37 
Put TAPS into GFF 1 
Make it as simple as Pointing & Clicking 2 
 
 
20. TAPS on WebASD is also capable of presenting real time turbulence advisories to the 
dispatcher when TAPS reports are made along the routes of specified flights. 
 
a. Have you used this feature? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 16 
No 34 
 
b. Do you feel that these advisories either are or could be helpful? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 50 
No 0 
 
c. Is the process to establish advisories for specified flights straightforward, and if 
not, how do you feel that this feature could be made easier? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 9 
No 9 
Null 31 
Put TAPS into GFF 2 
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21. How many of your flights would you estimate deviate from the flight planned altitude 
at least once during cruise flight due to turbulence? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
<20%  20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-100% 
 
Percent Dispatchers Mid Point 
< 20 16 15 
20-39 20 30 
40-59 11 50 
60-79 3 70 
80-100 0 90 
Weighted Average 32 % 
 
a. Once off of the flight planned altitude, how long on average do they remain at 
the new altitude? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
<20 minutes 
20-39 minutes 
40-59 minutes 
60-90 minutes 
The remainder of cruise flight 
 
Minutes  Dispatchers Mid Point 
< 20 6 15 
20-39 24 30 
40-59 5 50 
60-90 5 75 
Remainder of Cruise 10 60 
Weighted Average 41 Minutes 
 
Notes: A high number of dispatchers (34) feel that altitude changes are frequent 
occurrences, and although 16 show < 20%, even this is significant.  44 dispatchers 
report that when an altitude change is initiated, the duration can last from 20 minutes 
to the duration of the cruise portion of the flight.  Interestingly, the pilots’ responses 
show that dispatchers still may underestimate how often this happens. 
 
Perhaps the most important consideration in all this is that having 32% of all flights 
deviate from the optimum altitude for an average of 41 minutes results in a large 
economic cost in additional fuel burn. 
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22. Given the dynamic nature of turbulence, what other types of turbulence information 
(beyond TAPS) do you feel would be helpful either in avoiding or enhancing 
operational awareness of turbulence in a given piece of airspace (e.g. better forecasts 
etc.)? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
More Feedback from Crews 9 
More Feedback from ATC 3 
Better Forecasts 30 
More Specific Data 7 
ADDS for International Flights 3 
More information on Temp & Wind 3 
More ITWS sites 2 
Null 4 
 
Notes: Better forecasts are a recurring requirement for the dispatchers, especially with 
respect to more strategic planning (i.e. 1 to 6 hrs). 
 
23. Do you have any other recommendations to enhance the operational relevance of 
TAPS? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
No 16 
Wider coverage & equipage 6 
Reinstate availability 3 
Put TAPS into GFF 12 
Make WebASD more user friendly 12 
Ability to pass reports quickly 4 
Put Mod/Severe reports in Message Queue 2 
 
24. Have you passed information from TAPS reports to aircraft that you are handling?   If 
so, during what phase of flight of the aircraft did you pass the information and what 
was it used for (situational awareness of turbulence, routing decision, severe load 
confirmation, etc.)? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
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Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 23 
No 27 
Flight Planning 3 
Enroute Advisories 19 
Correlate PIREPS 0 
Confirm Turbulence 3 
 
Notes: Most were used as advisories for flights that were already enroute as an aid to 
situational awareness.  Others were used for flight planning and to confirm the 
presence of turbulence. 
 
25. Have pilots requested TAPS information from you? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 6 
No 44 
 
Notes: The pilots were originally briefed on the TAPS program after the initial 
installation of TAPS in 2004, but their training concentrated more on the E-Turb 
Radar.  Therefore, it is not surprising that that they would not request this data.  In the 
questionnaires administered to pilots, however, crews were very receptive to receiving 
such information. 
 
26. Have you had a pilot report turbulence around the same time that his aircraft produced 
a TAPS report?  If so, on average how does the information in the manual pilot report 
compare to the TAPS report? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses.  In making sense of the following, of 
the 20 dispatchers who did notice a pilot report turbulence around the same time as a 
TAPS report, many individuals wrote that they had witnessed instances where (1) the 
intensity reported by TAPS was similar to the intensity reported by the pilot, (2) the 
intensity reported by TAPS was greater than indicated by the pilot, and (3) vice versa.  
All of these accounts were included in the table). 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
No 30 
Yes 20 
Yes TAPS>PIREPS 6 
Yes TAPS<PIREPS 15 
Yes TAPS=PIREPS 7 
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27. In your opinion, which is more timely: a manual report of turbulence from a pilot or a 
TAPS report? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
TAPS 38 
PIREP 12 
 
28. In your opinion, is a TAPS report more accurate in terms of location and severity of the 
encountered turbulence than a manual pilot report of turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 45 
No 5 
 
 
 
 
29. Have you used information from a TAPS report during discussions with pilots 
regarding a request for a Severe Loads Inspection? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 3 
No 47 
 
30. Have you looked at TAPS reports to assist in planning routes for flights? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 19 
No 31 
 
a. Do you think that TAPS reports could be used to assist in route of flight 
planning? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Yes 44 
No 6 
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31. What is the information you want immediately available in a TAPS report? Flight 
Number?  Encounter Location (Lat/Long)?  Encounter Altitude?  Turbulence Severity 
Metric?  Aircraft Type?  Time of Report?  Aircraft Weight?  Aircraft Speed?  Severe 
Loads Flag/Maintenance Flag? 
 
(Most respondents circled their answers as they appeared in the body of the question, 
but were otherwise fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Flt Number 39 
Location 41 
Altitude 48 
Severity 46 
Time of Report 46 
A/C Type 48 
A/C Weight 19 
A/C Speed 17 
Maintenance Flag 24 
 
 
32. What TAPS filtering functions are important to you?  By time?  By severity?  By 
altitude?  By geography? 
 
(Most respondents circled their answers as they appeared in the body of the question, 
but were otherwise fill-in) 
 
Dispatcher Responses 
Time 41 
Severity 43 
Altitude 44 
Areas 36 
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Dispatcher Questionnaire Appendix 
 
Illustration for Scenario A 
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Illustration for Scenario B 
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Illustration for Scenario C 
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Appendix B: E-Turb Radar In-Service Evaluation: Pilot Questionnaire 
Summary 
 
The following shows all questions and, where applicable, multiple choice 
responses as presented to the 20 Boeing 737-800 pilots who participated in the 
questionnaire.  Tables and graphs show their responses.  Notes summarize 
responses to each question, including mention of any additional comments that 
respondents may have made in their answers. 
 
Pilot Questionnaire – Turbulence Procedures, Tools and Techniques 
 
Keeping in mind that all responses will remain anonymous, please be as candid yet 
comprehensive as possible in answering the following. 
 
SECTION 1: General Turbulence Resources and Procedures 
 
1. What tools do you utilize to define areas of turbulence on a flight, how frequently are 
they referenced, and how do you value the information provided by those tools? 
 
(For each tool below, respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
Primary Tool: Referenced at least once during any flight 
Secondary Tool: Referenced occasionally or as needed 
 
Referenced: Primary Secondary Rarely  Never 
Overall Value: 1 – Occasionally valuable, but usually unreliable or misleading 
2 – Somewhat Valuable most of the time 
3 – Valuable most of the time 
4 – Very Valuable/Essential  
 
 
 
Delta Turbulence Forecast 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
5 7 7 1 
 
Overall Value 
1 - Least 2 - Somewhat 3 - Most 4 – Essential 
7 5 4 4 
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Alerts from Delta Meteorology 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
0 7 9 4 
 
Overall Value 
1 - Least 2 - Somewhat 3 - Most 4 – Essential 
2 5 12 1 
 
Flight Plan Weather 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
11 6 3 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
3 9 7 1 
 
Input from Dispatchers 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
10 9 1 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
0 4 7 9 
 
ATC Frequency 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
20 0 0 0 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
0 1 6 13 
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Current Generation Radar (Legacy Magenta) 
 
Frequency Referenced 
Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
10 6 2 2 
 
Overall Value 
1 – Least 2 – Somewhat 3 – Most 4 - Essential 
8 4 5 3 
 
Notes: Data show pilots generally look at fewer sources for turbulence than 
dispatchers, potentially because they have less access and training for a lot of sources.  
As expected, data show the most used and trusted source for pilots are comments 
regarding ride quality transmitted over the ATC frequency.  Flight Plan Weather, a 
compilation of Forecasts and PIREPS, along with Dispatcher Input are the next most 
used sources, with reasonable confidence levels.  Meanwhile, the most used and 
generally trusted source for information by dispatchers, the Delta Turbulence 
Forecast, is seldom used or trusted by pilots.  Although Delta Meteorologists are not 
frequently used to inform turbulence related decisions, the pilots seem to have a 
reasonable level of confidence in their input.  Several comments were made about how 
subjective and often erratic PIREPS were (e.g. different turbulence levels reported in 
same area by different crews).  In summary, pilots, like dispatchers, have to rely on 
forecasts which they feel are only correct a little over 50% of the time and real time 
reports that are not very reliable. 
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2. During a flight, what minimum level of turbulence prompts you to request a new 
altitude, deviation, or re-route? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
LGT CHOP   LGT TURB   MOD CHOP   MOD TURB 
 
Pilot  Responses 
Light Chop 7 
Light Turbulence 8 
Moderate Chop 5 
Moderate Turbulence 0 
 
Notes: 15 (75%) of the pilots used either Light Chop or Turbulence as a trigger to 
make a decision about making changes due to turbulence.  Several comments were 
made that indicated pilots would not be as quick to make a change if they had better 
information. 
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3. How often (in terms of an overall percentage) do you do the following as a result of 
your turbulence threshold above: 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers, filling in percentages as 
appropriate) 
 
Choice Percentage 
Change altitudes with no reroute 66 
Reroute with no change in altitude 10 
Reroute and a change in altitude 8 
 
4. Do you find a general disparity between the level of turbulence contained in any pilot 
reported information for a given area and the levels of turbulence actually encountered 
within that area (i.e. Do turbulence PIREPs tend to be conservative in nature, reporting 
levels of turbulence that are higher than may actually be present, or is it the other way 
around)? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Forecasts are too conservative 8 
Too Conservative (Request Alt Change)  1 
Forecasts vary with forecaster & area 3 
Forecasts underestimate turbulence 1 
Forecasts are on target 7 
 
a. If so, how does this affect your practice of turbulence avoidance (Do you 
account for the disparity in turbulence reports and actual conditions)? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Pilot  Responses 
Account 6 
Account – Turn Seat Belt ON 2 
Account – Verify Other A/C 2 
Account – Avoid all Turbulence 2 
Ignore 4 
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b. Is there a similar disparity between the levels of turbulence that are forecast for 
a given area versus the levels of turbulence actually encountered within that 
area? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Pilot  Responses 
Yes 15 
No 5 
 
c. More generally, how often (as a percentage) would you estimate that forecasts 
of turbulence are accurate? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data 
developed the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Pilot  Responses Percent Std Dev 
All Forecasts 53 17 
Delta Turb Forecast 65 21 
 
Notes: Only 7 pilots felt the forecasts were on target, while 8 felt that forecasts over 
warn, predicting turbulence to be stronger than is actually encountered.  Most try to 
account for this, but they also tend to be very conservative because of their lack of 
confidence in the information, either avoiding the area or turning on the seat belt sign. 
 
5. What kind of information do you use in avoiding encounters with convective 
turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
 Preflight 
   
Information source 
Web Radar 16 
Turbulence Chart 5 
Flight Plan Weather 11 
Inbound Crew 3 
Dispatcher 11 
 
Notes: Nexrad data from the internet and big screen TVs at the gate (where 
available) are major sources during Preflight, with guidance from the dispatchers 
on the Flight Plan Weather providing additional information. 
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Climbout 
   
Information Source 
Radar 17 
PIREPS 14 
Reports on ATC Frequency 11 
TCAS for location of reporting A/C 1 
Visual for location of reporting A/C 4 
 
Notes: Onboard weather radar, ATC, and PIREPS are the primary sources for 
turbulence avoidance, with dispatchers playing a minimal role. 
 
 Enroute 
  
Information Source 
Radar 19 
PIREPS 15 
Reports on ATC Frequency 12 
TCAS for location of reporting A/C 2 
Dispatcher 8 
 
Notes: Onboard weather radar, ATC, and PIREPS are the primary sources for 
turbulence avoidance.  Also, the dispatchers appear more active in the Enroute 
phase by sending more tactical information like PIREPS and updated Convective 
SIGMETS. 
 
Descent 
  
Information Source 
Radar 18 
PIREPS 14 
Reports on ATC Frequency 13 
TCAS for location of reporting A/C 1 
 
Notes: Onboard weather radar, ATC, and PIREPS are the primary sources for 
turbulence avoidance, with dispatchers playing a minimal role similar to the climb 
phase. 
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a. When operating near thunderstorms in terminal areas, what tools do you use for 
turbulence avoidance?  
 
Information Source 
Radar 20 
PIREPS 11 
Reports on ATC Frequency 13 
TCAS for location of reporting A/C 3 
Wind Information (to determine cell movement) 1 
 
Notes: Onboard weather radar, ATC, and PIREPS are the primary sources for 
turbulence avoidance.  Given ATC constraints, the comments confirmed that fewer 
options were available in the terminal area, so the crews tend to be very proactive 
about having the cabin crew and passengers seated and secure.  Also, the 
dispatchers take a less active role in the terminal area. 
 
b. In the terminal area, are PIREPs of convective turbulence valuable to you? 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 19 
No 1 
 
i. If so, how long do you view these reports to be valid? 
 
Average Minutes Std Dev 
14 7 
 
Notes: The duration for the validity was somewhat subjective based on a 
lack of knowledge concerning how long reports really should be valid. 
 
ii. Would you find real-time, automatically generated, objective reports of 
convective turbulence more helpful in these areas? 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 20 
No 0 
 
iii. How long would you view these reports to be valid? 
 
Average Minutes Std Dev 
16 8 
 
Notes: Here again, the duration was somewhat subjective based on a lack 
of knowledge as to how long these reports really should be valid. 
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c. Would you find information concerning the actual turbulence hazard posed by 
an area of reflectivity (usually in the vicinity of convection) to the aircraft you 
are flying helpful? 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 17 
No 2 
Null 1 
 
Notes: Most felt this information would be helpful based on their understanding of 
the radar and assuming that meaningful ways to present the data could be found. 
 
More generally, a common approach to convective weather in all phases of flight 
was to tightly correlate high levels of radar reflectivity with the level of turbulence 
that might be expected.  This connection seems dubious in many cases based on 
data and experience with the E-Turb radar.  Several comments were made on the 
importance of human factors in the presentation of the new products, and most 
pilots felt they would need more training on the integration of the various new 
products being considered. 
 
6. What kind of information do you use in avoiding encounters with clear air turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Preflight 
   
Information source 
Turbulence Chart 10 
Flight Plan Weather 16 
Inbound Crew 3 
PIREPS 6 
Dispatcher 5 
 
Notes: The Flight Plan Weather is the major source of information for CAT during 
Preflight.  The dispatchers are also used during this phase.  Though viewed to be 
helpful, the Delta Meteorology Turbulence Forecast/chart is also not readily 
available to domestic crews. 
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Climbout 
   
Information Source 
Reports on ATC Frequency 12 
PIREPS 19 
Dispatch 0 
Flight Plan Weather 5 
Lenticular Clouds 1 
 
Notes: Reports of turbulence over ATC frequencies and PIREPS are the primary 
sources for clear air turbulence avoidance.  The dispatchers take a less active role 
in the climb phase. 
 
 Enroute 
  
Information Source 
Reports on ATC Frequency 16 
PIREPS 19 
Dispatch 4 
Delta Metro 2 
Flight Plan Weather 6 
 
Notes: As in the climb, reports of turbulence over ATC frequencies and PIREPS 
are the primary sources for turbulence avoidance enroute.  Knowing that the 
workload of pilots is reduced during this phase, dispatchers appear more active, 
often sending lots of tactical information such as PIREPS and updated 
AIRMETS/SIGMETS. 
 
Descent 
  
Information Source 
Reports on ATC Frequency 15 
PIREPS 19 
Dispatch 2 
Delta Metro 0 
Flight Plan Weather 4 
 
Notes: Here again, reports of turbulence over ATC frequencies and PIREPS are 
the primary sources for turbulence avoidance.  The dispatchers take a less active 
role in the descent/arrival phase similar to the climb phase. 
  
 
 
a. For flights operating near clear air phenomena in terminal areas, what tools 
do you use for turbulence avoidance? 
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Information Source 
Reports on ATC Frequency 12 
Predictive Wind Shear PWS 1 
PIREPS 17 
TCAS for location of reporting A/C 2 
Airport Terminal Info System ATIS 2 
 
Notes: Reports of turbulence over the approach frequency and PIREPS serve as the 
primary sources for turbulence avoidance.  As with operations in a convective 
environment, ATC significantly constrains crew options due to traffic density.  
Therefore, most pilots ensure that the cabin crew and passengers are seated and 
secure when operating in the terminal near areas of known CAT.  Also, the 
dispatchers take a less active role in the terminal area. 
 
b. In the terminal areas, are PIREPs of clear air turbulence valuable to you? 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 20 
No 0 
 
i. If so, how long do you view these reports to be valid? 
 
Average Minutes Std Dev 
21 14 
 
Notes: The duration for the validity was somewhat subjective based on a 
lack of knowledge concerning how long reports really should be valid. 
 
ii. Would you find real-time, automatically generated, objective reports of 
Clear Air turbulence more helpful in these areas? 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 20 
No 0 
 
iii. How long would you view these reports to be valid? 
 
Average Minutes Std Dev 
28 18 
 
Notes: The duration for the validity was somewhat subjective based on a 
lack of knowledge concerning how long reports really should be valid. 
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c. Would you find electronic turbulence reports scaled to the aircraft you are 
flying helpful? 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 18 
No 1 
Null 1 
 
Notes: With the understanding that meaningful ways could be found to 
present the data, nearly all pilots saw value in the TAPS reports. 
 
7. Do you feel that there is phase of flight or an altitude threshold below which you are 
committed to follow ATC vectors and accept the turbulence as encountered? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
   
Pilot Responses 
Yes 11 
No 9 
 
Notes: The pilots are reluctant to define an altitude below which they are strictly at the 
whim of ATC, but most admit that their options become fewer as they approach 
roughly the 10,000 foot mark. 
 
8. When attempting to avoid a given piece of airspace due to turbulence that is either 
forecast, reported by others, or experienced by you, what steps do you take in 
coordinating an amended clearance for a re-route, deviation or alternate altitude? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Steps Taken 
Contact Dispatcher 9 
Request approval from ATC 19 
Review PIREPS 6 
If unsafe, deviate & inform ATC 2 
Time permitting, contact Dispatch & Metro 6 
In Convective Wx., Radar is primary 3 
 
Notes: Most confirmed that turbulence reported over ATC frequencies, dispatchers, 
and PIREPS are the primary information drivers for making their decisions.  There is 
little direct dialogue with the dispatch in the preflight phase.  Once airborne, however, 
the pilot deviates vertically or horizontally based primarily on the PIREPS given on the 
current ATC frequency, with some input from dispatch if there is time to discuss 
options.  Overall, use of data from only the current ATC frequency results in a very 
myopic approach and the least chance of attaining the best solution for the flight as a 
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whole.  As noted in the dispatcher results, this begs the question of whether the overall 
plan is being optimized based on company goals. 
 
9. Versus requests for alternate altitudes, how often (in terms of an overall percentage) is 
it necessary for you to personally initiate re-routes (NOT tactical deviations) due to 
areas of hazardous turbulence? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Average Percentage Std 
Dev 
6 5 
 
Notes: There seemed to be a perception by many in the research community that a lot 
of reroutes took place to avoid turbulence, but the data appears to show otherwise with 
respect at least to the activities of both dispatchers and pilots.  This excludes tactical 
deviations for convective activity, and there was some confusion on this question by 
two of the pilots.  After clarification, they changed their percentages as noted on the 
questionnaire. 
 
10. How often (in terms of an overall percentage) do areas of turbulence that were not 
forecast (but confirmed by PIREPs or other means like ATC reports on your 
frequency) result in changes to your altitude and/or route? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Average Percentage Std 
Dev 
40 25 
 
Notes: This question was misunderstood by many of the pilots, and their comments 
seem to indicate they were being asked in a different way how often the forecast was 
off in predicting turbulence (Question 4c).  Based on the above premise, their 
responses were generally consistent with Question 4c, with an average of 40% and a 
standard deviation of 25. 
 
11. Based on tactical decisions and guidance from ATC in avoiding turbulence on a day to 
day basis, would you say that the dispatcher’s role today tends to be more reactive or 
proactive when collaborating with flight crews to avoid areas of turbulence during the 
enroute portion of a flight? 
 
(Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Pilot  Responses 
Proactive 5 
Reactive 15 
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Notes: Most who answered “Reactive” qualified their answers by stating that the 
approach of the dispatcher varies with the phase of flight and the information available 
to the dispatcher.  Many of the comments indicated that pilots rely most heavily on 
ATC chatter, an approach that does not allow for strategic planning. 
 
 
SECTION 2: Scenario-based Questions 
 
(Answers to these questions were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
categories in the tables to account for responses.  To make sense of responses to Scenario 
A, many pilots wrote that they would explore a variety of options, all of which were 
included in the table.) 
 
Scenario A 
12. A Delta B757 flight crew makes a conventional PIREP via ACARS of “moderate 
chop” during cruise at FL330 over southwestern Utah, and descends to FL270 for a 
better ride.  Due to traffic, the flight is unable to climb again for 30 minutes, 
devastating fuel consumption vs. what had been planned at FL390.  Subsequent to this, 
the dispatcher reports that recent electronic turbulence reports made in the vicinity 
confirm the presence of what flight crews would term mostly light, occasional 
moderate turbulence, but also show the dimensions of the turbulence to be only 80 
nautical miles long.  Armed with this information, if you were on a flight about to enter 
this area at FL330, how would you respond operationally to this information? 
 
Pilot Action/Recommendation 
Higher Altitude 4 
Lower Altitude 3 
Reroute No Altitude Change 0 
Reroute With Altitude Change 2 
Stay the course with Seat Belt ON 16 
 
Notes: Most pilots indicated that they would stay the course with the seat belt sign ON.  
Others discussed alternative options based on gathering more information, but even 
they would consider staying the course if the additional information validated the 
TAPS data. 
 
Scenario B 
 
13. While settling in for a shift, your dispatcher observes an electronic turbulence report of 
moderate turbulence lasting 30 seconds or less at FL330 over southern Colorado.  Just 3 
minutes behind the aircraft that made the report, having been on the exact same route and 
at exactly same altitude, is another aircraft (of the same type and approximately the same 
weight) also capable of making electronic turbulence reports.  The dispatcher observes, 
however, that this aircraft made no electronic report of turbulence while transiting the 
airspace where the first aircraft made a report.  If the dispatcher were to give this 
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information to you as you are about to enter this area, how would you respond 
operationally to this information? 
 
Pilot Action/Recommendation 
Higher Altitude 1 
Lower Altitude 0 
Reroute No Altitude Change 0 
Reroute With Altitude Change 0 
Stay the course with Seat Belt ON 19 
 
Notes: 1 pilot would try for a higher altitude, but noted that otherwise he would stay 
the course with the seat belt sign ON. 
 
Scenario C 
 
14. Due to convective activity, ATC has cleared you to deviate as necessary for the next 30 
miles.  Looking at the E-Turb radar display on ship 3708, if you saw solid magenta 
(denoting an area of moderate turbulence) in an area of low reflectivity (green), and 
your only other option was to transit an area of yellow, which route would you take? 
 
Pilot Action/Recommendation 
Transit Green with Magenta 3 
Transit Yellow with No Magenta  17 
 
Notes: Only 3 pilots would avoid the yellow versus the green, but based on positive 
comments about E-Turb in other questions on their sheet, it appears they might have 
confused the question to be asking about the older radar with the inaccurate magenta. 
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SECTION 3: Historical uses of the E-Turb radar on ship 3708 
 
The following questions relate primarily to any past experiences that you may recall 
having used the E-Turb Radar on ship 3708.  Please answer only in relation to times when 
E-Turb magenta information was presented on the radar display.  If there was never a time 
when you can recall seeing magenta on the E-Turb display, answer questions 17 and 20-23 
only. 
 
15. How would you categorize your use of the magenta information provided by the E-
Turb Radar? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
Referenced: Primary Secondary Rarely/Never 
Overall Value: 1 – Occasionally valuable, but usually unreliable or misleading 
2 – Somewhat Valuable most of the time 
3 – Valuable most of the time 
4 – Very Valuable/Essential  
    
 Primary Secondary Rarely Never 
4 – Essential 10 1 1 0 
3 – Mostly valuable 3 1 0 0 
2 – Somewhat valuable 0 0 0 0 
1 – Least valuable  0 0 0 0 
NULL 4 
 
Notes: The pilots were asked to answer only if they had had the opportunity to use the 
new radar and had actually seen E-Turb magenta on the display, so 4 respondents 
were Null.  Of the remaining 16, a few confused how often they would use the E-Turb if 
available (which was the intent of the question) vs. how often they had used it (even 
though exposure was very limited).  In any case, all 16 found the information to be 
either Valuable most of the time or Essential.  See Chart 3. 
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Occasn
Some
Most
Essential
Primary
Second
Rarely
Never
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Value
Usage
E-Turb Usage & Source
Primary
Second
Rarely
Never
 
 
16. Did the information provided by the E-Turb magenta give you confidence in transiting 
an area of precipitation that you might not have otherwise transited? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
a. Yes/No 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 15 
No 0 
NULL 5 
 
Notes: Of the 5 Null responses, 4 were based on not having used E-Turb as 
instructed by the questionnaire, and the other Null seemed to be based on limited 
experience.  Importantly, the remaining 15 felt the E-Turb gave them the 
confidence to transit an area of convective based not on reflectivity but on the 
actual turbulence hazard. 
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b. If so, did the magenta information result in a more expedited, efficient 
routing than would otherwise have been the case? 
 
  (Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 14 
No 0 
NULL 6 
 
Notes: Of the 6 Null responses, 4 were based on not having used E-Turb, and the 
other two Nulls seemed to be based on uncertainty in evaluating if it were more 
efficient. 
 
c. Approximately how many minutes or nautical miles did the routing save? 
 
  (Answers to this question were fill-in) 
 
Average Minutes Std Dev 
7 7 
 
17. Via the following metrics, please give as many examples as possible of times when real 
time, E-Turb magenta information either was helpful or could have been helpful in 
performing your duties? 
 
(Answers to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
a. Turbulence encounters avoided 
 
Pilot  Responses 
None 4 
Possibly Once 2 
Possibly Twice 0 
Possibly Several 14 
 
Notes: Of the 4 “None” responses, several seemed to be based on limited 
experience.  The remaining 16 felt the E-Turb gave them the confidence to 
transit an area of convective weather based not on reflectivity but actual 
turbulence.  Even so, there was some confusion on what constituted a 
“turbulence encounter,” though it appears many pilots gave the question the 
benefit of the doubt. 
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b. Airframe inspections avoided 
 
Pilot  Responses 
None 14 
Possibly Once 3 
Possibly Twice 2 
Possibly Several 1 
 
Notes: Again, there was a lack of comfort with this question since it asked 
respondents to speculate about a hypothetical.  Nevertheless, maintenance 
inspections are infrequent occurrences, so estimates of savings in this area 
were minimal. 
 
e. Reductions in traffic flow disruptions 
 
Pilot  Responses 
None 8 
Possibly Once 2 
Possibly Twice 3 
Possibly Several 7 
 
Notes: Of the 8 “None” responses, most seemed to have difficulty conceiving 
how E-Turb information could have impacted traffic flow disruptions. 
 
f. Other benefits (e.g. confidence in flight situation, workload etc.) 
 
Pilot  Responses 
Confidence in Forecast 3 
Confidence in PIREPS 4 
Confidence in new E-Turb Magenta 10 
Situational Awareness 10 
Reductions in ATC congestion 1 
 
Notes: Most pilots were enthusiastic about other benefits.  The most common 
ones mentioned were confidence in Forecasts, PIREPS, Magenta, and better 
Situational Awareness. 
 
18. Is E-Turb magenta a valuable tool in Turbulence avoidance? 
 
(Respondents had the following choices for their answers) 
 
Overall Value:      1 – Occasionally valuable, but usually unreliable 
2 – Somewhat Valuable most of the time 
3 – Valuable most of the time 
4 – Very Valuable/Essential 
   
 90 
 
Pilot Responses 
Occasionally Valuable 0 
Somewhat Valuable 0 
Mostly Valuable  7 
Essential 9 
NULL 4 
 
19. Did the information provided by the E-Turb magenta give you information concerning 
turbulence within an area of low radar reflectivity? 
 
(Responses to this question were fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
following categories to account for responses)  
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 10 
No 6 
NULL 4 
 
 
 If so,  
 
a. What constraints (ATC, traffic etc.) did you face while operating near this 
area, and how did it affect the action you took?  
 
Pilot Responses 
Lack of Situational Awareness 4 
No Constraints 6 
Too little warning 5 
ATC lacks E-Turb info 1 
 
 
b. Did you transit this area or avoid this area? 
 
Pilot Responses 
Transited 6 
Avoided 4 
NULL 10 
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c. If not for the information provided by the E-Turb magenta, what routing 
would you have taken? (Examples: Transit an area of low reflectivity with 
potential turbulence without E-Turb knowledge, Avoid a larger block of 
airspace due to conservative approach for smooth ride) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Longer Route 3 
Stay course with Seat Belt 3 
Depends on Radar Reflectivity 1 
Would have penetrated 
turbulence based on 
reflectivity 
4 
NULL 10 
 
20. New, automatic turbulence reports are capable of being presented in real time as 
turbulence advisories to the dispatcher and, at some point, to the pilots in the cockpit 
when turbulence reports are made along the routes of specified flights.  
 
a. Do you feel that these advisories either are or could be helpful? 
 
 (Responses to this question were fill-in) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 20 
No 0 
 
Notes: Comments were very supportive of objective TAPS data, although there was 
concern about the human factor issues concerning presentation, priority schemes, and 
time stamps on the data. 
 
21. Would E-Turb from equipped aircraft be helpful or confusing on an Electronic Flight 
Bag \ for an aircraft not equipped with E-Turb? 
 
(Responses to this question were fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
following categories to account for responses) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Helpful 19 
Confusing 1 
 
Notes: The one pilot who stated that the data would be confusing was not sure how it 
should be presented.  Still, there was widespread concern about the human factors 
issues concerning presentation, priority schemes, and time stamps on the data. 
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22. Do you find the automatic mode on the E-Turb radar (automatic tilt, gain, and ground 
clutter suppression) helpful? 
 
(Responses to this question were fill-in) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Yes 20 
No 0 
 
a. Have there been any times when you took the radar out of automatic mode, and 
why? 
 
(Responses to this question were fill-in, and those inputting the data developed the 
following categories to account for responses) 
 
Pilot Responses 
No 5 
Yes – Confidence check 14 
Yes – Review Vertical Profile 1 
 
23. Do you have any other recommendations to enhance the operational relevance of 
turbulence information? 
 
(Responses to this question were strictly fill-in, and those inputting the data developed 
the following categories to account for responses) 
 
Pilot Responses 
Radar ON Warning on Ground 1 
Uplink Auto Turbulence reports 4 
Better training 4 
Install on all A/C 4 
Longer range for E-Turb magenta 2 
NULL 5 
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SECTION 5: Personal Background 
 
24. How long have you been a pilot? 
25. How long have you been a pilot with Delta? 
26. What is your position on the flight deck (Captain or F/O)? 
27. Please list your pilot certificates and ratings held. 
28. Beyond your pilot certificates and ratings, is there anything else about your background 
that might be helpful in understanding your responses to this survey (e.g. educational 
background, military flying, previous encounters with turbulence, previous occupations 
etc.)? 
 
Demographic Summary 
Average years as a pilot 27 
Average years as a Delta pilot 16 
F/Os 7 
Captains 13 
Ratings held: 
B-737 
B757/767 
B-777 
MD88 
 
19 
9 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
 
 
SECTION 6: Future uses of the E-Turb Radar on ship 3708 
 
Feedback from flight crews on the continued performance of the E-Turb magenta will be 
vital, so please tear off this set of questions, and take it along with you for the next time 
you find yourself aboard ship 3708.  The questions below relate to any turbulence you 
encountered in which the radar either was or could have been helpful.  Responses will be 
collected solely for the purposes of evaluating this new system, and may be sent via 
company mail to Christian Amaral, Dept. 026, or e-mail to 
christian.x.amaral@delta.com. 
 
 
1. Were you satisfied with the presentation/design of the 2 levels of magenta (if 
applicable)? 
 
a. If not, what did you see as deficient (e.g. definition around the 2 levels, etc.)? 
 
 
 
2. Did the aircraft penetrate any area(s) where magenta was indicated?   
 
a. If so, did you feel that the magenta accurately predicted the level of turbulence 
experienced (if any)? 
 
 
 
3. Was the 25 nautical mile range of the magenta adequate for avoidance and/or the 
crew’s ability to secure the cabin? 
 
 
 
4. Did you encounter turbulence within clouds in areas where no magenta was depicted? 
 
a. If so, would you have liked to have seen that turbulence depicted or was it too 
light to be worthwhile? 
 
Please feel free to include any other feedback in the space below. 
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Appendix C 
 
Feedback on TAPS, and Operational Uses of TAPS Data on WebASD by 
Dispatchers, Meteorologists, and Pilots 
 
Description: Throughout the various phases of deploying TAPS on WebASD 
among dispatchers, Delta project personnel obtained general feedback concerning 
TAPS, as well as documentation of times when TAPS data was used within the 
operation through frequent visits to the Delta Operations Control Center (OCC).  
The following logs all discussion with dispatchers and meteorologists concerning 
the system, all known inquiries from pilots regarding TAPS data, as well as all 
known uses of TAPS between June of 2005 and January of 2006.  Because TAPS 
was not integrated into the applications most referenced by dispatchers, uses of 
the system usually led to the involvement of project personnel.  So although it was 
impossible to capture all uses of TAPS among 135 dispatchers, what follows 
would seem to approach a comprehensive account.  Of particular interest are a 
few applications of TAPS data in some higher profile encounters with turbulence 
that resulted in airframe inspections and injuries. 
 
1. Conversation with Dispatcher A 
 
Hasn’t had a chance to look at WebASD very much in the last few days, and feels that 
reports in the vicinity of convection, with the exception of reports indicating severe loads, 
are not very useful.  Pilots and dispatchers know about the thunderstorms when they’re 
around and know to expect a rough ride. 
 
He feels that fall and winter, with fast moving jet streams, will present the best 
opportunities to leverage TAPS. 
 
Also, when he tried to pull up WebASD, an error message about “low memory” was 
displayed, presumably because he had a lot of other applications open at the same time. 
 
2. Conversation with Dispatcher B 
 
Hasn’t had a chance to look at WebASD very much in the last few days, mainly because 
he’s been very busy and there “hasn’t been much turbulence.”  When there was turbulence, 
he would have liked to have pulled it up, but was getting behind and therefore didn’t 
access it. 
 
3. Conversation with Dispatcher C 
 
Hasn’t been able to spend too much time with the product due to workload, but was able to 
pull WebASD up and knew his way around the application.  He also mentioned that 
another dispatcher had helped show him a few features last week.  Otherwise, he’s happy 
with the system and the display. 
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4. Conversation with Dispatcher D 
 
Likes the product in general and is thrilled with the basic idea of TAPS, but would prefer 
to see a way for WebASD to be more integrated into how dispatchers go about their duties. 
 
• For example, having to enter all of the flight numbers that a dispatcher may be 
handling is cumbersome and will seriously inhibit the use of TAPS for targeted 
Advisories and Scaling.  It would be great if this could be automated and 
imported into WebASD in some fashion, based perhaps on the user’s profile 
login name interfacing with his unique duty roster for that day. 
• Also, there is no ability for dispatchers to cut and paste anything from a TAPS 
report on WebASD into an ACARS message that could quickly and easily be 
sent to pilots for a notification of turbulence represented by a TAPS report.  
Additionally, even if one were able to do this, that information needs to be 
conveyed in a manner more easily assimilated than lat/long and a number like 
rms g.   References to VORs and navaids would be ideal. 
 
Feels that integration into GFF would greatly enhance the face time that people have with 
TAPS, since even in a high workload environment, GFF is up as a primary desktop 
application.  This is not remotely the case with WebASD. 
 
Even so, he’d like to see TAPS on WebASD deployed sooner rather than later and feels it 
is certainly a worthwhile addition to the floor. 
 
5. Conversation with Dispatcher E (working Delta Shuttle desk) 
 
Had WebASD available (minimized) on the desktop, though he admitted he hasn’t looked 
at it very much in the last couple of days due to a high workload.  He then asked how to 
display certain aircraft, and how to scale reports.  When showed how to perform these 
tasks, he remarked, “that looked easy enough,” and otherwise looks forward to getting the 
tool deployed more widely. 
 
6. Conversation with Dispatcher F (8/22/05) 
 
During a recurrent training session, dispatcher remarked that turbulence associated with 
convection is obvious, and TAPS reports in the vicinity of thunderstorms were therefore 
not very useful.  Pilots reference the onboard weather radar and tend to be conservative in 
avoiding these areas and/or ensuring the security of the cabin. 
 
7. Conversation with Dispatcher G (8/22/05) 
 
It would be great if information from reports on WebASD could be cut and pasted into an 
ACARS message that could then be sent in an easily understandable format to crews. 
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Useful information for such an interactive feature would include: (1) turbulence severity 
(2) airframe type (3) altitude of the report (4) time of the report and (5) lat/long of the 
report. 
 
Additionally, perhaps reports of moderate or greater turbulence could be extracted, 
translated and sent to dispatchers’ message queues.  This would ensure immediate 
notification of significant turbulence events for those whose WebASD displays might be 
minimized. 
 
8. Conversation with Dispatcher H (8/25/05) 
 
During a tour of the OCC with program partners from NASA and Rockwell Collins, 
Dispatcher H had WebASD available on one of his three workstation monitors.  When 
asked by a tour participant about what he thought of TAPS so far, he stated that it was a 
“great tool” that has helped him to confirm or deny the presence of turbulence in various 
areas and along certain routes.  This has aided in hazard avoidance/preparedness, and is 
beginning to pay off in planning flights more efficiently based on the better information 
that TAPS is providing. 
 
As an aside, given the audience, I wonder if the dispatcher was more concerned with 
helping to echo a positive message about TAPS and its potential.  It would be interesting to 
know of specific instances in which he used TAPS to do what he said he’s been doing. 
 
9. Conversation with Dispatcher I (8/30/05) 
 
As a follow-up to a conventional PIREP of severe turbulence on a 737-800 from the 
previous evening, dispatcher mentioned that, though he did not have TAPS on WebASD 
open at his workstation at the time that the PIREP was made (about 1 hour after the 
encounter), the OCC sector manager sent him a snapshot of the display which clearly 
showed the associated TAPS reports (both moderate – no mx flag).  Knowing how to read 
the information, he felt TAPS would have been very useful in helping him to say to the 
captain, “I don’t disagree with your assessment, but here’s what happened to your 
airplane,” thereby dissuading the call of “severe,” and saving the delay of 1 hour and 27 
minutes that was required for a maintenance inspection.  Moreover, after receipt of the 
conventional PIREP, dispatcher told a crew flying nearby about it.  But by the time this 
was communicated, the aircraft was already in the potential “danger zone,” and the 
turbulence had dissipated anyways.  Had the crew been there 10-20 minutes earlier, 
though, TAPS would have been a crucial real-time advisory tool.   
 
Though he’s had WebASD open on previous occasions, he has not used it much due to 
screen real estate issues.  This experience encouraged him to use WebASD as at least a 
first reference in future instances.  He also remarked that he was very impressed with 
TAPS and saw the system’s operational relevance very clearly. 
 
TIMELINE: The TAPS reports occurred at 2151Z, and the captain estimated his encounter 
with severe as having occurred at 2220Z, in the same location as the TAPS reports.  The 
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conventional PIREP was made after landing at 2245Z, and the advisory to the other aircraft 
near where the encounter occurred happened at 2306Z. 
 
10. Conversation with Dispatcher J (9/2/05) 
 
After seeing a TAPS report of moderate turbulence from flight 498 (PTY-ATL) north of 
Cuba, feedback from dispatcher handling the flight was solicited.  Dispatcher did not have 
WebASD available at his workstation, but quickly pulled it up.  Though the crew had not 
sent any message regarding the encounter, Fred was impressed to see the report and stated 
that he’d be sure to monitor the display for the rest of the shift and, in general, more often 
on future shifts.  He also stated that he’d send a message about the report to Flight 912 (a 
737-800 from CCS-ATL), which would soon past east of where the report was made. 
 
 
 
 
Report Snapshot: 
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11. Email from Meteorologist A (9/2/05) 
 
Email from Meteorologist: 
 
Today is a day TAPs does not adequately portray what is going on.  Only 2 flights reported 
light turbc over the Ohio Valley-Midwest on TAPs.  But there is a ton of reports of 
moderate turbulence.  DL1176 rptd mdt turbc btwn CVG-MCI at FL360 and we didn’t see 
anything on TAPS.  If you check out the ADDs PIREP page, you can see all the activity. 
 
Reply: 
 
Meteorologist, 
  
Thanks for the feedback.  Having been on flights where we experienced what the pilots 
called moderate turbulence even though no TAPS reports were made, I’d agree that the 
threshold for a TAPS report to be issued is fairly high.  We know it’s giving us good, 
scientifically valid information, but because the software was coded so as not to clutter 
WebASD too much, there are some cases in which we’re not seeing all turbulence that 
crews are perceiving as operationally important.  That, I think, may change with future 
installations, and this kind of feedback definitely helps make the case to do so. 
  
Still, apart from the 3 flights you mentioned, I wonder what the coverage of TAPS 
equipped aircraft was in this area.  Also, how long are you displaying TAPS reports on 
WebASD?  You can show reports as old as 12 hours, but maybe some fairly recent reports 
were not there b/c you’re seeing reports that are only an hour old. 
  
Regardless, I think it’s safe to say that even the lower end of “light” turbulence on 
TAPS equates to what many crews would deem “moderate.”  Thanks again for the 
feedback and keep it coming! 
 
12. Conversation with Dispatcher K (9/7/05) 
 
After seeing 2 TAPS reports of severe turbulence from flight 149 (FCO-JFK) west of 
Rome over the Mediterranean Sea, feedback from dispatcher handling the flight was 
solicited.  Dispatcher did not have WebASD displayed or minimized, and stated that he 
had accessed the tool in the past but didn’t know what to do with it once it was open.  I 
walked him through the information available in a report, and showed him how to use the 
zoom functions as well as generally navigate the display to show areas of interest. 
 
He was impressed to see the severe reports from flight 149, and remarked that flight 77 
(FCO-ATL, schedules to depart after flight 149) had been held on the ground for over an 
hour due to thunderstorms in the vicinity.  The following ACARS dialogue ensued. 
 
07SEP1450RK 9EE238  
CMD 
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AN N182DN/GL AOE2 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
NOTICED SOME CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY ON CLMB OUT..DID YOU 
EXPERIENCE ANY SIGNIFICANT TURB ON CLMB OUT..ESP AROUND FL150- 
160 
RICK KNELL/34 
 
.QXSXMXS 071534 
A80 
FI DL0149/AN NXXXDN 
DT QXT AOE2 071534 M63A 
1.␁ 3401/07 LIRF/KJFK .NXXXDN 
YES WE HAD MODERATE + TURBULENCE IMC IN COVECTIVE AREA W 
TSTRMS LIGHTNING. AIRSPEED AND ALT FLUX +- 15 KTS. AND +-500 FT IN  
VCNTY OF STORM. 
 
13. Conversation with Dispatcher L (9/7/05) 
 
While in the OCC, dispatcher asked for input on the following scenario.  After receiving a 
conventional PIREP of moderate turbulence from flight 352 (a B737-800) at FL370 over 
RZC (a VOR located in northwestern Arkansas), he was puzzled at the lack of any 
corresponding TAPS report(s) on WebASD.  He then queried the crew of flight 1409 (an 
eastbound B737-800) about turbulence in the same area at FL360.  The following ACARS 
dialogue ensued: 
 
07SEP1356JC 079933  
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
GOOD MORNING 
  
PIREP PLS. THX 
FLIGHT CONTROL  
 
.QXSXMXS 071358 
A80 
FI DL1409/AN NXXXDZ 
1.␁ 3401/07 KATL/KSLC .NXXXDZ 
SAT -47 CLR MOSTLY SMOOTH 316/037 
 
07SEP1359JC 079933  
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
ACK. THX....JUST GOT RPT OF MDT AT RZC AT FL370. 
  
A80 
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FI DL1409/AN NXXXDZ 
DT QXS OKC1 071401 M14A 
1.␁ 3401/07 KATL/KSLC .N176DZ 
WE HEAR ALOT OF PEOPLE STATING MOD BUT WEVE BEEN GOOD  KNOCK 
ON WOOD 
 
07SEP1402JC 079A39  
-  QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
I THINK WE HAVE SOME REAR-ENDS THAT NEED TO BE RECALIBRATED.....I 
DONT BELIEVE ITS ANY MORE THAN OCNL MDT....AND RARE AT THAT 
  
QU ATLDDDL 
A80 
FI DL1409/AN NXXXDZ 
DT QXS TUL1 071402 M15A 
1.␁ 3C03 1409/07 KATL/KSLC 
/POS IRW          /OVR 1404/NXT JNC          /ETA 1522 
/ENS KSLC         /ALT 360/FOB 0290/SAT 47 
/WND 310030/MCH 80/TRB SMOOTH  /SKY SCATTERED/ICE     NONE 
 
.QXSXMXS 071404 
A80 
FI DL1409/AN NXXXDZ 
DT QXS MCI1 071404 M16A 
1.␁ 3401/07 KATL/KSLC .N176DZ 
LOTS OF COFFEE DRINKERS THIS TIME OF THE DAY 
 
Dispatcher did see some wind shear based on MDCRS data in the area from FL350-FL390 
to substantiate these claims (along with a TAPS report in southwestern Missouri of .090 
rms g), but also remarked that true moderate turbulence tends to be vastly underestimated 
by pilots.  I remarked that I wasn’t surprised by the lack of TAPS data, having been on 
flights when the ride was uncomfortable but did not trigger any TAPS reports.  He seemed 
comfortable with this conservative approach to the initial coding of TAPS, but also 
remarked that turbulence that is even perceived as moderate should be captured by future 
installations since it is seen to be of operational significance even if it’s not truly moderate. 
 
14. Conversation with Dispatchers M and N, 10/5/05 
 
Following up on an event the previous week over southern UT, dispatcher M provided 
information on the amount of fuel required for a flight plan step-down due to a report of 
turbulence. 
 
He felt that using TAPS reports to generate operational efficiencies was realistic, though 
there are process constraints that would need to be overcome.  Usually, flight planning 
below FL300 happens in the winter, when strong jet streams across the CONUS wreak 
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havoc enroute.  Particularly in high traffic sectors along the east coast, the scrambling that 
occurs when flight crews start looking for a smooth ride results in ATC restricting traffic 
above a certain flight level.  RVSM has offered more flexibility, but dispatcher N 
remarked that ATC still gets overwhelmed by tactical requests for altitude changes, and 
eventually shuts down airspace above a certain Flight Level, sending airplanes “along the 
interstate.” 
 
TAPS Being Used by a Dispatcher 
 
01JUN2138BG 079928  
CMD 
AN N3736C/GL TPA 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
FYI DL1248 JUST REPORTED MDT AT FL360 OVER SZW 
  
ATL FLIGHT CONTROL....93 
 
QU ATLDDDL 
.DDLXCXA 012143 
A80 
FI DL1286/AN N3736C 
DT DDL TPA 012143 M30A 
1.␁ 3401/01 KTPA/KSLC .N3736C 
THANKS FOR THE HEADS UP 
 
01JUN2146BG 079928  
CMD 
AN N3736C/GL TPA 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
THE REPORT CAME FROM THE 737 (800) THE PILOT NEVER SAID 
ANYTHING.  I AM USING THE NEW NASA TURBC PROGRAM.. 
  
ATL FLIGHT CONTROL....93 
 
The Role of TAPS in NTSB Injury Accident, DL612, BDA-BOS, 10/22/05 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Delta Flight Safety 
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2005 9:27 AM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Subject: B737-800, Ship 3706, Flight 612, BDA-BOS, Moderate Turbulence Encounter 
We had an event over the weekend that involved an encounter with moderate turbulence and a FA 
injury. Do you have a recording of this event (B737-800, xxxxx, Moderate Turbulence Encounter)?  
Any information you could provide would be extremely helpful. 
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Thanks 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2005 10:26 AM 
To: Delta Flight Safety 
Subject: RE: B737-800 BDA-Bos, Moderate Turbulence Encounter 
An initial look at the data indicates that there were indeed TAPS reports associated with this 
event, one of which was severe by TAPS standards (the airframe was still not compromised, 
though).  I’ve included the flight history which includes the ACARS message traffic along with the 
TAPS reports (denoted by a “TRP” in the freetext portion of the message).  Within those 
reports, rms g loads are highlighted in red (explanation: basically, any rms g value below .1 is 
deemed light turbulence, anything between .1 and .2 is light-moderate, anything between .2 and .3 
is moderate, and anything .3 or greater is severe).  Peak g loads (both above and below 1 g) are 
also highlighted in magenta. 
  
Sorry this is so cryptic – because the event happened over 12 hours ago, we don’t have a picture 
of the report like I showed you on the WebASD display.  Instead, we have to rely on the 
data available in flight history. 
  
Please feel free to call with any questions or to discuss more.  I’d like to learn more about the 
encounter myself. 
  
Thanks 
 
Flight History Capture: 
 
A80 
FI DL0612/AN NXXXDA 
DT QXS PVD1 221815 M41A 
1.␁ 3C03 0612/22 TXKF/KBOS 
/POS ADYNA        /OVR 1805/NXT KBOS         /ETA 1852 
/ENS              /ALT 340/FOB 0140/SAT 49 
/WND 238098/MCH 75/TRB LT CHOP /SKY CIRRUS   /ICE     NONE 
 
.QXSXMXS 221821 
DFD 
FI DL0612/AN N376DA 
DT QXS PVD1 221821 D17A 
-  TRP 180015  38.2070  -67.8358 340 143.8 793 0.425 0.02009 
  94.5 -110.04  1.767 -0.248  0.110 -0.077 -49 00 00 00 285 1 
 
.QXSXMXS 221821 
DFD 
FI DL0612/AN N376DA 
DT QXS PVD1 221821 D18A 
-  TRP 181745  40.1749  -68.9097 339 142.0 752 0.100 0.02035 
  95.5 -115.66  1.220  0.808  0.040 -0.046 -49 00 00 00 263 0 
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.QXSXMXS 221822 
DFD 
FI DL0612/AN N376DA 
DT QXS PVD1 221822 D19A 
-  TRP 181945  40.4022  -69.0292 335 141.8 736 0.087 0.02068 
  81.5 -113.91  1.217  0.835  0.046 -0.043 -49 00 00 00 261 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 221823 
A80 
FI DL0612/AN N376DA 
DT QXS PVD1 221823 M43A 
1.␁ 3401/22 TXKF/KBOS .N376DA 
ENCOUNTERED BRIEF MOD TURB ENROUTE.  F/A INJURED. DOCTOR LOOKED 
AT HER. SAID SHE WAS OK. WOULD LIKE PARAMEDICS 
 
22OCT1825KC 079D10  
CMD 
AN N376DA/GL PVD1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
CPY WILL NOTIFY BOS AND INFLT OF SITUATION 
  
QU XXXXXDL ATLFMDL 
.ATLXGDL 221833 
CC 14:24:02 10 BOS 
DL612 RQ PATCH W/CO DD38 
ATL R SB DL612/DD MOD TURBLC INJURED F/A...F/A IS PREGNANT AND HER 
LEG IS NOW INJURED...DR ON BOARD SAYS SHE WILL BE OKAY BUT WUD 
LIKE PARAMEDICSTO MEET THE FLT...DR SAYS HER BABY SEEMS FINE BUT 
SHE IS UNABLE TO STAND AT THIS TIME...DR SAYS F/A LEG IS NOT BROKEN 
BUT HAS BECOME MORE PAINFUL IN LAST FEW MINUTES....ALSO 2 PAX 
ONBOARD THAT ALSO REQUEST PARAMEDS...ONE PAX HAS HAD BACK 
INJURIES IN PAST AND NOW SAYS IS HAVING SOME PAIN...A FEMALE PAX 
INDICATES HER KNEE IS IN PAIN...F/A HUSBAND 
DD CPY...WILL PASS INFO ON...CLR 1833 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Delta Flight Safety  
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2005 10:31 AM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Subject: RE: B737-800, BDA-Bos, Moderate Turbulence Encounter 
Wow, so looks like the .425 would be severe.  I would expect severe with the 1.725 and -0.248.  Do 
you agree, or have any other thoughts? 
 
From: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2005 10:36 AM 
To: Delta Flight Safety 
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Cc:  
Subject: RE: B737-800 BDA-Bos, Moderate Turbulence Encounter 
That’s correct – b/c the flaps were at 0 degrees, though, the airframe limitations are 2.5 g and -1 g, 
so in this case neither limitation was exceeded for inspection purposes.  This captain is a John 
Wayne, though, when it comes to determining what is severe and just moderate by a pure seat of 
the pants metric. 
  
Do you know if the encounter happened in cloud? 
 
Follow-up from Flight Safety: 
 
Yes the incident did happen in a cloud layer.  The Captain reported that no returns were painted on 
the radar screen in the immediate vicinity.  
 
 
From: Delta Flight Safety  
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2005 5:13 PM 
To: Sr VP, Flight Ops and Chief Pilot 
Cc: Sr VP, Corp Safety Security and Compliance; Director, Flight Operations; Director, Flight 
Safety; Director, Fleets 
Subject: 737-800, BDA-BOS, Flight Attendant Injury 
Captain X, 
(Note: This information is provided per your request to Director, Flight Safety.)     
 
BDA-BOS, Flight Attendant Injury 
 
While in cruise at FL340, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence. (Note: the Captain 
reported the turbulence as moderate.  TAPS defined the turbulence as severe.) The seat 
belt sign was illuminated at the time of the event. A flight attendant, who was in the aft 
galley at the time of the event, sustained a fractured pelvic bone The NTSB classified the 
event as an injury accident.  
 
The weather at the time of the accident was as follows: 
•         The Captain reported the flight had just entered a high cirrus layer of clouds. 
•         The radar was on and no returns were noted at the aircraft’s altitude. 
 
The Flight Operations and Maintenance Remarks section on the flight release noted the 
following: 
•         “TRBC…COMPUTER ANALYSIS USED FOR BEST/NEXT BEST  ROUTE…PSBL 
LGT CHOP TODAY HOWEVER MOSTLY SMOOTH” 
•         “TRWS – ISOLD TO WDLY SCTD CELLS PSBL OVER THE WATER TODAY” 
 
There were no PIREPS for the route of flight.  (Note: The flight was out of range of radio 
communication with NY center and could not receive enroute pilot reports.  The crew had 
flown the previous leg BOS – BDA and had experienced only light turbulence over the 
route of flight.) 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Delta Flight Safety  
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2005 5:21 PM 
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To: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Subject: FW: 737-800, BDA-BOS, Flight Attendant Injury 
Can you define this in detail for my response? 
 
 
From: Sr VP, Corporate Safety  
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2005 5:18 PM 
To: Flight Safety  
Subject: RE: 737-800, Flight Attendant Injury 
 
Flight Safety: 
  
A few questions: 
• Was this aircraft TAPS equipped.  
• Any TAPS reports for that altitude  
• Was the general area TAPS plotted  
Sr VP, Corporate Safety 
 
 
From: Delta Turbulence project personnel 
Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2005 12:01 PM 
To: Delta Flight Safety 
Subject: RE: 737-800, BDA-BOS, Flight Attendant Injury 
  
As a 737-800, the aircraft was TAPS equipped.  Because I found out about the incident more than 
12 hours after it occurred, I couldn’t access the display that would have shown whether there were 
any reports from other aircraft in the vicinity of the encounter.  However, TAPS equipped traffic in 
the area where the event occurred would have been pretty sparse.  The 767Ers coming from 
Europe would have been our best bet for TAPS data in this area, but they most likely would have 
been coming off the North Atlantic Tracks further to the north on their way to JFK or inland towards 
ATL.  So basically, my guess is that there would have been no warning provided by other TAPS 
reports in the area. 
 
However, we do know what the incident aircraft reported, and basically it’s as appears in the re-
construction attached (see below).  The severe encounter happened at FL340.  Notice, however, 
the discrepancy between the time that the event occurred and the time that it was reported by the 
captain via ACARS.  Had a dispatcher been looking at this, and had the event happened on a 
busier route, he or she would have had a real-time notification of the event to warn other aircraft in 
the vicinity. 
  
Let me know if you need any more info. 
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Delta Flight Safety then requested a decode “key” for the ACARS-based TAPS reports, to 
be provided to the NTSB in its investigation.  TAPS data was to be used essentially as a 
substitute for DFDR data, since the NTSB lab in Washington DC would have been unable 
to look at the recorder for weeks.  Providing this data would have allowed the recorder to 
be released back to Delta, where it would have been examined by Flight Safety and shared 
with the NTSB. 
 
From: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2005 11:34 AM 
To: Delta Flight Safety 
Subject: TAPS decode/NTSB issue 
 
Following up on the flight 612 accident, did the TAPS data/decode satisfy the NTSB so that the 
DFDR could be released back to Delta and then shared? 
 
It was a huge help in assisting in the release of the DFDR. Thanks a million for your help.  I know I 
was a pest.  Have I shared a copy of the DFDR with you? 
 
TAPS Information Being Requested by Pilots, DL323, CVG-PDX, 11/1/05 
 
.QXSXMXS 020506 
DFD 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020506 D86A 
-  TRP 050535  42.5308 -108.6953 360 139.0 753 0.162 0.01985 
Severe encounter 
happens approximately 
here at 1800Z, FL340 
3 reports from 
DL211, BOS-BDA 
2 other reports 
made at 1817Z 
and 1819Z 
Captain reports 
injury, severe 
encounter 
approximately 
here at 1823Z 
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  57.5  -88.59  1.614  0.661  0.054 -0.097 -56 00 00 00 257 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 020507 
DFD 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020507 D87A 
-  TRP 050605  42.5480 -108.7702 360 139.0 733 0.309 0.02009 
  44.5  -82.97  1.820  0.604  0.100 -0.089 -53 00 00 00 249 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 020507 
DFD 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020507 D88A 
-  TRP 050635  42.5652 -108.8368 360 139.0 751 0.325 0.02036 
  41.0  -75.59  1.696  0.524  0.088 -0.180 -53 00 00 00 250 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 020508 
DFD 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020508 D89A 
-  TRP 050705  42.5823 -108.9095 360 138.9 729 0.206 0.02035 
  36.0  -78.05  1.632  0.295  0.139 -0.161 -52 00 00 00 239 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 020509 
DFD 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020509 D90A 
-  TRP 050735  42.5988 -108.9782 358 138.8 685 0.208 0.02095 
  27.5  -91.05  1.641  0.540  0.165 -0.144 -50 00 00 00 230 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 020511 
DFD 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020511 D92A 
-  TRP 050805  42.6160 -109.0434 360 138.8 754 0.218 0.02133 
  50.5  -89.65  1.405  0.393  0.159 -0.112 -50 00 00 00 250 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 020516 
A80 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS IDA1 020516 M71A 
1.␁ 3401/01 KCVG/KPDX .N3742C 
MODERATE PLUS TURB OVER KCPR FL320 THRU 380...LASTED APROX 4 MINS 
 
.QXSXMXS 020626 
A80 
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FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS PSC1 020626 M73A 
1.␁ 3401/01 KCVG/KPDX .N3742C 
DID U RECVE A TAPS RPT FROM OUR TURB OVR KCPR.. 
 
02NOV0630DE 9EE119  
CMD 
AN N3742C/GL PSC1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
YES I RECEIVED IT AND FORWARDED IT TO THE OTHER DISPATCHERS 
HAVING FLTS IN THE AREA AND ALSO TO METRO.  MY ONLY QUESTION IS 
THE LINE OF FLIGHT I HAVE FOR YOU SHOWS YOU 60-100NM SOUTH OF 
KCPR.  I GUESS THAT IS JUST THE SOFTWARE ESTIMATING YOUR POSN? 
 
.QXSXMXS 020634 
A80 
FI DL0323/AN NXXXXC 
DT QXS PSC1 020634 M76A 
1.␁ 3401/01 KCVG/KPDX .N3742C 
YES. WE WERE SOUTH OF KCPR..DO U KNOW WHAT THE G LOADS WERE.. 
 
02NOV0637DE 9EE23B  
CMD 
AN NXXXXC/GL PSC1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
WE ARE HAVING INTERNET PROBLEMS AND I CANNOT GET TO THE PAGE 
THAT HAS THAT INFO ON IT.  WILL CONTINUE TO TRY. 
 
It was later discovered that the Delta network was experiencing problems accessing the 
internet this night, and the dispatcher advised that she otherwise references WebASD 
infrequently. 
 
The pilot then queried another dispatcher while flying another leg the following day. 
 
.QXSXMXS 022018 
A80 
FI DL0890/AN NXXXXY 
DT QXS BIS1 022018 M67A 
1.␁ 3401/02 KPDX/KCVG .NXXXXY 
CAN YOU ACCESS THE TAPS REPORT FROM OUR FLT 323 FROM 11/1 NEAR 
KCPR. CURIOUS TO KNOW THE REPORTED TURB LEVEL. THX 
 
02NOV2020RC 9EE11A  
CMD 
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AN NXXXXY/GL BIS1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
WILL SEE WHAT I CAN DO 
 
The dispatcher then visited the office of the project pilot, who explained what TAPS had 
reported with a WebASD snapshot of the encounters (below).  The dispatcher who relieved 
him then sent the following message. 
 
 
  
02NOV2140BM 9EE310  
CMD 
AN NXXXXY/GL CID1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
THE TAPS REPORT GENERATED FROM FLT 323/01 AT 0507Z DETERMINED 
THE TURB LEVEL IN THE LOW END OF THE SEVERE RANGE.  THE  
TURB WAS WITHIN LIMITS OF AIRFRAME. 
 
Bill Watts then spoke with the captain over the phone, elaborating on the g loads that were 
encountered and on TAPS in general.  The captain appreciated the follow-up. 
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TAPS Information Being Requested by Pilots, 11/4/05 
 
At the urging of project personnel, this technical pilot inquired about TAPS during a trip. 
 
.QXSXMXS 041649 
A80 
FI DL0683/AN N176DZ 
DT QXS MCO1 041649 M17A 
1.␁ 3401/04 KATL/MKJS .N176DZ 
NO PIREPS ON FLTPLN. ANY TAPS REPORTS AHEAD? 
 
04NOV1654PS 07993A  
CMD 
AN N176DZ/GL MCO1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
NO REPORTS THRU FL AND SOUTH..DL361 ATL-GCM INFNT OF U –ON SIMILAR 
RTE REPORTS SMTH OVR LAL FL350 
 
TAPS Information Being Requested by Pilots, 11/9/05 
 
At the urging of project personnel, this technical pilot inquired about TAPS during a trip. 
 
.QXSXMXS 091443 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS ATL5 091443 M91A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
ANY TAPS REPORTS ON OUR ROUTE AT 340? WE’RE STAYIN AT 340 4 WINDS 
ALL THE WAY. ANY BAD ALTITUDES IF OFFERED BY ATC? 
 
09NOV1454GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL PDK5 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
NEGATIVE TAPS 
FL340 – AFFIRM – CHECK TIME/BURN AT BOTTOM OF PLAN FOR IDEA OTHER 
ALTS – AS YOU DESND INTO SJC – EXPECT TURB. NO OTHER  
REPORTS AT THIS TIME.  BOTH HIGHER AND LOWER ALTS PROVIDED 
NO BETTER TIME/BURN. 
  
.QXSXMXS 091458 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
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DT QXS ATL6 091458 M98A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
THANKS.  WE SAW FUELS SO JUST WANTED TO CHECK ON RIDES 
 
09NOV1511GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL ATL6 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
UNDERSTOOD – WHEN/IF I GET UPDATES I/LL PASS ALONG – THX 
  
09NOV1518GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL ATL6 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
THIS INFO JUST CAME THRU MY TRAFFIC –  
  
OVR ERN CO-NE NM-NRN TX-WRN OK-WRN NB: LGT CHOP ASSOC MTN 
WAVE...CHOP AOB FL390 
  
.QXSXMXS 091520 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS ATL6 091520 M04A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
THNKS    WE-LL PLAN ON IT 
 
09NOV1609PG 026A21  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL LIT1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1UPLINK.MSG 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
AIRPORT ALERT – PSP SNA ONT LAX SJC SFO SMF OAK OMA  
1544/09-0400/10                UPPERAIR             09NOV1544 
MODERATE TURBC PSBL DURG CLIMB OUT/DESCENT BELOW FL120 
  
.QXSXMXS 091615 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS LIT1 091615 M16A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
PRETTY BAD RIDES AT 340 AND 360BETWN MEM AND LIT 
 
.QXSXMXS 091616 
A80 
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FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS MLU1 091616 M17A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
DID WE SEND ANY TAPS DURING LAST 5 MINS? IF NOT THEN IT SHOULD 
 
09NOV1621GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL MLU1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
COPY RIDES – THX.  NO TAPS INFO SHOWING FOR ANYONE IN YOUR AREA. 
 
.QXSXMXS 091631 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS TKI1 091631 M22A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
THANKS. ILL TALK WITH THE TAPS GEEKS ABOUT THE SENSITIVITY 
 
09NOV1635GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL TKI1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
TAPS GEEKS – FUNNY THAT YOU MENTION THAT.  I JUST GOT OFF THE 
PHONE WITH ONE.  HE DID MENTION THEY INITIALLY SET THE  
SENSITIVITY A BIT HIGH TO PRECLUDE EXCESSIVE REPORTS.  HE SAID THEY 
ARE REVISITING THE SOFTWARE REPORTING WITH ADJUSTMENTS PROBABLY 
TO FOLLOW. 
 
.QXSXMXS 091822 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS PGA1 091822 M32A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
TAPS SHOULD HAVE SHOWN MOD CHOP AT 360 ABOUT 80NM SSW OF GJT 
PLZ FWD TO TAPS GEEKS 
 
09NOV1829GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL PGA1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
I/LL PASS THE WORD – NO DATA REPORTED FROM YOUR FLT.  
Mr X IS THE /GEEK/ I SPOKE TO EARLIER.  WILL SEND TO HIM. 
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.QXSXMXS 091832 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS PGA1 091832 M34A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
HEE HEE .... THAT LAST PATCH OF TURBULENCE SHOULDDA DEFINITELY 
GENERATED A TAPS 
 
09NOV1835GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL PGA1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
COPY THAT 
 
09NOV1843GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL PGA1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
THIS FROM DELTA PROJECT PERSONNEL – 
  
I SEE DL509 AHEAD OF HIM REPORTED WHAT THEYD PROBABLY CALL      
MODERATE TURB DESCENDING THROUGH 310 AND 300 EAST OF OAL....... 
 
.QXSXMXS 091845 
A80 
FI DL0596/AN N3760C 
DT QXS PGA1 091845 M38A 
1.␁ 3401/09 KATL/KSJC .N3760C 
THANKS WE’LL SIT EM DOWN. TRULY THIS TAPS THANG IS GONNA B 
BENEFICIAL. 
 
09NOV1855GV 079A3A  
CMD 
AN N3760C/GL LAS2 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
BENEFICIAL – AGREED. 
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Follow-up Discussion RE: Above Scenario 
 
From: Delta Project Personnel Sent: Mon 11/14/2005 2:10 PM 
To: Delta Tech Pilot 
Subject: FW: DFDR 
FYI, to see if TAPS got it wrong or if you were just being a wimp, we pulled the DFDR from your 
flight X (ATL-SJC) on Wednesday.  I’ll let you know what we find out. 
  
Thanks very much, though, for querying the dispatcher about TAPS, and please keep it up as 
able!! 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Tech Pilot  
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2005 10:13 PM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Subject: RE: DFDR Ship 3760 
Those “bumps” were significant enough that I would have definitely sat the Flight 
Attendants down unless they were in the middle of a major service. So, I guess the 
bumps we BAD but not (in retrospect) UNSAFE.... But, still bad enough that I 
would have sat the Flight Attendants down. 
 
From: Delta Project personnel 
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To: Tech Pilot 
Sent: Wed 11/16/2005 1:01 PM 
Subject: RE: DFDR Ship 3760 
Looking at the data, the first batch of turbulence between LIT and MEM looked like an rms g level 
of about .035, and the second batch (out west) was about .07.  For context, the TAPS report 
threshold (which I admit is high) is .09.  Anything between .2 and .3 is defined as moderate, and 
anything .3 or higher is severe+. 
  
-----Original Message----- 
From: Tech Pilot  
Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 1:12 AM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project Personnel 
Subject: RE: DFDR Ship 3760 
it is DEFINITELY set too low..... i will go so far as to say that you will need to lower 
the values to be success from an operational buy-in perspective. 
 
TAPS threshold discussion – emails from Delta Meteorology, 11/18/05 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From:   
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2005 9:09 AM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Subject: Taps? 
 
Flight 37 today (LGW-CVG) is reporting moderate turbulence at FL320 on TRK B btwn 35-40W.  
TAPS is not picking up anything.  Do you know if this is a TAP-equipped aircraft? 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From:  Delta Turbulence Project personnel  
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2005 9:30 AM 
To: Delta Meteorology 
Subject: RE: Taps? 
 
It is a TAPS equipped aircraft, and looking at the MDCRS reports in Flight History, the turbulence 
they’ve been experiencing is just below the reporting threshold.  The report at 1305Z (made at 59.4 
N, 33.5 W), for example, tells me that the highest recorded rms g level over the previous 25 
minutes was .077.  The report at 1330Z (made at 59.6N, 38.6W), records the highest value as 
.078, while the one made at 1355Z (made at 60.1 N, 44 W – see below) has a value of .081.  I see 
that the crew made their report at 1345Z. 
 
Let me know if you have any questions, and thanks very much for the heads up!  This kind of info. 
Really helps us make the case for refinements to TAPS. 
 
QU ATLDDDL 
.QXSXMXS 181345 
A80 
FI DL0037/AN N186DN 
DT QXS UAK1 181345 M27A 
1.␁ 3401/18 EGKK/KCVG .N186DN 
35W TO 40W CNT MOD CHP  
OCNL MOD TURB 
>I<                                                              
18NOV1355   000000  
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MDCRS report (covering the period from 1330Z to 1355Z): 
 
QU ATLDDDL 
.QXSXMXS 181355 
DFD 
FI DL0037/AN N186DN 
DT QXS UAK1 181355 D66A 
-  239N186DN0037181105135509785 6010 -4396350-24-51227 7902-234 
 62320 
 266 3950081 -634 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From:  Delta Meteorology 
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2005 9:35 AM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project Personnel 
Subject: RE: Taps? 
 
We have to value to show set to .04, but it still hasn’t shown up.  Any ideas why? 
 
Reply: 
 
That sliding scale is somewhat misleading based on the current TAPS report 
threshold.  On the aircraft, in order for a report to be generated at all, it must be in 
the vicinity of .09-.1 rms g.  So even if you slide the “minimum turbulence intensity” 
scale all the way down to 0, the only reports you’ll really see will be about .09 or 
higher. 
 
However, the 767-300Ers and 767-400s were coded so that the highest rms g 
level over the interval between each MDCRS report gets included in those 
MDCRS reports – whether that level is below or above the reporting threshold. 
 
Looking ahead, the ideal solution would be to re-code the airplanes to generate 
reports about .04 and higher.  This of course, has a cost associated with it, as 
lowering the report threshold increases the number of TAPS reports exponentially.  
In the meantime, I’d like to find a way to “map” the below threshold reports that get 
captured in those MDCRS reports.  Thanks for the feedback in any case – I’ll let 
you know developments/changes as they unfold. 
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TAPS Reports Near Report of Severe Turbulence, 12/2/05 
Flight XXX, B767-200, ATL-SAN 
 
 
 
The “X” marks the spot of the “severe” encounter by flight 228, having occurred at FL330 
and 1839Z.  Nearby TAPS reports occurred at Flight Levels 340 and 370, between 1620Z 
and 1803Z. 
 
Email from Dispatcher, 12/5/05 
 
[Context: cold front sagging southeastwards through Atlanta] 
 
FYI the system really helped me today giving very hard info to the pilots out of atl and down the 
east coast at the front passes. 
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Conversation with Dispatcher, 12/13/05 
 
Headed down to dispatch to get dispatcher’s feedback on (or bring to his attention) several 
reports sent by an aircraft he was handling (see WebASD snapshot below).  He was not 
aware of the TAPS data, nor of the ACARS message from the crew regarding the 
turbulence (he scrolled through his messages very quickly, and ultimately I had to point 
out the crew’s ACARS in his message queue).  When asked if he referenced TAPS very 
much, he mentioned that he doesn’t look at it very much (translation: never), because of 
limited TAPS equipage and limited overall usefulness.  When I asked if the reports below 
would have been of help, he said that “Light-Moderate turbulence is an everyday part of 
flying,” and therefore those reports had little value to him.  When asked about what tools 
he does use for turbulence, he looks at Sigmets on ADDS, and pulls up conventional 
company PIREPs in his message queue.  Overall, he was politely dismissive, and while his 
comments can be valuable, his lack of openness and contentment with current turbulence 
information is also not shared by the majority of dispatchers. 
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Conversation with Dispatcher, 12/13/05 
 
Asked whether he looked at TAPS very much, dispatcher replied that he did not, mainly 
because of the extra step involved with pulling up WebASD.  One strategy he uses to find 
turbulence while looking at GFF, for example, is to see what altitudes all aircraft are 
cruising at along specific routes (looking at all airlines), and using that to determine where 
the best ride is going to be.  While he acknowledged that this approach certainly has its 
shortcomings, it’s a display that he can look at to get a reasonable real-time picture of what 
guidance crews are getting on turbulence from ATC.  If TAPS could be integrated into 
GFF, and if the reporting threshold could also be lowered to capture more bumps, that 
would make a huge difference in terms of its relevance to him. 
 
Conversation with Dispatcher, 12/15/05 
 
Asked whether he looked at WebASD very much, he replied with more of the same 
feedback as the dispatcher above (though was harsher in his criticism).  Having dealt with 
numerous other ASD products, he thought WebASD was not intuitive at all and found it to 
be such a hassle he never looks at it.  He traditionally references the ADDS page for 
conventional PIREPs, which is intuitive and “speaks his language.”  He did think TAPS 
had tremendous value, however, and feels it needs to be integrated into GFF. 
 
Conversation with Dispatcher, 12/15/05 
 
In defense of WebASD, dispatcher felt it was not terrible, and in fact, always has it running 
(at least minimized) during a shift.  And while he agreed integrating TAPS into GFF would 
be the home-run solution, he also cautioned that even when integrated into GFF, not all 
dispatchers will choose to overlay the TAPS data.  This is due to the fact that some 
dispatchers are more computer savvy than others, and he said not to be discouraged by this.  
To illustrate his point, he told a few dispatchers on the international desks about turbulence 
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that their flights were reporting (via TAPS) a few days ago, and said that the reception was 
basically indifferent because that group tends not to be as savvy as some others. 
 
In applying TAPS, dispatcher has lately submitted reports of TAPS to the FAA database 
for display on the ADDS page (with no explicit reference to TAPS), and continues to 
circulate information from reports internally to give colleagues a heads up. 
 
As for suggested improvements, dispatcher recommended that a legend explaining the rms 
levels and icons be available as a default overlay for those looking to better understand the 
TAPS information (for GFF and/or WebASD). 
 
Email from Delta Meteorologist, with reply, 1/23/05 
 
From: Metro 
Sent: Mon 1/23/2006 4:51 PM 
To: Delta Turbulence Project personnel 
Subject: Taps question 
 
I had a captain a while ago in the international training class that said the 
instruments that measure accelerometer data for TAPS is never or never has been 
calibrated.  Is that true?  What is the Quality Assurance methods for TAPS 
equipment? 
I know some of our aircraft have bad temp/wind sensors because I get the report every month.  
The reports from these aircraft gets thrown out before going into weather models because they are 
unreliable, but that is from Forecast Systems Laboratory rather than Delta. 
Reply: 
  
Before I jump down his throat, I guess I'm not sure how the captain you spoke with meant his 
comments.  The thresholds that we set initially (correlating rms g levels with Light, Moderate, and 
Severe as defined by the FAA/AIM and FOM) were based on many datasets collected from 
turbulence incidents and accidents, as well as from onboard a NASA 757 research aircraft in 2002.  
I was not aboard, but understand there were some very energetic moments circuiting convection 
across the southeast - so there were ample demonstrations of what rms levels meant in terms 
of cabin response in dialogue with the AIM.  Still, as you know, we've discovered that our threshold 
for Light is probably high, given the fact that many pilots are reporting .1 rms as moderate.  This 
year, we'd like to re-code the TAPS software to capture turbulence well below .1 and give you a 
much more comprehensive picture of what’s out there.  Maybe he'd gotten info from a dispatcher 
telling him that some turbulence he'd encounter was only light according to TAPS, and was 
dissatisfied with that calibration. 
 
This of course highlights the difficulty with all this, since everyone has a different opinion on what 
constitutes the right calibration.  On the other hand, there is very good reason to trust the numbers 
coming from TAPS. 
  
To validating the system’s performance, before outfitting all the 737-800s with TAPS, we conducted 
a very extensive month-long verification process with 1-2 airframes, comparing FOQA and DFDR 
data against TAPS.  That process was repeated on the 763ERs and 767-400s prior to installation 
of the system on the rest of each fleet.  Since then, we've continued to monitor that TAPS is doing 
what it should, as is necessary given the occasional databus and accelerometer issues that pop 
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up.  Also, there are several filters which are in place on the ground to throw out any bad or 
suspect reports (due to the aforementioned databus or accelerometer issues).  These issues get 
communicated to us and Tech Ops, and the bad reports do not appear on WebASD. 
 
Sounds like this guy didn't have the whole picture, and maybe based an opinion on one encounter 
without getting all the facts??  I'm not surprised - I've found cynicism to be the scourge of the 
cockpit lately.  Hope this clears this up in any case - if not or if you have any questions, please let 
me know. 
 
DL 521, 1/11/06 
 
During the morning, the project pilot noticed the following reports that had recently 
appeared on WebASD. 
 
 
 
The ACARS history for this flight contained the following: 
 
.QXSXMXS 111536 
DFD 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS BIL1 111536 D13A 
-  TRP 153509  44.2701 -107.1826 350 157.8 772 0.148 0.02099 
  17.0  -46.76  1.440  0.718  0.104 -0.119 -53 00 00 00 267 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 111536 
DFD 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS CPR1 111536 D14A 
-  TRP 153539  44.2557 -107.0954 349 157.7 741 0.298 0.02236 
  36.0  -75.23  1.579  0.551  0.125 -0.143 -54 00 00 00 255 0 
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.QXSXMXS 111537 
DFD 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS BIL1 111537 D15A 
-  TRP 153609  44.2399 -107.0055 348 157.6 744 0.211 0.02212 
  24.5  -98.79  1.607  0.540  0.170 -0.266 -54 00 00 00 259 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 111538 
DFD 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS CPR1 111538 D16A 
-  TRP 153639  44.2255 -106.9128 341 157.6 713 0.219 0.02287 
  43.0  -86.48  1.598  0.659  0.052 -0.137 -54 00 00 00 252 0 
 
.QXSXMXS 111540 
A80 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS CPR1 111540 M29A 
1.␁ 3C03 0521/11 KPDX/KATL 
/POS CZI          /OVR 1539/NXT OVR          /ETA 1639 
/ENS BNA          /ALT 330/FOB 0257/SAT 57 
/WND 252063/MCH 77/TRB LT CHOP /SKY IN CLOUD /ICE     NONE 
 
.QXSXMXS 111543 
A80 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS CPR1 111543 M30A 
1.␁ 3401/11 KPDX/KATL .N381DN 
FL 350 W OF CZI MOD TURB OCNL SEV CHOP.  +/- 20KTS.  330 BETTER. PLZ 
PASS TO MTC. 10KT OVRSPD AND SVR TURB IN LOGBOOK. 
 
11JAN1545DS 077116  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL CPR1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
ACK. ANYONE HURT? 
 
.QXSXMXS 111547 
A80 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS CPR1 111547 M32A 
1.␁ 3401/11 KPDX/KATL .N381DN 
NOT YET.  ASK AFTER LAWYERS ARE CALLED 
 
The 737 Maintenance Coordinator then sent the following message: 
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11JAN1556PG 042212  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL LBF1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1UPLINK.MSG 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
DISPATCH HAS REPORTED OVSPD AND SEVERE TURB. I NEED SOME SOME  
DETAILS TO DETERMINE TYPE OF INSP. OVSPD WITH FLAPS UP? NEED TO 
VERIFY TYPE OF TURB...SEVERE TURBULENCE IS IDENTIFIED AS 
TURBULENCE WHICH CAUSES LARGE  ABRUPT CHANGES IN ALTITUDE 
AND/OR ATTITUDE. THE AIRPLANE COULD BE OUT OF CONTROL FOR A 
WHILE. IT USUALLY CAUSES LARGE VARIATIONS IN AIRSPEED. 
PASSENGERS AND CREW ARE MOVED VIOLENTLY AGAINST THEIR SEAT 
BELTS AND LOOSE OBJECTS WILL MOVE AROUND THE AIRPLANE. DID YOU 
HAVE SEVERE TURB? 
 
A Radio Patch then occurred between captain, mx coordinator and dispatcher: 
 
.ATLXGDL 111607 
CJ 11:01:23 14 RAP 
DL521 RQ PATCH DD92 
ATL R SB 
Captain:..SENT MSG ABT TURBC/REPLY FM MA WAS THAT WE HAD 
FL350 76 MACH WIND CLEAN AIRSPEED P/M 20KTS WENT INTO CLAKER 
ABT 4-7 TIMES DONT KNOW ABT ALT STARTED DSNDG AT 33 
Mintenance:..WUD U SAY DEFINITION IS ACCURATE 
Captain:..HATE TO DO IT BUT YES I DO 
Maintenance:..HV SPECIFIC INSPECTNS FOR THAT TYPE OF TURBC WL GET 
THAT 
READY 
Captain:..SINCE DSND JUST LCP 
Dispatcher:..METRO SAID MTN WAVES FORMG AND U WERE ON LWR FRINGES 
OF THAT SO SHUD BE MUCH QUIETER REST OF FLT. DL..FL380 GUY WAS 
GETTING  BEAT UP TOO. 
Dispatcher..METRO SAYS AOB 350 IS BETTER BUT BASED ON U 33-34 IS 
MY LIMIT/U ARE PASSED ANY DANGER/CZI ANTICAPTG MTN WAVES 
 
The Maintenance coordinator then sent the following message: 
 
11JAN1609PG 042212  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL LBF1 
-  QUATLDDDL.1UPLINK.MSG 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
I FORGOT TO ASK PER MAINTENANCE MANUAL DO YOU FEEL A 
STRUCTURA 
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L INSP IS REQUIRED? PLZ INCLUDE IN YOUR IRREGULARITY. THX 
 
.QXSXMXS 111615 
A80 
FI DL0521/AN N381DN 
DT QXS LBF1 111615 M42A 
1.␁ 4303/11 KPDX/KATL .N381DN 
/FRM          /   /    
NO.  I DON’T THINK ANY STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS 
 
A structural inspection was therefore not ordered, and the aircraft continued on its rotation 
as normal. 
 
On seeing this exchange, the project pilot went to the OCC to discuss the issue first with 
the dispatcher who handled the flight.  Though he hates WebASD, he likes TAPS and was 
glad to have had the information available when it was presented at his desktop.  He sent 
the following message to the crew: 
 
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL CPR1 
1.␁ QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
PER TAPS, YOUR ENCOUNTER WAS A HEAVY MODERATE.  MAX LOAD WAS 
1.6 G, MIN WAS .5 G.  A HEALTHY BUMP BUT WELL WITHIN AIRFRAME 
LIMITS. 
 
The project pilot then spoke with the 737 maintenance coordinator who also appreciated 
the information and included it in the daily TMC maintenance log (as below). 
 
LOG INPUT 2017E 11JAN06 715913 
3711   PDX-ATL G119891-001 MH-03.0 IMM-             APU-      
DLY       0521   01/11/06     0550 APU CYCLES-                 
IR-2017/11JAN/ATL/   326900 – AT FL 350 ENCOUNTERED SEVERE  
    TURBULENCE WITH SUBSEQUENT OVERSPEED OF PLUS10 KNOTS  
    CLEAN CONFIG. DO NOT FEEL STRUCTURE PROBLEM OCCURED DUE  
    TO DURATION OF EVENT. AIRSPEED +/- 20 KNOTS BANK ANGLE  
    +/- 15 DEG.  
CA-NO OVERSPEED INSP REQ PER MM 05-51-04. PER TAPS LOADS WERE  
    1.6 AND .5 WHICH ARE WITHIN LIMITS PER MM  
    NO STRUCTURAL INSP REQUIRED 
 
Follow-up Emails between Project Pilot and Flight Safety personnel, 1/11/06: 
 
FYI, in case you weren't aware of the severe turb event over Wyoming earlier today (I understand 
there were no injuries), here's what TAPS had to say on the matter. 
 
All, 
 
Attached is a snapshot of the turbulence DL521 experienced as captured by TAPS on WebASD.  
Though in the heavy moderate range, the worst loads experienced over the duration of the event 
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(which lasted about 2 minutes), were 1.6 g/.5 g, for a maximum deviation of just .6 g from 1 g.  This 
is well below the flaps up airframe limitations of 2.5 g/-1 g. 
 
Also attached is a text file containing the raw-format TAPS report in ACARS, with the maximum g 
load values highlighted. 
 
Please feel free to be in touch with any questions, and thanks again. 
 
Conversation with SLC-based line pilot 
Jumpseat Observation, 1/24/06 
 
Briefing the crew on TAPS, what the WebASD display looks like, the capabilities the 
system and the operational vision for it moving forward, Captain gave the following 
feedback.  In the future, he’d prefer to see TAPS reports, scaled to his airplane, in a 
graphical format on either his nav display or on the dedicated radar/TCAS display (which 
sits in the center console on the 757 and 767).  In terms of using TAPS information to 
drive operational decisions and create efficiencies, he was all for it, and said that his own 
threshold for changing altitudes is based on (1) whether or not a service is in progress, (2) 
what his altitude options are, and (3) what the fuel implications of an altitude change (up or 
down) might be.  If there is no service underway, he prefers to sit everyone down, and 
drive through turbulence to avoid a fuel penalty. 
 
For example, he recounted a flight 3 days ago during which there was turbulence east of 
SLC between FLs 280 and 390.  His aircraft was at the flight planned altitude of FL360.  
He said that the airplane was still too heavy to make FL400, and going down to FL280 
would have devastated fuel consumption.  Since a service was not underway (and therefore 
there was no safety issue), he elected to remain AT FL360 and drove through about a 
hundred miles of light to occasional moderate turbulence. 
 
Conversation with Sector Manager, 1/25/06 
 
Sector Manager asked that I visit him to help prepare for an upcoming recurrent class that 
he’ll be teaching in February.  He had some basic questions about changing color 
preferences and saving those preferences for default views, etc.  When I showed him how 
to change the colors of various overlays (satellite, Nexrad etc.), he suggested ARINC 
ensure that the mouse pointer turns into a thumb-like icon whenever it moves over the 
colors on the right side of the “Overlays” menu.  He didn’t realize that those colors could 
be changed by clicking on them, and felt that if the mouse was transformed into a thumb, 
then users could easily see that the color palette is a clickable, configurable item. 
 
We ran into a number of issues when launching the display, including: lack of saved, 
default display settings, “Java out of Memory” errors, being prompted with various launch-
associated windows that should only appear for first-time users etc.  Each time WebASD 
started doing weird things, however, killing the browser and starting a fresh one did the 
trick. 
 
DL503, 1/28/06 
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Captain reported severe turbulence at FL320 100 NM east of EKR.  TAPS reports 
confirmed severe turbulence, but showed that the turbulence had actually occurred at 
FL340, and also did not indicate the need for a maintenance inspection. 
 
Dispatcher shared this information (along with the picture below) with the dispatcher who 
handled the flight, but since the captain had already called it severe turbulence (and 
because the dispatcher who handled it apparently had no interest in dealing with the issue 
any further), a maintenance inspection was ordered upon arrival in SLC, and no structural 
anomalies were discovered.  The aircraft was slated to overnight in SLC anyways, so no 
delay was incurred. 
 
Email from dispatcher to project personnel 
 
FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS HDN1 290154 D72A 
-  TRP 015241  39.8222 -105.6857 340 145.4 755 0.224 0.02062 
  38.5  -58.36  1.485  0.526  0.118 -0.084 -54 00 00 00 268 0 
>P<                                                              
29JAN0153   000000  
 
QU ATLDDDL 
.QXSXMXS 290153 
DFD 
FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS EGE1 290153 D71A 
-  TRP 015211  39.8138 -105.6130 340 145.5 751 0.364 0.02025 
  52.5  -78.05  1.726  0.123  0.161 -0.180 -56 00 00 00 268 0 
>P<                                                              
29JAN0152   000000  
 
QU ATLDDDL 
.QXSXMXS 290152 
DFD 
FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS EGE1 290152 D70A 
-  TRP 015141  39.8048 -105.5477 340 145.6 756 0.198 0.01996 
  53.5  -69.96  1.405  0.700  0.062 -0.088 -55 00 00 00 270 0 
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DL503/28 ACARS history: 
 
(Immediately following the above TAPS reports)… 
 
.QXSXMXS 290156 
A80 
FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS EGE1 290156 M89A 
-  3401/28 KFLL/KSLC .N381DN 
MOD/SEV TURB 100 NM E OF EKR AT 320 
 
.QXSXMXS 290205 
A80 
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FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS HDN1 290205 M92A 
-  4303/28 KFLL/KSLC .N381DN 
/FRM          /   /    
MOD/SEV TURB AT  FL 340 FOR 30-60 SECS. NO ZIPR [Overspeed] ENTRY. THX. 
 
29JAN0206PG 035734  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL HDN1 
-  QUATLDDDL.1UPLINK.MSG 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
RCVD YOUR MESSAGE 
NAME: XXX  TITLE: B737 MTC COORDINATOR  
 
29JAN0208BS 076F2B  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL HDN1 
-  QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
  
ACK TURBC REPORT. . . PLZ CLARIFY SEVERITY. . .SEV OR MOD. ALSO ARE 
THERE ANY ONBOARD INJURIES - PSGRS/CREW? IS THE ACFT OK TO 
CONTINUE?  MAY I OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE? 
  
.QXSXMXS 290212 
A80 
FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS HDN1 290212 M96A 
-  3401/28 KFLL/KSLC .N381DN 
+ - 30 KNOTS/+ - 1500 FPM. IT WAS SEVERE/NO INJURIES/A/C SEEMS FINE 
 
29JAN0214BS 077031  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL HDN1 
-  QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
  
ACK. . .TURBC THX. I HAVE PSGR SERVICE MEETING YOU. WAS THE SEAT BELT 
LIGHT ON AND WERE THE F/AS SEATED? 
  
.QXSXMXS 290217 
A80 
FI DL0503/AN N381DN 
DT QXS GJT1 290217 M98A 
-  3401/28 KFLL/KSLC .N381DN 
YES AND 1 FLT. WAS UP. CAPT MADE PA 10 MINS PRIOR FOR ALL TO BE 
 130 
SEATED. EVERYBODY OK 
 
29JAN0218BS 079A16  
CMD 
AN N381DN/GL GJT1 
-  QUATLDDDL.1DISPATCHER 
** NO ACK REQ ** 
  
ACK. . . THX - MTC AND PSGR HDLG MEETING YOU IN SLC FOR ASSIST. 
 
WebASD snapshot, 1/29/06 
 
Notice the 2 moderate TAPS reports from DAL 1195, made at FL370 just ahead of DAL 
1163.  Just 8-10 minutes after these reports were made (and as pictured here), DAL 1163 
transited the very same piece of airspace as the location of the reports, but no TAPS reports 
were made.  Inspection of the ACARS history for flight 1163 revealed regular reporting of 
“DFD” type MDCRS reports, so it appears that the “box” was functioning properly. 
 
Problems related to the validity reports, it seems, extend far beyond the realm of just 
convective turbulence.  This example serves as a cautionary tale in applying even very 
good information in the ways that have been conceived for TAPS during the cruise phase 
of flight so far. 
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Appendix D 
 
Delta Air Lines’ Flight Crew Feedback on Multiscan/E-Turb Radar 
 
The following catalogues all qualitative feedback concerning the performance of 
the Multiscan radar, and subsequently the combined performance of the Multiscan 
and E-Turb magenta for all entries after 8/21/04.  Each entry represents feedback 
captured via (1) hard copy questionnaires that were available on the flight deck 
and mailed to project personnel, (2) phone conversations with pilots who used the 
radar during encounters with convective weather, (3) detailed observations by 
project personnel occupying the jumpseat, and (4) information regarding system 
performance that was sent via ACARS for review by project personnel. 
 
Note: Jumpseat observations were also conducted between October of 2006 and 
January of 2007, but no E-Turb magenta or significant weather was encountered. 
 
Date Source Feedback 
5/25/04 Email from 
line pilot to 
B737-800 
fleet captain 
“Flew 3708 (Multiscan ship) a couple nights ago from SFO to JFK 
around significant wx in the mid-west; it was night time and the radar 
was needed. I was very impressed by the multi-scan capability. It lived 
up to the billing – much better than the normal 737NG radar! A definite 
safety benefit in the information presented and ability to analyze 
returns.” 
Various According to 
737-800 
Technical 
Manager, 
Anecdotal 
information 
from various 
line pilots 
All positive feedback, no negative reviews of any kind 
5/16/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 570, 
SLC-IAD 
Conditions: 
encountered 
several cells 
over the 
Midwest, did 
not enter IMC 
at any point 
while 
deviating 
1. Both pilots were very pleased with the Multiscan’s automated 
capabilities 
2. Weaving between cells, the captain remarked that he did not “buy” 
a particularly sharp gradient in reflectivity within one echo. 
3. Pilots were impressed by the much better defined magenta 
available in WX+T mode compared with other radar units.  In this 
case, magenta was painted only within the most reflective portion of 
the cells 
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6/23/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 523 
ATL-SFO, 
flight 670 
SFO-ATL 
Conditions: 
encountered 
a few isolated 
cells enroute, 
deviation not 
necessary at 
any time 
1. Positive comments about system capabilities and special features 
2. On climbout from SFO, in auto mode, first officer remarked that he 
saw exactly what he wanted to see on the radar screen given some 
small buildups east of the Sierra Nevada mountains 
3. First officer remarked that the gain control had better credibility than 
previous systems.  On other units, changing the gain did not always 
result in the echoes showing proportionally more or less reflectivity 
4. Painted magenta in areas of little or no reflectivity near Atlanta (but 
did not transit areas) 
5. Even though a few small, distant cells were present enroute, overall 
basis for evaluation was disappointing due to scanter than expected 
convection around Atlanta 
7/5/04 E-mail from 
line pilot to 
737-800 Fleet 
Captain 
I used the new radar and liked what I saw under the conditions that I 
used it on.  I came back to ATL on a day with a lot of cells in the area 
and the auto feature was great.  When I was above developing cells that 
were close by the radar would never over scan them and when I 
descended below the bottoms of some of the cells it did a nice job of 
showing me, even though I was below them, where they where located.  
I have clearly defined cells displayed that matched what was outside. 
 
6/14/04 Crew 
Operations 
Report (COR) 
I used the new radar going to CCS.  It is extremely sensitive and 
displayed even minor weather has heavy.  Had we not switched back 
and forth between traditional settings and the new self scan, we would 
have deviated a long way around weather that was either well below us 
or minor.  Perhaps if we had more information it would be a better tool.  
Overall it is too sensitive (just my opinion). 
6/30/04 COR, 
Flight 
number 
XYZ 
Location 
JAX 
Reference 
number 
XXXX 
 Time 
1500Z 
Actual city 
pair flown 
ATL-RDU 
Ship 
First leg with AC3708 with new test radar. We were deviating for wx in 
JAX center airspace on freq 127.87. Jax directed us to go direct to a fix 
on the RDU arrival. We were painting a strong isolated cell on the 
requested course and stated we could not accept that routing. JAX then 
directed 15 degrees left for traffic. The cell was too close to this turn and 
we said we were unable to comply. The controlled then became agitated 
and asked us if we were using our emergency authority to contradict an 
ATC directive. I replied with an affirmative response. We were able to 
take his original requested course within 10 to 15 miles after passing the 
cell. A contributing factor was this radar with auto tilt. It tends to tilt lower 
and paint a lot more wx than I normally see at cruise. After switching to 
manual tilt with a 0 tilt angle, the strong cell almost disappeared from our 
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number 
003708 
Aircraft 
type 737-
800 
Crewmemb
er X 
Employee 
number X 
Base ATL 
Crewmemb
er Category 
B737 CAPT 
Category 
Aircraft 
Condition 
Safety 
concern? 
Yes 
display. (See Follow-up conversation with captain, 8/17/04, below) 
 
7/29/04 Jumpseat 
dialogue with 
737-800 
crews, flights 
467 (ATL-
DFW), 381 
(DFW-SAN) 
Scott Smith (ATL based F.O.) said that the WXR700 (conventional unit 
on 737NGs) tends to be too sensitive.  Often, it will paint red in a certain 
spot, and when crews have to penetrate the area they find only light-
moderate precipitation.  Interestingly, and in contrast to some other 
feedback received on the Multiscan, he said he did not encounter this 
problem during either of the two flights that he was aboard ship 3708 
with the Multiscan radar installed.  To him, it showed a much more 
realistic picture than the previous radar. 
 
Important unknowns in this kind of feedback are the gain settings that 
were used on both the Multiscan unit and the conventional WXR700 
radar.  During previous jumpseat rides, I noticed the gain setting on the 
Multiscan unit spun to its highest level of sensitivity, particularly at higher 
altitudes.  Awareness of the Multiscan’s automatic gain feature, which 
automatically compensates for reduced reflectivity at higher altitudes 
and colder temperatures, may be lacking.  Further emphasis on setting 
the gain to “CAL” and leaving it there may be needed.  This potential 
variation in gain settings may be a leading cause of the kind of 
anecdotal feedback regarding radar sensitivity currently being received. 
8/17/04 Follow-up 
conversation 
from COR 
dated 6/30 
(issue 
deviating with 
JAX center) 
When asked where the gain was set during the event mentioned in the COR, the 
captain stated that it was at CAL in auto mode, where it remained when put in manual 
mode.  Tom Staigle and Christian Amaral cited the automatic gain, as well as 
OverFlight protection features as factors in the reduced reflectivity that resulted when 
the radar was placed back in manual mode.  The captain further stated that as soon as 
he denied the controller’s clearance by exercising his emergency authority, the 
controller asked other Delta aircraft (presumably transiting the area that the radar had 
predicted as hazardous, though there’s no way to be certain) for ride reports.  All 
aircraft responded that the ride was smooth, and after about one minute of deviating, 
the captain accepted direct to the fix where he’d previously been asked to proceed.  
When asked if the aircraft penetrated the area where the radar had painted high 
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reflectivity, the captain responded that they skirted the edge of that area but did not 
penetrate the “core.” 
Christian and Tom explained that his issue underscores a broader, more fundamental 
change in terms of what the new radar is communicating versus previous radars.  That 
is, raw returns are being replaced by hazard assessments, and the E-Turb will 
enhance that effect even more. 
Assessing the particular situation with which the captain was confronted, the other 
Delta aircraft that were in the vicinity of the cell could have been just above (or just 
past) something that was about to give them a very rough ride, as predicted by the 
Multiscan.  Since the captain deviated, we’ll never know.  Also, conditions were IMC, 
so there was no way to visually verify the top of the cell in question. 
The other possibility, of course, is that perhaps the radar is too sensitive, as has 
occurred in the past with the introduction of GPWS and TCAS systems. 
8/21/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 1062, 
DFW-ATL 
While in AUTO mode with the gain set to CAL, a cell with strong echoes was detected 
ahead and to the left of the flight path.  At the time, the aircraft was in IMC at FL330.  
Taking the radar out of AUTO mode and leaving the gain at the same setting, the cell 
nearly disappeared, showing green and a hint of yellow with the tilt at 0 degrees, -1 
and then -2.  The cell essentially blended in with other light echoes all around.  
Cranking the gain to the highest setting was required to display the same reflectivity as 
in AUTO mode at that altitude, and the captain remarked that he normally would leave 
the gain alone (at the calibrated setting) on the previous radar, adjusting the tilt 
downward to detect the hazard instead.  Again, operating the radar in this fashion 
yielded very benign echoes, and both pilots remarked that, without the advisory 
information provided by the Multiscan's automatic functionality, they would have had no 
reservations about transiting the area where the radar had painted nasty weather while 
in AUTO mode. 
 
We weren't really certain what to make of the system at this point, wondering whether 
the unit was in fact too sensitive. 
 
ATC then issued a clearance to FL410, at which time we popped out on top of the 
cirrus.  At the same time, the top of the echo that the Multiscan had detected as 
hazardous became visible, ending in an anvil at about FL430 or 440. 
8/23/04 E-mail from 
Captain to 
project pilot 
I had the opportunity to use the new wx radar on 18 Aug from LAX-SLC on flt 252. The 
new wx radar is a big improvement over the older radar system on the 800 fleet. The 
auto-tilt feature significantly reduces crew workload in a convective weather 
environment and the wx display is much more accurate in terms of where the actual 
cells are located and what degree of convective activity they contain. The new radar 
provided the crew with very accurate  wx/turb information minimizing the disruption to 
cabin service and the chance for turbulence related injuries to the crew and pax. It's a 
great system and I hope when economic conditions improve, this system can be 
retrofitted on the remainder of the 800 fleet. 
8/25/04 COR (based 
on a flight 
earlier that 
day from 
DFW-ATL) 
Paraphrased from actual COR: Liked the Multiscan radar, and felt it did an 
excellent job of distinguishing cells at long range.  Very dissatisfied with the 
turbulence feature, however, which did not show the continuous light chop that 
was experienced in cumuliform clouds at mid-altitudes (15,000-25,000 feet).  
Turbulence was painted in cells, but that should be fairly obvious.  Did not feel 
that the feature was of any value, since the turbulence was painted only where 
one would expect to find it, and did not correlate with the light turbulence that 
was experienced. 
 
Supplementary data: Even though TAPS software had been installed on this 
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aircraft on 8/24, there were no TAPS reports associated with this flight.  The 
account above may be corroborated by events 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 on the 
8_26_04.evt file from the data logger. 
 
8/31/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight from 
ATL-PHL 
Even though very little weather reflectivity appeared during the flight, magenta 
was painted in one area near Atlanta while it was not present in a cumuliform 
cloud that the pilot felt would be turbulent.  Upon entering the cloud in question, 
the turbulence was relatively smooth. 
9/16/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 340, 
COS-ATL 
(Hurricane 
Ivan) 
Context: Rome Arrival into Atlanta, lots of convection and turbulence associated 
with the northeast quadrant of Hurricane Ivan.  An unprecedented number of 
TAPS reports on this arrival, with several moderates as the day progressed 
(including one moderate from ship 3708 on flight 954, ATL-LGA).  A request for 
ride reports yielded “moderate turbulence all the way in until turning final.” 
Multiscan Performance: The Multiscan automated functionality worked flawlessly 
throughout, significantly reducing pilot workload in some very challenging 
airspace. 
E-Turb Performance: Descending from 27,000 to 23,000 feet, speckled (but 
sparsely distributed) magenta began being depicted in areas of very low and nil 
reflectivity.  When we transited the area, the bumps were very, very light, not 
unlike turbulence we had been encountering for some time in similar IMC 
conditions.  Because of building weather over ERLIN intersection, ATC then 
vectored us 20 degrees left of course, which brought us directly into an area of 
more concentrated speckles.  Recognizing this, the first officer asked for 20 
degrees right of course as an alternative, which would have taken us very close to 
the heavier reflectivity at ERLIN but avoided turbulence (since there was none 
predicted in that area).  ATC denied the request, and there was good correlation 
between the speckles and what we experienced.  A glance at the altimeter during 
this encounter read 19,300 feet (in the course of a descent). 
During the remainder of the descent, which included a few minutes in VMC 
between layers, very little if any magenta was depic ted.  Throughout this period, 
the flight crew and I felt that the turbulence experienced was just as intense as 
the area where concentrated speckles had been displayed previously. 
Additionally, ATC advised traffic on frequency of a microburst 1 mile to the 
northeast of runways 8L and 8R (on the north side of the field).  A speck of 
magenta was apparent in this vicinity while on final. 
Supplementary data: 2 TAPS reports during this segment, both in the light range. 
 
9/16/04    340      15:19:12      34.2183     -85.3631    0.134 
9/16/04    340      15:27:12      34.0611     -84.8313    0.107 
9/24/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 446, 
JFK-SAN 
Observed isolated cells, separated primarily by VMC conditions, at altitude.  The 
captain remarked that the Multiscan did an outstanding job of painting the cells 
as they actually appeared, including the overhang typical of thunderstorm tops.  
Using the previous radar, this overhang went virtually undetected. 
Even though the aircraft path was within 25 nautical miles of the storms, no 
magenta was depicted within these cells. 
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Also, both pilots had flown ship 3708 previously, and were very impressed with the 
Multiscan’s capabilities.  The captain mentioned a flight in August from LAX to 
GDL (Guadalajara, Mexico) during which the new system was especially helpful.  
While descending into GDL, the crew’s workload was significantly reduced thanks 
to the cancellation of ground returns in the vicinity of thunderstorms and 
mountainous terrain. 
However, the captain also mentioned a flight during which strong returns were 
painted even though the tops were well below the altitude of the aircraft.  He 
recounted that the aircraft was cruising at about FL350, and estimated that the 
cell tops in question were at approximately FL200, 80-100 nautical miles distant.  
Even though the cells were this far from the aircraft, he confidently asserted that 
the cells topped out well below the aircraft altitude. 
9/25/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 788, 
SAN-ATL 
Observed isolated cells over New Mexico and the Texas panhandle.  Both pilots 
had flown ship 3708 previously, and saw the system as a very significant 
improvement vs. the previous radar. 
Even though the aircraft path was within 25 nautical miles of the storms, no 
magenta was depicted within these cells. 
10/18/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 1169, 
PHX-CVG-
LGA 
Leg 1: PHX-CVG 
Context: Lots of rain with embedded convection ahead of a cold front pushing 
through the Ohio Valley throughout the day.  Indianapolis Center had descended 
every CVG arrival from the west very early due to airspace restrictions associated 
with the weather.  TARNE3 arrival to runway 18R, solid IMC all the way to about 
800 feet. 
Multiscan Performance: Excellent 
E-Turb Performance: Patch of speckled magenta encountered at FL290 within an 
area of relatively low reflectivity (green), and all felt that the correlation between 
the turbulence predicted by the magenta and the turbulence actually 
experienced was very good.  At first, the captain commented that perhaps this 
area had been a false warning, since the magenta began to disappear behind us 
while the ride remained smooth.  Before he could finish this sentence, the bumps 
occurred. 
Also had good correlation between a patch of speckled magenta encountered 
just after leveling at FL230, and skirted the right side of an area of concentrated 
speckles to the east and north of TARNE intersection. 
Similar turbulence encountered in areas where speckles were very sparsely 
distributed (from about 10,000 to 5000 feet, and particularly around 9,000 feet).  
This may have merely been turbulence just below the threshold established for 
the speckled magenta, but such experiences can be confusing and may 
underscore the need for significant education on the system once it is deployed 
more widely. 
Leg 2: CVG-LGA 
Relatively smooth with just a few speckles of magenta depicted during the 
cl imbout.  Otherwise smooth, and no significant weather to LGA. 
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10/18/04 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 323, 
LGA-CVG 
Context:  After a modified holding pattern at Henderson VORTAC (HNN) due to a 
line of storms over the CVG airport, vectored to the north, then west, then south for 
a landing on 18L.  Storms containing the highest reflectivity had largely moved 
south and east before being cleared from HNN, but lots of rain and turbulence still 
remained for the arrival. 
Multiscan Performance: Excellent 
E-Turb Performance: From 11,400 feet until about 9,000 feet, an area of 
predicted turbulence (concentrated speckles) within relatively low reflectivity 
correlated very well against what was experienced.  Initially, the low reflectivity 
(green and nil returns) made both pilots skeptical about the existence of the 
turbulence, but after transiting the area, they agreed that the magenta had in fact 
told the truth. 
For the remainder of the descent, sparsely distributed speckles appeared within 
areas of relatively higher reflectivity (yellows), and the turbulence was fairly 
smooth. 
11/23/04 ACARS from 
pilot, flight 
1236, ATL-
MCI 
QU ATLDDDL 
.DDLXCXA 231838 
A80 
FI DL1236/AN N378DA 
DT DDL MCI 231838 M27A 
3A02/23 KATL/KMCI .N378DA 
MDT TURB ENCOUNTERED DP RTG ATL THRU 9000. NO MAGENTA DSPLY. 
ENROUTE FL310 MDT CHP NO DSPLY SEVRL RANGES.SEND 2 737 FLET 
Supplementary Data: No relevant TAPS reports 
12/6/04 Anonymous 
response to 
hard copy of 
onboard E-
Turb 
Questionnaire 
1. Were you satisfied with the presentation/design of the 2 levels of magenta (if 
applicable)? - Yes 
a. If not, what did you see as deficient (e.g. definition around the 2 levels etc.)? Only 
dispersed pattern displayed 
2. Did the aircraft penetrate any area(s) where magenta was indicated?  Yes! 
a. If so, did you feel that the magenta accurately predicted the level of turbulence 
experienced (if any)?  Turb was present and approached moderate 
3. Was the 25 NM range of the magenta adequate for avoidance and/or the crew’s 
ability to secure the cabin? More notice would be better.  By the time we were able 
to coordinate, we were in it. 
4. Did you encounter turbulence within clouds in areas where no magenta was 
depicted? N/A 
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a. If so, would you have liked to have seen that turbulence depicted or was it too light 
to be worthwhile? 
Please feel free to include any other feedback in the space below. 
Great to have had the little warning we did! 
3/22/05 ACARS 
response to 
request for 
feedback 
from project 
pilot, flight 
1555, ATL-
FLL 
Context: Ideal proving ground for E-Turb, with lots of convection throughout south 
Georgia along the route of flight.  Several TAPS reports (included below with rms g 
levels highlighted) were made during climbout and cruise. 
MESSAGE FROM DISPATCHER (prior to departure): 
** PLEASE ACK ** 
WHEN ABLE PLEASE SEND FEEDBACK ON PERFORMANCE OF NEW RADAR, 
PARTICULARLY PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF MAGENTA WITH WX/T MODE 
SELECTED 
TAPS REPORTS: 
-  TRP 192452  33.4561  -84.1313 139 145.7 513 0.119 0.03715 73.5 -139.57  1.295  
0.716  0.087 -0.031  -6 00 00 00 245 0 
-  TRP 193952  32.4275  -82.7580 360 142.1 777 0.104 0.01985 75.5 -119.53  1.387  
0.803  0.049 -0.039 -42 00 00 00 257 0 
-  TRP 194052  32.3492  -82.6357 359 142.0 806 0.176 0.01880 74.0 -127.97  1.304  
0.595  0.113 -0.042 -36 00 00 00 264 0 
-  TRP 194352  32.0245  -82.4414 360 141.7 796 0.085 0.01899 90.5 -121.29  1.252  
0.812  0.067 -0.047 -30 00 00 00 257 0 
-  TRP 194422  31.9634  -82.4133 360 141.6 796 0.099 0.01866 91.0 -123.40  1.176  
0.819  0.066 -0.039 -32 00 00 00 259 0 
-  TRP 194452  31.9064  -82.3837 360 141.6 799 0.112 0.01852  87.5 -124.45  1.321  
0.844  0.093 -0.044 -33 00 00 00 261 0 
-  TRP 194522  31.8507  -82.3535 366 141.6 800 0.098 0.01848  90.5 -125.51  1.321  
0.776  0.066 -0.038 -32 00 00 00 255 0 
-  TRP 194722  31.6300  -82.2444 380 141.2 765 0.087 0.01976 106.0 -121.99  1.165  
0.739  0.057 -0.056 -31 00 00 00 236 0 
CREW FEEDBACK: 
A80 
FI DL1555/AN N378DA 
GOT GOOD WORKOUT WITH NEW RADAR. MAGENTA TBC WORKED GREAT 
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EVEN AT HI ALT WITH MIN MOISTURE 
4/17/05 ACARS 
message 
from crew, 
flight 1630, 
ATL-SLC 
FROM RZC [waypoint in northwest Arkansas] TO PER [waypoint in north central 
Oklahoma], IN AND OUT OF CIRRUS WITH INTER LT CHOP. E TURB RADAR NOT 
PAINTING ANYTHING 
5/5/05 Conversation 
between 
project pilot 
and captain, 
flight 665, 
DFW-SLC 
Descending into SLC, in the vicinity of convection, the aircraft sent a string of TAPS 
reports, including one moderate report. 
 
After landing, the captain commented that he was very pleased with the E-Turb 
system’s performance, which he said painted only speckled magenta.  In his opinion, 
that correlated very well with what he experienced as turbulence “approaching 
moderate.” 
Additionally, he noted that the radar issued windshear alerts during taxi-in, and the 
tower confirmed the presence of microbursts south of the field. 
TAPS Report data: 
 
-  TRP 192753  40.1047 -111.4755 189 123.4 574 0.200 0.02676 
  27.0 -171.21  1.467  0.657  0.066 -0.058 -18 00 00 00 254 0 
 
-  TRP 192823  40.1228 -111.5312 189 123.4 554 0.185 0.02709 
  30.0 -170.51  1.433  0.563  0.090 -0.067 -17 00 00 00 245 0 
 
-  TRP 192853  40.1346 -111.5909 190 123.4 566 0.186 0.02752 
  26.0  171.21  1.300  0.455  0.108 -0.120 -18 00 00 00 250 0 
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-  TRP 192923  40.1461 -111.6527 186 123.3 553 0.111 0.02749 
  32.0  165.59  1.366  0.863  0.060 -0.041 -17 00 00 00 245 0 
 
-  TRP 193223  40.3185 -111.9246 169 123.2 557 0.154 0.02822 
  28.5 -161.37  1.398  0.718  0.094 -0.046 -13 00 00 00 254 0 
 
-  TRP 193323  40.3981 -111.9864 166 123.2 541 0.103 0.02811 
  26.5 -172.97  1.243  0.746  0.034 -0.015 -13 00 00 00 251 0 
 
-  TRP 193453  40.5272 -112.0554 149 123.1 478 0.132 0.03055 
  29.0 -170.86  1.279  0.712  0.083 -0.029  -8 00 00 00 224 0 
 
-  TRP 193853  40.8204 -112.0849 107 122.9 401 0.136 0.04023 
  21.0 -161.72  1.314  0.709  0.047 -0.037   1 00 00 01 202 0 
5/12/05 Jumpseat 
observation, 
flight 505, 
ATL-DEN 
Lots of convective activity associated with frontal system over the US mid-section. 
East of Memphis, while level at FL380, passed between 2 cells in clear air.  Speckled 
magenta overlaid red reflectivity in cell to the right (north of route).  No turbulence 
encountered. 
NOTE: While in Memphis Center’s airspace, numerous aircraft asked if it would be 
possible to cut out some waypoints along their flight plan routes, since the weather 
system presented numerous options for tactical deviations.  The response from ATC 
was, “There are weather routes from the Northeast into the West and Southwest, and 
we have been told to grant no shortcuts without first calling traffic management.” 
Near the Oklahoma panhandle/Colorado/Kansas borders, while level at FL360, 
heading 290 in cirrus cloud, a speck of magenta ahead and to the left of the flight path, 
associated with a small circle of green reflectivity, appeared.  The captain turned on the 
seatbelt sign. 
The magenta then disappeared, and the area of reflectivity also began to dissipate.  
Moments later, the aircraft emerged from the cirrus, revealing a small buildup that 
topped out just below the altitude of the aircraft.  No turbulence encountered. 
5/13/05 Jumpseat 
observation, 
Flight 1022, 
SLC-EWR 
Continued convective activity associated with frontal system over US mid-section. 
During taxi-out, ground control advised the crew to call clearance delivery for a re-route 
to the filed flight plan.  Clearance confirmed that the re-route was due to weather over 
the mid-section of the US, and issued a drastic re-route to the north.  Instead of a more 
or less linear due east routing to Newark (in accordance with the original flight plan), 
the re-route drew an arc whose top was at the upper peninsula of Michigan, adding 
200 NM to the journey and resulting in an arrival that was 30 minutes late even though 
the flight departed on-time.  Arrival time would have been later had the captain been 
less conscientious about looking for the best winds and asking for shortcuts. 
Even though the range of the radar extended to 320 nautical miles, weather was 
painted only once.  The cells captured were 150-200 NM distant, had lots of space 
between them, and were just to the north of Detroit. 
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7/15/05 Jumpseat 
observation, 
Flight 1419, 
ATL-MSY 
 
Lots of convection throughout the eastern U.S. associated with a low pressure system 
that had come ashore the prior weekend as Hurricane Cindy.  All descriptions assume 
AUTO mode with the gain set to calibrated. 
 
Climbing away from Atlanta at about 4500’, ATC issued a vector due to weather over 
JCKTS intersection.  This weather was depicted on the radar screen in green and 
yellow, and even though the aircraft was within about 15 NM of the cell, there was no 
magenta associated with it.  Due to weather west and southwest of MEI (Meridian, 
MS), numerous deviations were made enroute. 
 
During descent at FL250 in IMC conditions, a few specks of magenta associated with a 
small patch of green reflectivity appeared ahead.  Though the ride was relatively 
smooth in surrounding areas, only very light chop was encountered while transiting this 
area. 
 
Later, while descending at FL180 and again in IMC, more specks of magenta, 
associated with black (nil) returns, appeared in the flight path.  As the aircraft 
approached the area where the specks had been apparent, however, magenta 
disappeared. 
 
Lots of reflectivity with speckled and solid magenta appeared to the right of course 
during the remainder of the descent into MSY.  Due to a late descent from ATC, 
however, a left hand 360 degree turn was made.  Magenta was not apparent in any 
cells during the turn, but reappeared a few seconds after rolling out and resuming the 
arrival towards runway 19.  No areas of magenta or reflectivity were penetrated for 
remainder of the flight. 
7/15/05 Jumpseat 
observation, 
Flight 871, 
MSY-HSV-
ATL 
 
Upon contacting departure immediately after takeoff from runway 19, ATC issued a 
right hand vector to 320 degrees.  Reflectivity there was green and yellow, though nil to 
the left.  The captain requested a left hand turn to the same heading instead, and the 
controller denied the request citing traffic to the east and reports of a smooth ride from 
2 Southwest B737s that had departed through the area of weather just before.  In 
addition, no magenta was depicted in that area, and as advertised, a smooth ride was 
experienced. 
 
Because of widespread thunderstorms across Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, an 
ATC reroute prior to takeoff had put the flight on an enroute heading of due north 
towards Memphis before a right turn towards the ERLIN2 arrival into ATL.  Heading 
010 towards Memphis, weather was depicted at fairly long range in a northeasterly line 
from Jackson to Columbus, MS.  The captain requested to cut the corner towards 
ERLIN in order to take advantage of a large hole north of the line, but was denied due 
to “in-trail flow restrictions” from the Traffic Management Unit.  In the first officer’s 
estimation, this routing added about 250 NM to the flight, and the FMS calculated an 
additional 30 minutes to Atlanta. 
 
All was rendered moot, however, when a lingering thunderstorm over the Atlanta 
airport and holding at 2 locations progressively closer to the arrival necessitated a 2.5 
hour diversion to Hunstville, AL. 
 
Continuing from HSV to ATL, no significant weather close to the flight path was 
encountered.  The top of a small cumulus buildup with no reflectivity and no magenta, 
however, was encountered in VMC during cruise at FL190.  The captain nonetheless 
elected to deviate around the cloud with a quick left turn before returning to the flight 
plan route, and asked why he had not seen any magenta.  I responded that the 
turbulence in the cloud probably amounted only to light chop that was below the 
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magenta trigger, but couldn’t be sure since we didn’t actually go through the cloud. 
7/29/05 Jumpseat 
observation, 
Flight 890, 
CVG-TPA 
 
Lots of convection south of the TN/GA line, associated with a stationary front draped 
across the southeast.  While deviating left of a cell over Atlanta, windshear was forcing 
the temporary closure of the Atlanta airport.  Thunderstorms extended through south 
Georgia into the Florida panhandle around Tallahassee, then quieted before picking up 
again along the west coast of the peninsula.  The captain, who remarked that he was 
relatively new on the 737-800, was the pilot flying. 
 
First cells encountered were east of Chattanooga, TN, extending south over Atlanta 
while at FL370. Green and yellow returns were observed with the radar in AUTO mode, 
and the captain deviated well left and clear.  In marginal IMC conditions between 
Chattanooga and Atlanta, however, no magenta was observed while flying through an 
area of nil reflectivity, and the ride was in fact smooth. 
 
Several more cells, showing lots of red, dotted the route south of Atlanta towards 
Tallahassee.  The captain chose a narrow passage that avoided all reflectivity.  South 
of Columbus, GA, the captain took the radar out of AUTO mode, demonstrating how he 
would normally use the conventional radar.  Leaving the gain at the calibrated position 
and tilting at 0 and -1 degrees, reflectivity was, of course, significantly reduced, and he 
felt that he was getting more reflectivity in AUTO mode than was actually present.  I 
then explained the automatic gain compensation, and after pointing out the cells as 
they appeared through the windows, both crewmembers somewhat grudgingly agreed 
that the picture painted by AUTO mode had indeed told the truth. 
 
While green returns in AUTO mode mostly represented the edge of storms, prompting 
deviation, only black had been present in the same areas while in manual mode.  From 
the standpoint of an effort to validate the magenta by getting into some IMC conditions, 
the reluctance to penetrate any reflectivity was frustrating.  I wished that, in good 
conscience, I could have dialed down the gain while in AUTO mode to achieve better 
validation.  Still, we did get well within 25 nautical miles of many cells showing heavy 
reflectivity, and, interestingly, very little magenta was observed in and around these 
areas.  One might speculate that these storms were diminishing due to the onset of 
nightfall. 
 
During the descent towards Tampa, a more or less continuous line of cells was 
observed left of course.  While level at FL240, magenta speckles appeared in green 
reflectivity but left of course, 15 NM distant.  Magenta was observed ahead, again left 
of course, descending through 15,000 feet.  For no apparent reason, the captain took 
the radar out of AUTO mode at 8000 feet, even though no cells and VMC conditions 
prevailed for the remainder of the flight. 
 
Once on the ground, I asked the captain why he had taken the radar out of AUTO 
mode, and he explained that due to the high workload, his newness on the 737-800, 
and the presence of thunderstorms in the vicinity, his behavior almost subconsciously 
defaulted to the familiar.  I told him I understood, but also explained – as humbly as 
possible – that by eliminating workload to help the crew focus on flying the airplane, 
that’s exactly the environment in which the automation shines. 
 
Though the Multiscan picture definitely appears more accurate than the one painted by 
previous generation systems, as pilots currently conceive using the weather radar in 
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the en route environment, it is scaring crews to deviate much wider from storms than 
they might otherwise. 
 
Meanwhile, in the terminal area, where reflectivity for the same gain setting on older 
systems is naturally much higher, crews are used to seeing a lot of red on the radar 
screen.  During this flight in fact, the first officer remarked that he often sees a lot of red 
during the approach phase of flight, only to discover heavy rain and a fairly smooth 
ride.  So due to the wide disparities in the picture given by a constant  gain setting on 
legacy systems, areas of high reflectivity at low levels appear to be of much lesser 
concern than red returns at altitude. 
 
With training and experience on newer radar systems, perceptions and methodologies 
about reflectivity and hazard are likely to change, but getting to that point will be a 
challenge for those used to older systems. 
8/23/05 Jumpseat 
observation  
Flight 385, 
ATL-MCI 
The pilot turned the radar on while taxiing out to the runway.  Since he 
had flown the plane before, he was very comfortable with just leaving 
the tilt alone and keeping the gain in Calibrated.  We hit all of our 
waypoints and climbed to FL340.  There was no weather to speak of 
(just a few very small patches of green) until we approached Memphis.  
Dave’s navigation display clearly showed that there was a fairly large 
storm cell directly in the flight plan outbound from Memphis (we were 
about 120 nm away when we saw it). [Aside: the majority of the time the 
pilots has the radar set in the 80 nm range setting and even smaller 
when operating around convection.  They only went out to 160 and 320 
for quick looks at the area].  As we got closer the cell showed yellows 
and greens.  From the outside view, it appeared that the tops went up to 
FL370 or higher.  The pilots asked for a deviation around the cell and it 
was approved by ATC.  
 
As we maneuvered around the cell, I didn’t see any turbulence magenta 
in that particular cell, but we did encounter some of what I would 
consider less-than-light turbulence.  We got around that cell and 
continued on the flight plan to Kansas City.  We were assigned the 
Tyger 5 Arrival for an intercept to ILS for RWY 1R.  As we neared 
Kansas City we could see clouds at the lower altitudes in between us 
and MCI (Kansas City).  As we descended on the approach we picked 
up some greens on the radar and experienced some minimal 
turbulence.  As we got closer to the ILS we could see heavier green cell 
near the BARBQ waypoint and some speckled magenta (about 5 nm to 
the left at 5,000 ft.  We never encountered anything that I would call light 
turbulence.  We did encounter rain on the ILS without any green on the 
radar.  The landing was uneventful. 
 
Concerning Turbulence information in the cockpit, both wanted safety of 
flight information before ride quality.  Dave thought that the E-Turb 
feature was a huge plus when operating in the Southeast and especially 
Florida where Delta flies some flights that are so short you can’t really 
do any deviation.  It’s great to know the turbulence when you have to 
pick your way through the storms.  Both liked the idea of getting 
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automatic turbulence reports that would come up on their nav display as 
long as they could be turned off to reduce clutter if needed. 
 
8/23/05 Jumpseat 
observation 
Flight 262, 
MCI-ATL  
We were given the Lakes Four departure to St. Louis.  As we were 
climbing out past the Napoleon NAVAID, Dave asked for direct to St. 
Louis.  The controller came back with go direct to Nashville.  So the 
pilots selected Nashville as the next way point in the Nav computer.  I 
asked them if they needed to tell the dispatcher that they got direct to 
Nashville and they said “No.”  Dave asked about any altitude reports and 
the controller came back with one report of light chop about 50 miles to 
the north.  We did have some choppy turbulence at FL370 enroute, but 
really no significant weather until we got closer to Georgia.  We were 
given the Rome Two arrival. 
 
About 40 miles to the east of Nashville we started to pick up some nasty 
looking cells around the Rome NAVAID and ERLIN waypoint.  As we got 
closer, we could here planes starting to deviate around the cells.  
Approach control asked us come right to deviate around the weather.  
Both Dave and Ralph really were using the radar to look at the 
reflectivity and the turbulence (none yet).  We were cleared down to 
descend to 13,000 ft.  We crossed through the first storm line about 
24,000 ft.  See WebASD picture below.  The storm cells were red in the 
middle and contained a lot of speckled magenta on the edges.  The 
Multiscan helped us to find a hole between the tops of two cells (hole 
seemed clear down to 20,000 or so, Cells tops were 35,000+ on one 
and around 30,000 on the other).  The pilots did deviate a couple 
degrees off of the Approach issued heading to get into the holes.  The 
TCAS icons showed all of the aircraft picking their way around the cells.  
We could here some aircraft trying to shoot the holes at lower altitudes.  
They kept asking for deviations due to weather (turbulence?).  As 3708 
rounded the cell, Approach brought us back to the left to intersect the 
DALAS waypoint and get back on the Rome 2 arrival.  There were large 
weather cells out our left window the rest of the way in (lots of yellow 
and red).  I did see some speckled magenta, but never any solid 
magenta (centers of the cells were > 25 nm away).  We did have some 
clouds layers that didn’t even paint green on the radar as we came in 
past the DALAS waypoint at around 13,000 ft.  We did have a little 
turbulence as we continued in for the ILS, but nothing significant.  The 
landing was uneventful. 
 
Dave thought it would be nice if the radar could be programmed to know 
when to turn itself on and off.  That way the radar was totally automatic 
and he didn’t have to worry about anything other than interpreting the 
data.  
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8/30/05 Jumpseat 
observation 
Flight 814, 
ATL-RDU 
Near the eastern portions of the remnants of Katrina, there were still 
some showers in the area from a feeder band passing through the 
region. On takeoff the radar was in Wx+T mode and pointed up +5°. As 
we took the runway, the radar showed a green and yellow cell over the 
runway and on climbout. No magenta was displayed. We experienced 
heavy rain on the take-off roll and took off into the cell. It was bumpy – 
but less than the 0.09g threshold. I don’t believe the radar should have 
indicated anything. On climbout a green/yellow cell to the right of the 
flight path showed some solid magenta around its perimeter. 
 
As we turned left in the climb we broke out of the cloud layer at about 
8,000ft. ATC had us crossing a line of convection. 
 
Our flight path was to take us through a build up showing 4 - 5 solid 
magenta regions at the edges with green and yellow regions inside. ATC 
assured us it was a smooth ride. The pilot requested a deviation left of 
the cell. 
 
There was no significant weather for the remainder of the flight. 
 
8/30/05 Jumpseat 
observation, 
Flight 1555, 
RDU-ATL 
There was a ground hold for Atlanta (wx I think) and we took off about 
15 minutes late. Standard Takeoff from RDU – no wx in the area and we 
climbed to FL280. 
 
Nearing ATL we passed by a couple of cells that had heights of about 
33,000ft. The radar showed green with yellow in the middle, and several 
solid magenta “blobs” around the edges. We began our descent.  We 
passed by – still in VMC. 
 
The Nexrad image being captured by ATR personnel showed us in a red 
region – maybe it was below us, but there was nothing where we were. 
Another clear example of how the NEXRAD composite map is not a 
useful or reliable tool (on its own) for flight decisions. 
  
On descent into ATL we passed through a layer of clouds between 
8,000ft and 5,000ft. There was some very low intensity turbulence. The 
pilots asked me why it didn’t show up on the radar. Another education 
issue – not all clouds show up on radar. It depends on their water 
content. There was no signal from this cloud layer (as perceived by the 
radar). Below the clouds the ride was bumpy (light – maybe). 
 
9/30/05, 
10/1/05 
Observation 
by Tech Pilot 
and F/O 
aboard 3708, 
flight 451 
After arranging for ship 3708 to be the aircraft for rotation to UVF (St Lucia) 
and back, pilot flew 3708 and had the following comments. 
 
Encountered several cells offshore of Florida’s east coast and over the 
Caribbean, and both he and the captain were very impressed with the 
Multiscan’s automatic functionality.  It gave them exactly the picture they 
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(ATL-UVF), 
flight 1296 
(UVF-ATL) 
needed with no workload required.  F/O tried to be somewhat aggressive and 
convince the captain to transit some areas of green reflectivity, ultimately to no 
avail.  Additionally, the presence of magenta was depicted in the vicinity of 
reflectivity on the display, but none was transited. 
 
While flying at FL390, however, in minimally reflective cirrus blow-off (no 
returns on the nav display), a rough ride was experienced in the absence of 
magenta.  Pilot felt that he should have seen some speckled magenta in this 
area.  However, the circumstances surrounding this encounter (high altitude, 
no green depicted on the display, in very light cirrus cloud) probably indicate a 
level of reflectivity below the threshold necessary for any turbulence to be 
captured by the system.  Pilot took a picture of the cloud in which the 
encounter occurred (below).  The Cb top in the middle was not transited - 
merely the surrounding cirrus. 
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Glossary 
 
ACARS – Addressing Communications and Reporting System, used to provide 
aircraft-ground and ground-aircraft text datalink using the VHF radio 
 
ADDS – Aviation Digital Data Service, a web-based product maintained by the 
FAA Aviation Weather Center 
 
AIM – Airman’s Information Manual, published by the FAA as a reference for pilots 
and dispatchers regarding procedures for aircraft operations 
 
AIRMET – As used in this document, an official advisory issued to aviators due to 
the potential for moderate turbulence in an area of defined dimensions 
 
AOC – Airline Operations Center, usually housing dispatch and meteorology 
departments 
 
ARINC – Aeronautical Radio Incorporated 
 
ATC – Air Traffic Control 
 
ATIS – Automated Terminal Information Service, updated information broadcast to 
aviators regarding weather conditions and any important Notices to Airmen at a 
given airport 
 
CAT – Clear Air Turbulence 
 
CIWS – Corridor Integrated Weather System, a set of weather products aimed at 
reducing the impact of convection on the management of air traffic in high density 
areas such as the Northeast 
 
EDR – Eddy Dissipation Rate 
 
E-Turb – Enhanced turbulence prediction mode for airborne weather radar 
 
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration 
 
 148 
F/O – First Officer, or co-pilot, on the flight deck 
 
G – One unit of acceleration of gravity at 9.8 m/sec2 
 
GFF – Graphical Flight Following, a tool designed by Delta Air Lines for use by 
Delta dispatchers in the real-time monitoring flights.  GFF interfaces with a variety 
of other applications, including flight planning. 
 
GTG – Graphical Turbulence Guidance, a forecast product available via the FAA’s 
ADDS Aviation Weather Center 
 
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization 
 
IPT – Integrated Product Team, a working group element of the Joint Planning and 
Development Office 
 
In-situ – associated with reference to measurements made at the actual location 
of the object or material measured, as opposed remote sensing (e.g., from space) 
 
ITWS – Integrated Terminal Weather Service, a product that fuses together the 
FAA and National Weather Service (NWS) weather sensors in the airport terminal 
area to provide automated weather forecasts 
 
JPDO – Joint Planning Development Office 
 
MSL – Mean Sea Level, height above sea level corrected for non-standard 
atmospheric pressure 
 
NAS – National Airspace System 
 
NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
 
NCAR – National Center for Atmospheric Research 
 
Nexrad – Ground-based, composite Doppler weather radar 
 
NGATS – Next Generation Air Traffic System 
 
OCC – Operations Control Center at Delta Air Lines, housing dispatch, 
meteorology, maintenance control, and other operational planning groups 
 
PIREPS – Pilot Reports (normally of weather conditions encountered aloft) 
 
PWS – Predictive Windshear, a capability built into most modern airborne weather 
radars, PWS warns crews about hazardous windshear occurring close to the 
ground 
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Rms g – Root Mean Square of a Gravitational force on a body for a given time 
interval 
 
SIGMET – As used in this document, an official advisory issued to aviators due to 
the potential for severe turbulence in an area of defined dimensions 
 
TAPS – Turbulence Auto PIREP System 
 
TCAS – Traffic Collision and Avoidance System, a system that uses data 
broadcast by aircraft transponders to aid in preventing traffic conflicts.  On most 
modern airliners, nearby aircraft are presented as TCAS “targets” on a cockpit 
display, and pilots can view the data to see the path that aircraft ahead of them 
may be taking in real-time.  This information is often used as guidance in avoiding 
hazards in areas of widespread thunderstorm activity. 
 
TPAWS – Turbulence Predication and Warning Systems Project 
 
WebASD – As referenced in this report, a web based flight following display 
provided by ARINC as a platform for displaying TAPS reports 
 
Wx – Abbreviation for “Weather” 
 
WxAP – Weather Accident Prevent Project 
 
WXR-2100 – Rockwell Collins Multiscan airborne weather radar 
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